

MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Descartes to Hegel

ALBERT SCHWEGLER

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CONTENTS

I	Christianity and Scholasticism	1
II	Transition to Modern Philosophy	4
III	Descartes	15
IV	Geulinx and Malebranche	24
V	Spinoza	28
VI	Idealism and Realism	37
VII	Locke	38
VIII	Hume	43
IX	Condillac	46
X	Helvetius	47
XI	French Illumination and Materialism	49
XII	Leibnitz	55
XIII	Berkeley	65
XIV	Wolff	67
XV	The German Illumination	71
XVI	Transition to Kant	73
XVII	Kant	79
XVIII	Transition to the Post-Kantian Philosophy	114
XIX	Jacobi	117
XX	Fichte	125
XXI	Herbart	149
XXII	Schelling	158
XXIII	Transition to Hegel	191
XXIV	Hegel	197

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

Albert Schwegler's *A Handbook of the History of Philosophy* is published by us in two volumes—the first covering the period of *Greek Philosophy* (already published) and the second covering the period of *Modern Philosophy* (from Descartes to Hegel) Stirling's translator's note as well as a brief sketch of the life of Schwegler is reprinted at the beginning of the first volume.

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I. CHRISTIANITY AND SCHOLASTICISM

The Christian Idea—The character of Greek intellectual life at the time of its fairest bloom was the direct dependence of the subject on the object (nature, the state, etc.). The breach between them, between spirit and nature, had not yet begun; the subject had not yet reflected himself into himself, not yet comprehended himself in his absolute significance, in his infinitude. After Alexander the Great, with the decline of Greece, this breach appeared. Surrendering the objective world, self-consciousness drew back into itself, but only with the downfall of the bridge between them. Truth, all element of divinity, must now appear to consciousness, not yet duly *deepened*, as alien and remote; and a feeling of unhappiness, of unappeasable longing, take the place of that fair unity between spirit and nature which had been characteristic of the better periods of Grecian political and intellectual life. A last desperate attempt to reach the alienated divine life, to bring the two sides violently together, by means of transcendent speculation and ascetic mortification, by means of ecstasy and swoon, was made by Neo-Platonism; it failed, and ancient philosophy sank in complete exhaustion, ruined in the attempt to conquer dualism. Christianity took up the problem: nay it proclaimed for principle the very idea which ancient thought had been unable to realize, annulment of the alienation (farness) of God, the substantial unity of God and man. The God became man—is, speculatively, the fundamental idea of Christianity, an idea which is expressed practically, too (and Christianity from the first had a practically religious character), in the redemption (reconciliation) and the call for regeneration (that is, of a purification and religious transformation of sense in contrast to the merely negative action of *asceticism*). From this it is that monism has remained the character and the fundamental tendency of the whole of modern philosophy. And in truth modern philosophy began at that pre-

cise point at which ancient philosophy ended : the withdrawal of thought, of self-consciousness into its own self, this, which was the stand-point of the post-Aristotelian philosophy, constitutes in Descartes the starting-point of modern philosophy, which advances thence to the logical resolution of that antithesis beyond which ancient philosophy had been unable to pass.

2. Scholasticism—Christianity, in the Apologists of the second century and the Alexandrine Fathers, related itself very early to the philosophy of the time, especially Platonism. Then, later, in the ninth century, attempts were made, through *Scotus Erigena*, at a combination with Neo-Platonism. But it was only in the second half of the middle ages, or from the eleventh century downwards, that there developed itself—in the proper sense—a Christian philosophy, the so-called *Scholasticism*.

The character of Scholasticism is conciliation between dogma and thought, between faith and reason. When the dogma passes from the Church, where it took birth, into the school, and when theology becomes a science treated in universities, the interest of thought comes into play, and asserts its right of reducing into intelligibleness the dogma which has hitherto stood above consciousness as an external, unquestionable power. A series of attempts is now made to procure for the doctrines of the Church the form of a scientific system. Of such systems the first is that of *Petrus Lombardus* (d. 1164) in his four books of *Sentences*, a work which, on the part of later scholastics, gave rise to very numerous commentaries. All these systems assumed as infallible presupposition that the creed of the Church was absolutely true (no Scholastic system ever transgressed this presupposition); but they were all guided at the same time by a desire to comprehend this revealed, positive truth, to rationalize the dogma. "*Credo ut intelligam*", this *dictum of Anselm*, the beginner and founder of Scholasticism (born about 1035, Archbishop of Canterbury from 1093), was the watchword of the whole movement. In the resolution of its problem, Scholasticism applied, indeed, the most brilliant, though mostly only formal, syllogistic acuteness, and gave rise to mighty doctrinal structures, not unlike in complicated bulk to the huge domes of Gothic

architecture. The universal study of Aristotle, named *par excellence* 'the philosopher', who had several of the most important Scholastics for commentators, and who was highly popular at the same time among the Arabians (*Avicenna* and *Averroes*), supplied a terminology and schematic points of view for method. The zenith of Scholasticism is constituted by these indisputably greatest masters of the art and method, *Thomas Aquinas* (d. 1274, a Dominican), and *Duns Scotus* (d. 1308, a Franciscan),—the founders of two schools, into which the entire movement was thenceforward divided; the one proclaiming the understanding (*intellectus*) as principle, the other will (*voluntas*); both through this antithesis of the theoretical and the practical principles, leading to two tendencies essentially different. Just here, however, the decline of Scholasticism began: its zenith was the turning-point to dissolution. The rationality of the dogma, the unity of reason and faith, this was the presupposition tacitly adopted; but this presupposition fell to the ground, and the whole foundation of Scholastic metaphysics was in principle abandoned, the moment Duns Scotus transferred the problem of theology to the practical sphere. With the separation of theory and practice, and still more with the separation in nominalism (see 3) of thought and thing, philosophy became divided from theology, reason from faith: reason took position above faith, above authority (Modern Philosophy), and the religious consciousness broke with the traditional dogma (the Reformation).

3. Nominalism and Realism—Hand in hand with the development of Scholasticism in general, proceeded that of the antithesis between *nominalism* and *realism*, an antithesis the origin of which is to be found in the relation of Scholasticism to the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. The nominalists were those who held universal notions (*universalia*) to be mere names, *flatus vocis*, empty conceptions without reality. With nominalism, there are no general notions, no *genera*, no *species*: all that is, exists only as a singular in its pure individuality; and there is no such thing as pure thought, but only natural conception and sensuous perception. The realists again, by example of

Plato, held firm by the objective reality of the universals (*universalia ante res*). The antithesis of these opinions took form first as between *Roscelinus* and *Anselm*, the former as nominalist, the later as realist; and it continues henceforth throughout the whole course of Scholasticism. There began, however, as early as *Abelard* (b. 1079) an intermediate theory as well nominalistic as realistic, which after him, with unimportant modifications, remained, on the whole, the dominant one (*universalia in rebus*). In this view the universal is only conceived, only thought, but even so it is no mere product of consciousness; no, it possesses also objective reality in the things themselves, nor could it be abstracted from them, unless it were virtually contained in them. This identity of being and of thought is the presupposition and foundation on which the entire dialectic industry of the Scholastics rests. All their arguments found on the assumption that whatever is syllogistically proved has exactly the same constitution in actuality that it has in logical thought. If this presupposition fell, there fell with it the whole basis of Scholasticism; leaving nothing for thought—thus at fault as regards its own objectivity—but to withdraw into its own self. In effect this self-produced dissolution of Scholasticism made its appearance in *William Ockam* (d. 1347), the widely-influential reviver of nominalism, which, powerful in the very beginning of Scholasticism, and now more powerful as opposed to a form of thought that was no longer growing but exhausted, withdrew the foundations from the whole structure of scholastic dogmatism and plunged it hopelessly in ruin.

II. TRANSITION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY

The struggle of the new philosophy with scholasticism, protracted throughout the entire fifteenth century in a series of intermediate events, reaches its termination negatively in the course of the sixteenth, and positively in the first half of the seventeenth century.

I. The Fall of Scholasticism—The proximate cause of this altered spirit of the time we have just seen : it is the internal

decline of scholasticism itself. As soon as the tacit presupposition, which underlay the theology and whole method of scholasticism,—the rationality of the dogma, namely, or the applicability of scientific demonstration to the matter of revelation,—was broken up, the entire structure, as already remarked, fell helplessly to the ground. The conception directly opposed to the principle of scholasticism, that it was possible for the same thing to be at once true to the dogma and false or at least indemonstrable to reason,—a point of view applied by the Aristotelian *Pomponatius* (1462-1530) to the immortality of the soul, and later by *Vanini* (see below) to the great problems of philosophy,—became, however much it was resisted by the church, ever more and more universal, and brought with it a conviction of the impossibility of reconciling reason and revelation. The feeling that philosophy must be emancipated from its previous state of pupilage and servitude strengthened : a struggle towards greater independency of research awoke; and, though none durst turn as yet against the church itself, attempts were made to shake the authority of the main pillar of scholasticism, the philosophy of Aristotle, or what was then considered such. (Particularly distinguished here was *Petrus Romus*, 1515-1572, massacred on the Eve of St. Bartholomew). The authority of the church declined more and more in the opinion of the nations, and the great systems of scholasticism ceased to be continued.

2. Results of Scholasticism—Notwithstanding all this, scholasticism was not without excellent results. Although completely in the service of the church, it originated in a scientific interest, and awoke consequently the spirit of free inquiry and a love of knowledge. It converted objects of faith into objects of thought; raised men from the sphere of unconditional belief into the sphere of doubt, of search, of understanding; and even when it sought to establish by argument the authority of faith, it was really establishing, contrary to its own knowledge and will, the authority of reason : it brought thus another principle into the world, different from that of the ancient church, the principle of intellect, the self-consciousness of reason; or at least

it prepared the way for the triumph of this principle. The very defects of the scholastics, their many absurd questions, their thousandfold useless and arbitrary distinctions, their *curiosities* and *subtilties*, must be attributed to a rational principle, to the spirit of inquiry, the longing for light, which, oppressed by the authority of the church, was able to express itself only so, and not otherwise. Only when left behind by the advancing intelligence of the time, did scholasticism become untrue to its original import, and unite its interests with those of the church, exhibiting itself then, indeed, as the most violent opponent of the new and better spirit.

3. The Revival of Letters—A chief instrument of that change in the spirit of the time, which marks the beginning of a new epoch for philosophy, was the revival of classical literature. The study of the ancients, especially of the Greeks, had, in the course of the middle ages, ceased to be cultivated. The philosophy of Plato and of Aristotle was, for the most part, known only through Latin translations or secondary sources. All sense for beauty of form or taste in expression had died out. Of the spirit of classical life there was not left even a dream. But this was altered now, chiefly by the arrival in Italy of certain learned Greeks, fugitives from Constantinople. Under their influence the study of the ancients in the original sources came again into vogue; the newly discovered printing-press multiplied copies of the classics; the Medici drew scholars to their court; in particular *Bessarion* (d.1472) and *Ficinus* (d.1499) were influential in bringing about a better acquaintance with ancient philosophy. And so gradually a band of men classically educated opposed itself to the stereotyped, uncritical, tasteless manner in which the sciences had been hitherto cultivated; new ideas came into circulation; and the free, universal, thinking spirit of antiquity was born afresh. Classical studies found a fruitful soil in Germany also. *Reuchlin* (b. 1455), *Melancthon*, and *Erasmus* were their advocates; and the humanistic party, in its hostility to the scholastic aims, belonged to the most decided influences that were now in favour of the advancing cause of the Reformation.

4. The Reformation—All the new elements—the struggle against scholasticism, the interests of letters, the striving for national independency, the endeavours of the state and the corporations to emancipate themselves from the church and the hierarchy, the direction of men's minds to nature and actuality, above all the longing on the part of consciousness for autonomy, for freedom from the fetters of authority—all these elements found their rallying-point and their focus in the German Reformation. Originating primarily in national interests and interests of religious practice, falling early too into an erroneous course, and issuing in a dogmatic ecclesiastical one-sidedness, the Reformation was still in its principle and genuine consequences a rupture of thought with authority, a protest against the shackles of the *positive*, a return of consciousness from its self-alienation into itself. Thought returned from the yonder to the here, from the extra-mundane to the intra-mundane : nature and the moral laws of nature, humanity as a such, one's own heart, one's own conscience, subjective conviction, in short, the rights of the subject began at last to assume some value. Marriage, if considered hitherto not indeed immoral, but yet inferior to self-denial and celibacy, appeared now as something divine, as a law of nature imposed by God himself. Poverty, too, appeared no longer an object in itself; though previously considered superior to riches, and though the contemplative life of the monk had hitherto ranked higher than the worldly activity of the layman supported by the labour of his hands. Religious freedom assumed the place of obedience (the third vow of the church) : monkhood and priesthood had come to an end. In the same way, with reference to knowledge, man returned to himself from the alien region of authority. He had become convinced that within himself must the entire work of salvation be accomplished; that reconciliation and grace were his own business, and independent of the interposition of priests; that he stood to God in a direct relation. In his belief, in his conviction, in the depths of his own soul, he found his only true being. As then Protestantism sprang from the same spirit as the new philosophy, it presupposes the closest connexion with

this latter. Naturally, however, there will be a special distinction between the manner in which the new spirit realizes itself as religious principle, and that in which it realizes itself as scientific principle. But, as said, in both, in the Protestantism of religion as well as in the Protestantism of reason, this principle is one and the same; and in the progress of history both interests are found to advance hand in hand. For, the reduction of religion to its simple elements (a reduction which Protestantism had once for all begun, but which it had only carried forward to the Bible, and there left), must of necessity be continued farther, and closed only with the ultimate, original, supra-historical elements,—that is, with reason. Reason that knows itself the source of all philosophy as of all religion.

5. The Growth of the Natural Sciences—To all these movements, which are to be regarded not only as signs and symptoms, but as causes of the various revolutions of the epoch, there is yet another to be added, which very much facilitated and assisted the emancipation of philosophy from the fetters of the church, and that is, the coming into existence of natural science, and of the observation of nature by the method of experience. It is an epoch of the most penetrating and fruitful discoveries in the province of nature. The discovery of America and that of the maritime route to the Eastern Indies, had already widened the visible horizon; but still greater revolutions are associated with the names of *Copernicus* (d. 1543), and *Kepler* (d. 1631), and *Galileo* (d. 1642),—revolutions which could not possibly remain without influence on the prevalent idea of the universe, and the entire mode of thought of the time, and which more especially produced a mighty inroad on the authority of the church. Scholasticism, withdrawn from nature and the world of experience, blind to that which lay at its feet, had lived in a dreamlike intellectualism; but nature was restored to honour now, and became, in her majesty and her glory, in her fulness and her endlessness, again the immediate object of contemplation; while natural investigation demonstrated itself as an essential object of philosophy, and empirical science consequently as a universal human interest. From this epoch empirical

science dates its historical importance; and only from this epoch does it possess a continuous history. The consequences of the new movement admit of an easy estimate. Scientific inquiry not only destroyed a variety of transmitted errors and prejudices, but, what was highly important, it turned the thoughts and attention of men to the mundane, to the actual; fostering and encouraging the habit of reflection, the feeling of self-dependence, the awakened spirit of scrutiny and doubt. The position of a science of observation and experiment presupposes an independent self-consciousness on the part of the individual, a wrestling of himself loose from authority and the creed of authority,—in a word, it presupposes scepticism. Hence the originators of modern philosophy, *Bacon* and *Descartes*, began with scepticism; the former in requiring an abstraction from all prejudices and preconceived opinions as condition of the study of nature, and the latter in his postulate, to doubt at first all. No wonder that between natural science and ecclesiastic orthodoxy there presently broke out an envenomed struggle,—a struggle which was to cease only with the overthrow of the latter.

6. *Bacon of Verulam*.—The philosopher who, for principle, consciously adopted experience, or an observing and experimenting investigation of nature, and that, too, in express contrast to scholasticism and the previous method of science, and who, on that account, is frequently placed at the head of modern philosophy, is (the just named) *Bacon*, Baron of Verulam (b. 1561, Lord-Keeper of the Great Seal, and Lord Chancellor under James I., subsequently disgraced, d. 1626—a man not without weaknesses of character).

The sciences, says *Bacon*, have hitherto found themselves in a most deplorable condition. Philosophy, lost in barren and fruitless logomachies, has, during so many centuries, produced not a single work or experiment capable of bringing any actual advantage to the life of the race. Logic hitherto has subserved rather the confirmation of error than the investigation of truth. How is this? From what does this poverty of the sciences in

the past proceed ? From this, that they have been separated from their root in nature and experience. Several causes are responsible for this : first, the old and inveterate prejudice that man would derogate from his own dignity, did he occupy himself much or long with experiments and the things of matter; secondly, superstition, and the blind fanaticism of religion, which in every age has proved itself the irreconcilable foe to natural science; thirdly, the exclusive attention of the Romans to morals and politics, and of the better heads among Christians to these and to theology; fourthly, the veneration of antiquity and the overwhelming authority of certain philosophers; lastly, a certain despondency and despair of being able to overcome the many and great difficulties which oppose themselves to the investigation of nature. To all these causes the depression of the sciences is to be traced. What is wanted now, then, is a thorough renewal, regeneration, and reformation of the sciences from their lowest foundations upwards : we must find at all costs, a new basis of knowledge, new principles of science. This reformation and radical cure of the sciences is dependent on two conditions : objectively, on the reduction of science to experience and the study of nature; subjectively, on the purification of the mind and intellect from all abstract theories and transmitted prejudices. These conditions united yield the true method of natural science, which is no other than the method of induction. On correct induction depends the salvation of science.

Bacon's philosophy is comprised in these propositions. His historical import, then, is in general this, that he directed anew the observation and reflection of his contemporaries to actual fact, proximately to nature; that he raised experience, which hitherto had been only matter of chance, into a separate and independent object of thought; and that he awoke a general consciousness of its indispensable necessity. To have established the principle of empirical science, of a thinking exploration of nature, this is his merit. But still only in the proposing of this *principle* does his import lie : of any *contained matter* of the Baconian philosophy, we can, in rigour, not speak; although he

has attempted (in his work *De Augmentis Scientiarum*), a systematic encyclopædia of the sciences on a new principle of classification, and his scattered through his writings a profusion of fine and fertile observations (which are still in vogue for mottoes).

7. The Italian Philosophers of the Transition Period.—With Bacon there must be mentioned some others who prepared the way for the introduction of the new philosophy. First of all a series of Italian philosophers who belonged to the second half of sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century. With the tendencies of the period already described, these philosophers cohere in two ways: firstly, in their enthusiasm for nature, an enthusiasm which, with all of them, has more or less of a pantheistic character (Vanini, for example, entitled one of his writings, 'Of the wonderful Secrets of the Queen and Goddess of Mortals, Nature'), and secondly, in their devotion to the ancient systems of philosophy. The best known of them are these: *Cardan* (1501-1575), *Campanella* (1568-1639), *Giordano Bruno* (-1600), *Vanini* (1586-1619). They were all men of passionate, enthusiastic, impetuous nature; wild, unsettled character; roving and adventurous life: men animated by an intense thirst for knowledge, but who gave way withal to extravagant wildness of imagination, and to a mania for secret astrological and geomantic arts; on which account they passed away without leaving any fruitful or enduring result. They were all persecuted by the hierarchy; two of them (Bruno and Vanini) perished at the stake. In their entire historical appearance they are, like the eruptions of a volcano, rather precursors and prophets, than originators and founders of a new era of philosophy.

The most important of them is *Giordano Bruno*. He revived the old (Stoic) idea, that the world is a living being, and that a single soul pervades the universe. The burthen of all his thoughts is the deepest enthusiasm for nature, and for the reason which lives and works in nature. This reason, according to him, is the artificer within, who fashions matter, and reveals himself in the shapes of the world. Out from the interior of the root, or of the seed-grain, he causes the stems to spring, from these the branches, from the branches boughs, and so on

to buds and leaves and flowers. All is inwardly planned, prepared, and perfected. In the same way does this universal reason, from its place within, recall the sap from the fruits and the blossoms, to the branches, etc., again. The world is thus an infinite animal in which all lives and moves in the most varied manner. Bruno characterizes the relation of reason to matter quite in the Aristotelian way : they are to each other as form and matter, as actuality and potentiality; neither is without the other; form is the internal impelling power of matter, matter as infinite possibility, as infinity formable, is the mother of all forms. The other side of Bruno's philosophizing, his theory of the forms of knowledge (Topic), which takes up the greater part of his writings, as of smaller philosophical value, shall be here omitted.

8. Jacob Bohm.—Like Bacon in England, and Bruno in Italy, Bohm bespeaks in Germany the same movement of transition that is now before us. Each of the three in a manner that is characteristic of his nationality : Bacon as champion of empiricism, Bruno as representative of a poetic pantheism, Bohm as father of theosophical mysticism. In depth of principle, Bohm belongs to a much later period; but in imperfection of form he retrocedes to the time of the middle-age mystics; while, in an historicogenetic point of view, again, he is connected with the German Reformation and the various Protestant elements at that time in ferment. We shall best place him among the precursors and prophets of the new era.

Jacob Bohm was born in 1575, at Altseidenburg, not far from Gorlitz, in Upper Lusatia. His parents were poor country-people. When a boy he herded the cattle; when older, and after he had learned in the village school to read and barely write, he was apprenticed to a shoe-maker in Gorlitz; and finally, having accomplished his travels as journeyman, he settled down, in 1594, at Gorlitz, as master of his trade. He had experienced revelations or mysterious visions even in his youth, but still more at a later period, when the longing for truth took possession of him, and his soul, already disquieted by the religious conflicts of the time, found itself in a state of highly-wrou-

ght excitement. Besides the Bible, Bohm had read only a few mystic books of theosophic and alchemistic import, for example, those of Paracelsus. Now, then, that he set himself to the writing down of his thoughts, or, as he called them, his visions (illuminations), the want of all previous culture at once disclosed itself. Hence the painful struggling of the thought with the expression, which not unfrequently, nevertheless, attains to dialectic point and poetic beauty. In consequence of his first work *Aurora*, composed in the year 1612, Bohm fell into trouble with the rector at Gorlitz, Gregorius Richter, who publicly denounced the book from the pulpit, and even reviled the person of its author. He was prohibited by the magistrates from the writing of books, an interdict which he observed for years, till at length the edict of the spirit became all too strong in him, and he resumed composition. Bohm was a plain, quiet, gentle, and modest man. He died in 1624.

It is exceedingly difficult to give in a few words any statement of the theosophy of Bohm, inasmuch as Bohm, has been able to give birth to his thoughts, not in the form of thoughts, but in that of sensuous figures, of obscure images of nature, and for the expression of them has frequently availed himself of the strangest and most arbitrary expedients. There reigns in his writings a twilight, so to speak, as in a Gothic dome, into which the light falls through windows variously stained. Hence the magical effect which he produces on many minds. The main thought of Bohm's philosophizing is this : that self-distinction, inner diremption, is the essential character of spirit, and consequently of God, so far as God is to be conceived as spirit. To Bohm God is a living spirit only if, and so far as, he comprehends within himself difference from himself, and through this other, this difference within himself, is manifest, is an object, is a cognising consciousness. The difference of God in God is alone the source of his and of all actusity and spontaneity, the spring and jet of self-actuating life, that out of its own self creates and produces consciousness. Bohm is exhaustless in metaphors to render intelligible this negativity in God, this self-differentiation and self-externalization of God into a

world. Vast width without end, he says, stands in need of a straitness and confiningness in which it may manifest itself; for in width without confinement manifestation were impossible : there must, therefore, be a drawing-in and a closing-in through which a manifestation may be realized. See, he elsewhere exclaims, were will only of one sort, then mind had only one quality, and were a moveless thing, that lay ever still, and did nothing further than always one and the same thing; there were no joy in it, neither any art nor science of severals, and there were no wisdom; all were a nothing, and there were properly no mind nor will to anything, for all were only the sole and single. It cannot be said, then, that the entire God is in a single will and a single being : there is a difference. Nothing without contrariety can become manifest to itself; for were there nothing to resist it, it would proceed perpetually of itself outwards, and would not return again into itself; but if it enter not again into itself, as into that out of which it originally went, nothing is known to it of its primal being. Bohm expresses the above thought quite perfectly, when, in his answer to theological questions, he says : the reader is to understand that in Yes and No consist all things, be they divine, diabolic, terrestrial, or however they may be named. The One, as the Yes, is pure power and love, and it is the truth of God, and God himself. He were incognisable in Himself, and in Him there were no joy or upliftingness, nor yet feeling, without the No. The No is a counter-stroke of the Yes, or of the truth, in order that the truth may be manifest and something, wherein there may be a *contrarium*, wherein there may be the eternal love, moving, feeling, and willing. For a one has nothing in itself that it can will, unless it double itself that it may be two; neither can it feel itself in oneness, but in twoness it feels itself. In short, without difference, without antithesis, without duality, there is, according to Bohm, no knowledge, no consciousness possible; only in its other, in its opposite (that is yet identical with its own being), does something become clear and conscious to itself. It lay at hand to connect this fundamental idea, the thought of a one that in itself differentiated itself, with the doctrine of

the Trinity; and the trinitarian schema accordingly, in many an application and illustration, underlies Bohm's conception of the divine life and differentiating process. Schelling afterwards took up anew these ideas of Bohm's, and philosophically reconstructed them.

Were we to assign to the theosophy of Bohm a place in the history of the development of later philosophy correspondent to the inner worth of its principle, we should most appropriately set it as a complement over against the system of Spinoza. If Spinoza teaches the reflux of everything finite into the eternal One, Bohm demonstrates the efflux, the issue, of the finite out of the eternal One, and the inner necessity of this efflux and issue, inasmuch as, without self-diremption, the being of this One were rather a non-being. Compared with Descartes, Bohm has certainly more profoundly seized the notion of self-consciousness and the relation of the finite to God. His historical position, however, is in other respects much too isolated and exceptional, his form of statement much too troubled, to allow us to incorporate him without any hesitation in a series of systematic evolutions otherwise continuous and genetically coherent.

III. DESCARTES

The originator and father of modern philosophy is *Descartes*. Whilst, on the one hand, like the thinkers of the transition-period, he has completely broken with previous philosophy, and once again considered all from the very beginning; he has, on the other hand, again, not merely, like Bacon, proposed a principle that is only methodological; or, like Bohm and the contemporary Italians, given expression to philosophical glances without methodic foundation; but he has, from the stand-point of entire freedom from presupposition, introduced a new, *positive*, materially full, philosophical principle, and then endeavoured to develop from it, by method of continuous proof, the leading propositions of a system. The want of presupposition and the newness of his principle constitute him the originator,

its inner fruitfulness the founder of modern philosophy.

Rene Descartes (Renatus Cartesius), was born in 1596 at La Haye in Touraine. Already in his early years, dissatisfied with the prevalent philosophy, or rather altogether sceptical in its regard, he resolved, on completion of his studies, to bid adieu to all school learning, and henceforward to gain knowledge only from himself and the great book of the world, from nature and the observation of man. When twenty years of age, he exchanged the life of science for the life of the camp, serving as a volunteer first under Maurice of Orange, and afterwards under Tilly. The inclination to philosophical and mathematical inquiries was too powerful in him, however, to allow him permanently to quit these. In 1621, the design of a reformation of science on a firmer foundation, being now, after long internal struggles, ripe within him, he left the army; passed some time in various pretty extensive travels; made a considerable stay in Paris; abandoned finally his native country in 1629; and betook himself to Holland, in order to live there unknown and undisturbed wholly for philosophy and the prosecution of his scientific projects. In Holland, though not without many vexatious interferences on the part of fanatical theologians, he lived twenty years, till in 1649, in consequence of an invitation on the part of Queen Christina of Sweden, he left it for Stockholm, where, however, he died the very next year, 1650.

The subject-matter of the philosophy of Descartes, and the course it took in his own mind, may be concisely stated in the following summary :

(a) If we are ever to establish any fixed and permanent article of knowledge, we must begin with the foundation, we must root out and destroy every presupposition and assumption to which from our childhood we may have been accustomed,—in a word, we must doubt all things that appear even in the least degree uncertain. We must not only doubt, therefore, of the existence of the things of sense, since the senses often deceive, but even of the truths of mathematics and geometry : for however certain the proposition may appear, that the sum of two and three is five, or that a square has four sides, we can-

not know whether any truth of knowledge is at all intended for us finite beings, whether God has not created us rather for mere opinion and error. It is advisable, therefore, to doubt all, nay, even to deny all, to assume all as false. (b) In thus assuming everything as false, in regard to which any doubt can be at all entertained, there is one thing, nevertheless, that we cannot deny: this truth, namely, that we ourselves, we who so think, exist. Precisely from this rather, that I assume all things as false, that I doubt all things, there evidently follows my own existence, the existence even in doubting, of the subject that doubts. The proposition, consequently, I think, therefore I am (*Cogito, ergo sum*), is the first, most certain proposition that meets every one who attempts to philosophize. On this most certain of all propositions depends the certainty of all other articles of knowledge. The objection of *Gassendi*, that existence may be equally well inferred from every other human function, as from that of thought,—that it may be equally well said, I walk, therefore I am,—does not apply, for of none of my actions am I absolutely certain, unless of my thought. (c) From the proposition, I think, therefore I am, there follows further now the whole constitution of the nature of spirit. In investigating, namely, who then are we, who thus hold all things for false that are different from us, we see clearly that, without destroying our personality, we can think away from ourselves everything that belongs to us, except our thought alone. Thought persists, even when it denies all else. There cannot belong any extension, therefore, any figure, or anything else that the body may possess, to our true nature: to that there can belong thought only. I am, then, essentially a thinking being, or thinking being simply, that is to say, spirit, soul, intelligence, reason. To think is my substance. The mind, then, can be perfectly and clearly known in itself, in its own independency, without any of the attributes that attach to the body; in its notion there is nothing that belongs to the notion of body. It is impossible, consequently, to apprehend it by means of

any sensuous conception, or to form to one's-self a picture of it : it is apprehended wholly and solely through pure intelligence. (d) From the proposition, I think, therefore I am, there follows still further the universal rule of all certainty. I am certain that, because I think. I exist. What is it that gives me the certainty of this proposition ? Evidently nothing else than the clear perception that it is impossible for any one to think and not be. From this, then, there follows of itself, and for all other knowledge, the criterion of certainty : that is certain, whatever I recognise as clearly and evidently true, whatever my reason recognises as true with the same irresistible distinctness as the above *cogito ergo sum*. (e) This rule, however, is only a *principle of certainty*, it does not supply me yet with a *knowledge of the body of truth*. We review, therefore, under application of the rule, all our thoughts or ideas, in order to discover something that shall be objectively true. But our ideas are partly innate, partly contributed from without, partly formed by ourselves. Amongst them all we find that of God eminent and first. The question occurs, Whence do we get this idea ? Evidently not from ourselves : this idea can only be implanted in us by a being that possesses in his own nature the complete fullness of every perfection; that is, it can be implanted in us only by an actually existent God. On the question, how is it that I am capable of thinking a nature more perfect than my own : I find myself always driven to this answer, that I must have received it from some being, whose nature *actually* is more perfect. All the attributes of God, the more I contemplate them, demonstrate that the ideas of them could not be produced by me alone. For although I may possess the idea of a substance, as I am a substance, the same reason would dispossess me of the idea of infinite substance, as I am only finite substance. Such an idea as infinite substance can be produced in me only by an actually infinite substance. And let it not be thought that the notion of the infinite is acquired by means of abstraction and negation, as darkness, it may be, is negation of light; for I see rather that the infinite has more reality than the finite, and that therefore the notion of the infinite must, in a certain

sort, be earlier in me than that of the finite. But if this clear and distinct idea, which I have of infinite substance, possesses more objective reality than any other, neither is there any other of which I can possibly have less reason to doubt. It remains, then, knowing, as I now do, that it is from God that the idea of God has come to me, only to investigate in what manner it *has* come. It cannot possibly have been acquired through the senses, whether consciously or unconsciously; for ideas of sense originate in external affections of the organs of sense, and it is self-evident that no such origin can be predicated of it. Neither can I have invented it, for I can as little add to, as subtract from it. But as we have seen, if it is not contributed from without, and if it is not formed by myself, it must, be innate—just as the idea of my own self is innate. The first proof that can be led for the existence of God, then, is that I find the idea of God existing in me, and that of this existence there must be a cause. Further, I infer the existence of God from my own imperfection, and in particular, from my knowledge of it. For as I am acquainted with certain perfections which belong not to myself, there must evidently exist a being more perfect than I am, on whom I, for my part, depend, and from whom I have received whatever I possess. The best and most evident proof for the existence of God, finally, is the proof that follows from the very notion of him. My mind, in observing amongst its various ideas one that is the most eminent of all, that namely of the most perfect being, perceives also that this idea not only possesses like all the rest, the possibility of existence, that is, contingent existence, but that it likewise involves necessary existence. Just as I infer for every possible triangle that equality of its three angles to two right angles which lies in the idea of the triangle in general, so from the necessary existence that belongs to the idea of the most perfect being, do I infer his actual existence. No other idea that I possess involves necessary existence, but from this idea of the Supreme Being, necessary existence is, without contradiction, inseparable. It is only our prejudices that prevent us from seeing this. Because we are accustomed, namely, in the case

of all other things, to separate the notion of them from the existence of them, and because also we often form ideas in our own fancy, it is easy for us in regard to the Supreme Being, to fall into doubt as to whether this idea too be not one of the fancied ones, or at least such as does not in its notion involve existence. This proof is essentially different from that of Anselm of Canterbury, as disputed by Thomas, the reasoning of which is this :—‘Consideration demonstrates the word God to mean that which must be thought as what is greatest; but to be in actuality as well as in thought, is greater than to be in thought alone; therefore, God exists not only in thought, but in fact.’ But this conclusion is manifestly vicious, and we ought to infer instead, Therefore God must be *thought* as existing in fact; from which proposition plainly the reality of his existence is no necessary result. My proof, on the other hand, is this : whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to the true and unalterable nature of anything, to its essence, its form, that may be predicated of it. Now we found, on investigating God, that existence belongs to his true and unalterable nature, and, therefore, we may legitimately predicate existence of God. In the idea of the most perfect being necessary existence is involved, not because of any fiction of our understanding, but because existence belongs to his eternal and unalterable nature. (f) This result, the existence of God, is of the greatest consequence. At first it was obligatory on us to renounce all certainty, and to doubt of everything, because we knew not whether error belonged not to the nature of man, whether God had not created us to err. But now we know, by reference to the innate idea and the necessary attributes of God, that he possesses veracity, and that it were a contradiction did he deceive us or cause in us error. For even if the ability to deceive were regarded as a proof of superiority, the will to deceive would be certainly a proof of wickedness. Our reason consequently can never apprehend an object that were possibly untrue, so far, that is, as it is apprehended, or so far as it is clearly and distinctly known. For God were justly to be named a deceiver, had he given us so perverted a judgement that it took falsehood for

truth. And thus the absolute doubt with which we began is now removed. All certainty flows for us from the being of God. Assured of the existence of an undeceiving God, it is enough, for the certainty of any knowledge, that we clearly and distinctly know its object. (g) From the true idea of God there result the principles of natural philosophy, or the theory of the duality of substance. *That* is substance which requires for its existence the existence of nothing else. In this (highest) sense only God is substance. God as infinite substance has the ground of his existence in himself, is the cause of himself. The two created substances, on the contrary, thinking substance and bodily substance, mind and matter, are substances only in the less restricted sense of the term; they may be placed under the common definition, that they are things requiring for their existence only the co-operation of God. Each of these two substances has an attribute constitutive of its nature and being, and to which all its other characteristics may be collectively reduced. Extension is the attribute and being of matter; thought is the being of spirit. For everything else that may be predicated of body presupposes extension, and is but a mode of extension, while, similarly, everything that we find in spirit is only a modification of thought. A substance to which thought directly appertains is called spirit, a substance which is the immediate substrate of extension is called body. Thought and extension are not only different from each other, but it is the very nature of these substances to negate each other; for spirit is not only cognizable without the attributes of body, but it is in itself the negation of the attributes of body. Spirit and body are essentially diverse, and possess nothing in common. (h) In an anthropological reference (to omit the physics of Descartes, as only of subordinate interest philosophically), there results from this antagonistic relation between spirit and matter, a similar antagonistic relation between soul and body. Matter being essentially extension, spirit essentially thought, and neither having anything in common, the union of soul and body can only be conceived as a mechanical one. The body, for its part, is to be regarded as an automaton artificially constructed

by God, as it were a statue or a machine formed by God of earth. In this body there dwells the soul, closely, but not inwardly, connected with it. The union of the two is but a forcible collocation, since both, as self-subsistent factors, are not only different from each other, but essentially opposed to each other. The self-dependent body is a completed machine, in which the accession of the soul alters nothing; the latter, indeed, may produce certain additional movements in the former, but the wheel-work of this machine remains as it was. The indwelling thought alone distinguishes this machine from others; and the lower animals, consequently, as unpossessed of self-consciousness and thought, are necessarily assigned only the same rank as other machines. It is here, now, that the question of the seat of the soul becomes of interest. If body and soul are mutually independent, essentially opposed substances, it will be impossible for them to interpenetrate and pervade each other; contact of any kind, indeed, will be impossible between them unless by force, and in a single point. This point in which the soul has its seat is not to Descartes the whole brain, but only the inmost part of it, a small gland in the midst of its substance, which is named the *pineal gland*. The proof of this assumption depends on the circumstance that all the other parts of the brain are double, and consequently disqualified from acting as organ of the soul, which, so provided, would necessarily perceive things in a twofold manner. There is no other spot in the body capable of uniting impressions equally with the pineal gland, and this gland, therefore, is the capital seat of the soul, and the *locus* of formation for all our thoughts.

Having thus developed the leading ideas of the Cartesian system, we shall now concisely recapitulate the characteristics of its historical and philosophical position. Descartes is the founder of a new epoch in philosophy, because, *firstly*, he enunciated the postulate of an entire removal of any presupposition. This absolute protest maintained by Descartes against the acceptance of anything for true, because it is so given to us, or so found by us, and not something determined and established by thought, became thenceforward the fundamental principle

of the moderns. Descartes first proposed, *secondly*, the principle of self-consciousness, of the pure, self-subsistent ego, or the conception of mind, thinking substance, as individual self, as a singular ego—a new principle, a conception unknown to antiquity. Descartes, *thirdly*, gave complete distinctness to the antithesis of being and thought, existence and consciousness; and announced the conciliation of this antithesis as a philosophical problem—the problem, for the future, of all modern philosophy. But these great ideas, distinctive of an epoch in the history of philosophy, are suggestive; at the same time, of the philosophical defects of the Cartesian system. *Firstly*, Descartes empirically assumed the constituents of his system, particularly his three substances. It appears, indeed, from the protest with which the system begins, that nothing ready-given or ready-found is to be assumed, but that all is to be deduced from thought. But this protest is not so serious in the event; what has been apparently set aside is taken up again unchanged, once the principle of certainty has been made good. And hence it is that Descartes *finds ready to hand*, directly given, as well the idea of God as the two substances. In order to deduce them, he appears, indeed, to abstract from much that is empirically present; but when he has abstracted from everything else, the two substances remain behind in the end simply as residue. That is, then, they are empirically assumed. It is a *second* defect that Descartes isolates the two sides of the antithesis, thought and being, in their mutual relation. He makes both, ‘substances’, elements, that is, which mutually exclude and negate each other. The being of matter he places *only* in extension, or in pure self-excludedness; that of spirit *only* in thought, or intension, pure self-includedness. They stand opposed to each other like centrifugal and centripetal forces. But with such a conception of spirit and matter any internal assimilation of them becomes impossible; where the two sides meet and unite, as in man, this they are enabled to do only by a forcible act of creation, only by the divine assistance. Descartes, nevertheless, demands and endeavours to find a conciliation of the two sides. But preci-

sely the inability really to overcome the dualism of his position is the *third* and capital defect of his system. It is true that in the statement, 'I think, therefore I am', or 'I am thinking,' the two sides, being and thinking, are conjoined together, but then they are so conjoined only to be established as mutually independent. To the question, How does the ego relate itself to what is extended? it can only be answered: As thinking, that is, as negative, as excludent. And thus for the conciliation of the two sides there remains only the idea of God. Both substances are created by God, both are held together by the will of God, and through the idea of God is it that the ego obtains the certainty of the existence of what is extended. God is thus, in a measure, a *deus ex machina*, in order to bring about the unity of the ego with the matter of extension. The externality of any such process is obvious.

It is this defect in the system of Descartes that acts as conditioning motive to the systems that follow.

IV. GEULINX AND MALEBRANCHE

Descartes had placed mind and matter, consciousness and the world, in complete separation from each other. Both are for him substances, independent powers, mutually exclusive contraries. Spirit (that is to say, in his conception, the simple self, the ego) is essentially what distinguishes itself from, what excludes, matter,—what abstracts from sense. Matter, on the other hand, is essentially what is opposed to thought. But the relation of the two principles being thus determined, the question involuntarily occurs, How then is it possible for any connexion to have place between them? Both being absolutely different, nay, mutually opposed, how is it possible for the affections of the body, on the one hand, to act on the soul, and how, on the other hand, is it possible for the volitions of the soul to act on the body? It was at this point that the Cartesian *Arnold Geulinx* (born 1625 at Antwerp, died 1669 as Professor of Philosophy at Leyden), took up the system of Descartes in order to procure for it a more consistent form. For his

part, Geulinx is of opinion that neither the soul acts directly on the body, nor the body directly on the soul. Not the former : since I can at discretion manifoldly determine or influence my body, but I am not the cause of this, for I know not how it happens, I know not in what manner influence is propagated from my brain to my limbs, and I cannot possibly suppose myself to do that in regard to which I am unable to understand how it is done. But if I am unable to produce inovement within my body, still less must I be able to produce movement without my body. I am only a spectator of this world, then ; the only action that is mine, that remains for me, is contemplation. But this very contemplation can only take place mysteriously. For how do we obtain our perception of an external world ? The external world cannot possibly act directly on us. For, even if the external objects cause, in the act of vision say, an image in my eye, or an impression in my brain, as if in so much wax, this impression, or this image, is still something corporeal or material merely; it cannot enter into my spirit, therefore, which is essentially disparate from matter. There is nothing left us, then, but to seek in God the means of uniting the two sides. It is God alone who can conform outer to inner, inner to outer; who, converting external objects into internal ideas,—ideas of the soul,—can render visible to the latter the world of sense, and realize the determinations of the will within into facts without. Every operation, then, that combines outer and inner, the soul and the world, is neither an effect of the spirit nor of the world, but simply an immediate act of God. When I exercise volition, consequently, it is not from my will, but from the will of God that the proposed bodily motions follow. On *occasion* of my will, God moves my body; on *occasion* of an affection of my body, God excites an idea in my mind : the one is but the occasional cause of the other (and hence the name, *Occasionalism*, of this theory). My will, nevertheless, moves not the mover to move my limbs; but he who imparted motion to matter, and assigned it its laws, even be created my will also,

and he has so united together these most diverse things, material motion and mental volition, that, when my will wills, such a movement follows as it wills, and when the movement follows, my will wills it, not that either, however, acts or exerts physical influence on the other. On the contrary, just as the agreement of two watches which go so perfectly together, that both strike exactly the same hour at once, results not from any mutual influence on their part, but simply from the fact that they were both set together; so the agreement of the bodily motion and the mental volition depends only on that sublime artificer who has produced in them this inexplicable community. Geulinx, then, it is obvious, has only brought the fundamental dualism of Descartes to its ultimate point. If Descartes called the union of soul and body a violent collocation, Geulinx calls it, in so many words, a miracle. The strict consequence of such a conception, then, is, that there is possible not any immanent, but only a transcendent principle of union.

2. Analogous to the theory of Geulinx, and equally at the same time only a consequence and further extension of the philosophizing of Descartes, is the philosophical position of *Nicholas Malebranche* (born at Paris 1638; entered, at the age of twenty-two, the *congregation de l'oratoire*, determined to the prosecution of philosophy by the writings of Descartes; died, after many troubles with theological opponents, 1715).

Malebranche takes his point of departure from the Cartesian view of the relation between soul and body. These are rigorously distinguished from each other, and in their essence mutually opposed. How does the soul (the ego) attain, then, to a knowledge of the external world, to ideas of corporeal things? For only in the spiritual form of ideas is it possible for external, and, in particular, material things, to be present in spirit; or the soul cannot have the thing itself, but only an idea of it, the thing itself remaining without the soul. The soul can derive these ideas neither from itself, nor from things. Not from itself: for any power of generating the ideas of things purely from its own self, cannot be ascribed to the soul as a limited being; what is merely an idea of the soul does not on

that account actually exist, and what actually exists depends not for its existence and apprehension on the goodwill of the soul; the ideas of things are given to us, they are no production of our own thought. But just as little does the soul derive these ideas from the things themselves. It is impossible to think that impressions of material things take place on the soul, which is immaterial, not to mention that these infinitely numerous and complex impressions would, in impinging on one another, reciprocally derange and destroy one another. The soul, then,—there is no other resource,—must see things in a third something that is above the antithesis, that is, in God. God, the absolute substance, contains all things in himself, he sees all things in himself according to their true nature and being. For the same reason in him, too, are the ideas of all things; he is the entire world as an intellectual or ideal world. It is God, then, who is the means of mediating between the ego and the world. In him we see the ideas, inasmuch as we ourselves are so completely contained in him, so accurately united to him that we may call him the place of spirits. Our volition and our sensation in reference to things proceed from him; it is he who retains together the objective and the subjective worlds, which, in themselves, are separate and apart.

The philosophy of Malebranche, then, in its single leading thought that we see and know all things in God, demonstrates itself to be, like the occasionalism of Geulinx, a special attempt to overcome the dualism of the Cartesian philosophy on its own principles and under its own presuppositions.

3. Two defects or inner contradictions of the philosophy of Descartes are now apparent. Descartes conceives mind and matter as substances, as mutually exclusive contraries, and sets himself forthwith to find their union. But any union in the case of such presuppositions can only be one-sided and external. Thought and existence being each a substance, must only negate and mutually exclude each other. Unnatural theories, like the above, become, then, unavoidable consequences. The simplest remedy is this, to abandon the presupposition, to remove its independency from either contrary, to conceive both

not as substances, but as forms of the manifestation of a substance, This remedy is particularly indicated and suggested by another circumstance. According to Descartes, God is the infinite substance,—in the special sense of the word, the only substance. Mind and matter are also, indeed, substances, but only in relation to each other; while in relation to God, again, they are depended and not substances. This, properly speaking, is a contradiction. It were more consistent to say, that neither the thinking individuals nor the material things, are anything self-subsistent, but only the one substance,—God. God only has real being; whatever being attaches to finite things is unsubstantial, and they themselves are but accidents of the one true substance. Malebranche approaches this conclusion; the corporeal world is at least for him ideally sublated into God, in whom are the eternal archetypes of all things. It is Spinoza, however, who, logically consequent, directly enunciates this conclusion of the accidentality of the finite and the exclusive substantiality of God. His system, then, is the truth and completion of that of Descartes.

V. SPINOZA

Baruch Spinoza was born in Amsterdam on the 24th of November 1632. His parents, Jews of Portuguese extraction, were well-to-do tradespeople, and gave him the education of a scholar. He studied with diligence the Bible and the Talmud. He soon exchanged, however, the study of theology for that of physics and the works of Descartes. About the same time, having long broken inwardly with Judaism, he broke with it outwardly also, without, however, formally embracing Christianity. In order to escape the persecutions of the Jews, who had excommunicated him, and with whom his life was in danger, he left Amsterdam and betook himself to Rhynsburg, near Leyden, but settled finally at the Hague, where, wholly absorbed in scientific pursuits, he lived in the greatest seclusion. He earned his living by the polishing of optical glasses, which his friends disposed of. The Elector of the Palatinate, Carl

Ludwig, made him an offer of a philosophical chair at Heidelberg, with the promise of complete liberty of opinion; but Spinoza declined it. Delicate by nature, suffering from ill-health for years, Spinoza died of consumption on the 21st of February 1677, at the early age of forty-four. The cloudless purity and sublime tranquillity of a perfectly wise man were mirrored in his life. Abstemious, satisfied with little, master of his passions, never immoderately sad or glad, gentle and benevolent, of a character admirably pure, he faithfully followed the doctrine of his philosophy, even in his daily life. His chief work, the *Ethic*, was published the year he died. He would have liked probably to have published it in his lifetime, but the hateful name of Atheist must have deterred him. His most intimate friend, Ludwig Mayer, a physician, in accordance with his will, superintended the publication after his death.

The system of Spinoza is supported on three fundamental notions, from which all the others follow with mathematical necessity. These notions are those of substance, attribute, and mode.

(a) Spinoza starts from the Catersian definition of substance : substance is that which, for its existence, stands in need of nothing else. This notion of substance being assumed, there can exist, according to Spinoza, only a single substance. What is through its own self alone is necessarily infinite, unconditioned and unlimited by anything else. Spontaneous existence is the absolute power to exist, which cannot depend on anything else, or find in anything else a limit, a negation of itself; only unlimited being is self-subsistent, substantial being. A plurality of infinities, however, is impossible; for one were indistinguishable from the other. A plurality of substances, as assumed by Descartes, is necessarily, therefore, a contradiction. It is possible for only one substance, and that an absolutely infinite substance, to exist. The given, finite reality necessarily presupposes such single, self-existent substance. It were a contradiction, that only the finite, not the infinite, should have existence; that there should be only what is conditioned and caused by something else, and not also what is self-existent and self-

subsistent. The absolute substance is rather the real cause of all and every existence; it alone is actual, unconditioned being; it is the sole virtue of existence, and through this virtue everything finite is : without it there is nothing, with it there is all; all reality is comprehended in it, as, beside it, self dependent being there is none; it is not only cause of all being, but it is itself all being; every special existence is only a modification (individualization), of the universal substance itself, which, by force of inner necessity, expands its own infinite reality into an immeasurable quantity of being, and comprises within itself every possible form of existence. This one substance is named by Spinoza God. As is self-evident, then, we must leave out of view here the Christian idea of God, the conception of an individual, spiritual personality. Spinoza expressly declares that he entertains quite a different idea of God from Christians; he distinctly maintains that all existence, material existence included, springs directly from God as the single substance; and he laughs at those who see in the world aught but an accident of the divine substance itself. He recognises in the views of these a dualism which would annul the necessary unity of all things—a self-substantiation of the world, which would destroy the sole causality of God. The world is for him no product of the divine will that stands *beside* God, free : it is an emanation of the creative being of God, which being is, by its very nature, infinite. God, to Spinoza, is only the substance of things, and not anything else. The propositions, that there is only one God, and that the substance of all things is only one, are to him identical.

What properly is substance now ? What is its positive nature ? We have here a question that from the position of Spinoza is very hard to answer. Partly for this reason, that a definition, according to Spinoza, must include the proximate cause (be genetic) of what is to be defined, whilst substance, as *increate*, can have no cause external to itself. Partly, again, and chiefly for this reason, that to Spinoza, all determination is negation (*omnis determinatio est negatio*, though only an incidental expression, is the fundamental idea of the entire system), for

determination implies a defect of existence, a relative non-being. Special, positive designations, then, would only reduce substance to something finite. Declarations in its regard, consequently, must be only negative and provisory, as, for example, it has no external cause, is not a many, cannot possibly be divided, etc. Spinoza is reluctant to say even that it is one, because this predicate may be easily taken as numerical, and then it might appear as if another, the many, were opposed to it. Thus there are left only such positive expressions as enunciate its absolute relation to its own self. It is in this sense that Spinoza says of it, it is the cause of itself, or its nature implies existence. And it is only another expression for the same thought when he calls substance eternal, for by eternity he understands existence itself, so far as it is conceived as following from the definition of the object, in the same sense in which geometers speak of the eternal qualities of figures. Spinoza applies to substance the predicate infinite also, so far as the notion of infinitude is identical to him with the notion of true being, with the absolute affirmation of existence. In the same manner the allegation, that God is free, expresses only what the others express, to wit, negatively, that all external force is excluded, and positively, that God is in agreement with himself, that his being corresponds to the laws of his nature.

In sum, there is only one infinite substance, excludent of all determination and negation from itself, the one being in every being,—God.

(b) Besides infinite substance or God, Descartes had assumed two derivative and created substances, the one spirit or thought, the other matter or extension. These also re-appear here as the two ground-forms under which Spinoza subsumes all reality,—the two ‘attributes’ in which the single substance reveals itself to us, so far as it is the cause of all that is. How now,—this is the perplexing question, the Achilles’ heel of the Spinozistic system,—are these attributes related to the infinite substance? Substance cannot wholly disappear in them; else it were determinate, limited, and in contradiction, therefore, to its own notion. If then these attributes do not exhaust the objec-

tive being of substance, it follows that they are determinations in which substance takes form for the subjective' apprehension of understanding; or for behoof of understanding all is once for all divided into thought and extension. And this is the conception of Spinoza. An attribute is for him what understanding perceives in substance as constitutive of its nature. The two attributes are therefore determinations, which express the nature of substance in these precise forms, only for perception. Substance itself being unexhausted by any such specialties of form, the attributes must be conceived as but expressions of its nature for an understanding that is placed apart from it. That such understanding should perceive substance only under these precise two forms is indifferent to substance itself, which *impli-citer* possesses an infinitude of attributes. That is to say, all possible attributes, not limitations, may be assumed for substance. It is only the human understanding that invests substance with the two specially mentioned, and exclusively with these two, for of all the notions of the understanding, they are the only ones actually positive or expressive of reality. To the understanding, substance is thought, then, considered under the attribute of thought, and extension, considered under the attribute of extension. In a word, the two attributes are but empirically derived determinations, that are incommensurate besides with the nature of substance. Substance stands behind them as the absolute infinite which cannot be comprehended in any such special notions. The attributes explain not what substance really is; and in its regard consequently appear contingent. Spinoza fails to supply any principle of union between the notion of absolute substance and the particular manner in which it manifests itself in the two attributes.

In their own natural relation, the attributes, as with Descartes, are to be directly opposed to each other. They are attributes of one and the same substance, it is true, but each is independent in itself, as independent indeed, as the very substance which it is supposed *realiter* to represent. Between thought and extension, then, spirit and matter, there can be no mutual influence; what is material can only have material

causes, what is spiritual only spiritual ones, as ideas, volition, etc. Neither spirit, consequently, can act on matter, nor matter on spirit. Thus far, then, Spinoza adheres to the Cartesian severance of spirit and matter. But, as referred to the notion of the single substance, both worlds are equally again one and the same; there is a perfect agreement between them, a thorough parallelism. One and the same substance is thought as present in both attributes—one and the same substance in the various forms of existence under either. 'The idea of the circle and the actual circle are the same thing, now under the attribute of thought and again under that of extension.' From the one substance there proceeds, in effect, only a single infinite series of things, but a series of things in a variety of forms, even after subjection primarily to one or other of the forms of the attributes. The various things exist, like substance itself, as well under the ideal form of thought, as under the real form of extension. For every spiritual form there is a correspondent corporeal one, as for every corporeal form a correspondent spiritual one. Nature and spirit are different, indeed, but they are not isolatedly apart: they are everywhere together, like type and anti-type, like things and the ideas of things, like object and subject, in which last the object mirrors itself, or what *realiter* is, *idealiter* reflects itself. The world were not the product of a single substance, if these two elements, thought and extension, were not, at every point in inseparable identity, united in it. Spinoza subjects, in particular, the relation between body and soul to the idea of this inseparable unity of spirit and matter, a unity which, according to him, pervades the whole of nature, but in various grades of perfection. And here we have his simple resolution of the problem, which, from the point of view of Descartes, was so difficult, and even inexplicable. In man, as everywhere else, extension and thought (the latter, in his case, not only as feeling and perception, but as self-conscious reason) are together and inseparable. The soul is the consciousness that has for its objects the associated body, and through the interven-

tion of the body, the remaining corporeal world, so far as it affects the body; the body is the real organism whose states and affections consciously reflect themselves in the soul. But any influence of the one on the other does not for this very reason exist; soul and body are the same thing, but expressed in the one case only as conscious thought, in the other as material extension. They differ only in form, so far as the nature and life of the body, so far, that is, as the various corporeal impressions, movements, functions, which obey wholly and solely the laws of the material organism, spontaneously coalesce in the soul to the unity of consciousness, conception, thought.

(c) The special individual forms which are ideas or material things, according as they are considered under the attribute of thought or under the attribute of extension, receive their explanation at the hands of Spinoza by reference to the notion of accident, or, as he names it, *modus*. By *modi* we are to understand, then, the various individual finite forms, in which infinite substance particularizes itself. The *modi* are to substance what the waves are to the sea—shapes that perpetually die away, that never are. Nothing finite is possessed of a self-subsistent individuality. The finite individual exists, indeed, because the unlimited productive power of substance must give birth to an infinite variety of particular finite forms; but it has no proper reality,—it exists only in substance. Finite things are only the last, the most subordinate, the most external terms of existence, in which the universal life gives itself specific forms and they bear the stamp of finitude in that they are subjected, without will, without resistance, to the causal chain that pervades this world. The divine substance is free only in the inner essence of its own nature, but individual things are not free, they are a prey to all the others with which they are connected. This is their finitude, indeed, that they are conditioned and determined, not by themselves, but by what is alien to them. They constitute the domain of pure necessity, within which each is free and independent only so far as power has been given it by nature to assert itself against the rest, and maintain intact its own existence and its proper and peculiar interests.

These are the fundamental notions, the fundamental features of the system of Spinoza. As for his *practical philosophy*, it may be characterized in a few words. Its main propositions follow of necessity from the metaphysical principles which we have just seen. And for first example we have the inadmissibility of what is called free-will. For, man being only *modus*, what is applicable to the others is applicable to him; he is involved in the infinite series of conditional causes; and free-will, therefore, cannot be predicated of him. His will, like every other bodily function, must be determined by *something*, whether an impression from without or an impulse from within. Men believe themselves free, simply because they are conscious of their own acts, but not of the motives of them. In the same way, the notions, which we usually connect with the words good and bad, rest on an error, as follows at once from the simple notion of the absolute divine cause. Good and bad are not anything actual in things themselves, but only express relative notions suggested to us by our own comparison of things one with another. We form for ourselves, namely, from the observation of particular things, a certain general conception, and this conception we continue to regard as if it were a necessary rule for all other particular things. Should now some single individual clash with our general conception, that individual would be regarded as imperfect, and as in disagreement with its own nature. Sin, then, the bad, is only relative, and not positive, for nothing happens contrary to the will of God. It is a mere negation or privation, and appears something positive only to our finite minds. There is no bad to God. What, then are good and bad? That is good which is useful to us, that bad which prevents us from attaining to the good. That, again, is useful which procures us greater reality, which preserves and promotes our being. Our true being, however, is reason; reason is the inner nature of our soul; it is reason that makes us free; for it is from reason that we possess the motive and the power to resist the molestations of things from without, to determine our own action according to the law of the due preservation and promotion of our existence, and to place ourselves as

regards all things in a relation adequate to our nature. What, consequently, contributes to our knowledge, that alone is useful. But the highest knowledge is the knowledge of God. The highest virtue of the soul is to know and love God. From knowledge of God there arises for us the supreme happiness and joy, the bliss of the soul : it gives us peace in the thought of the eternal necessity of all things; it delivers us from all discord and discontent, from all fruitless struggling against the finitude of our own being; it raises us from life in sense to that life in intellect, which, freed from all the troubles and the trials of the perishable, is occupied only with itself and with the eternal. Felicity, then, is not the reward of virtue,—it is virtue itself.

What is true and great in the philosophy of Spinoza is, that everything individual, as finite, is merged by it in the gulf of substance. With regard immovably directed to the Eternal One, to God, it loses sight of all that to the common mind passes for real. But its defect is, that it fails truly to convert this negative gulf of substance into the *terra firma* of positive existence and actual life. It is with justice, then, that the substance of Spinoza has been compared to the den of the lion, where there are many steps to, but few from.* The existence of the phenomenal world, the reality of the finite, if perishable, if null, is still not explained by Spinoza. We cannot see what this finite world of null appearance is here for; any living connexion to God fails. The substance of Spinoza is exclusively a principle of identity; it is not a principle of difference. Reflection, in its reference, proceeds from the finite to the absolute, but not also from latter to the former; it clasps together the many into a selfless unity in God; it sacrifices all individual existence to the negative thought of unity, instead of enabling this unity, by a living evolution into concrete variety, to negate its own barren negativity. The system of Spinoza is the most abstract monotheism that can possibly be conceived. It is not by accident, then, that Spinoza, a Jew, has, in explanation of the universe, once more revived the idea of its absolute unity :

* Schewegler says "none" not "few". "Few" stultifies Spinoza's den; but "none", the lion's.

such idea is, in some sort, a consequence of his nationality, an echo of the East.

VI. IDEALISM AND REALISM.

We stand now by a knot-point, a ganglion, a commissure, in the onward course of philosophy. Descartes had demonstrated the antithesis of thought and existence, of mind and matter, and had postulated a principle of resolution for it. This resolution succeeded ill with him, however, for he had placed the two sides of the antithesis in their greatest possible mutual isolation, he had assumed both as substances, as independent, mutually negating powers. The successors of Descartes sought a more satisfactory solution; but the theories to which they found themselves compelled, only showed the more plainly the untenableness of the entire presupposition. Spinoza, finally, abandoned the false presupposition, and stripped each of the opposing sides of its independent substantiality. In the infinite substance, spirit and matter, thought and extension, are now one. But they are not one in themselves; and only as one in themselves were there a true unity of both. That they are in substance one avails them little, for to substance itself they are indifferent, that is, they are not immanent differences of substance. With Spinoza, too, then, they are absolutely separated from one another. The reason of this isolation is simply that Spinoza has not sufficiently disembarrassed himself of the presuppositions and dualism of Descartes,—he, too, looks on thought as *only* thought, on extension as *only* extension, and this conception of them necessarily excludes the one from the other. If an inner principle of union is to be found for them, this abstraction of each must be broken up and removed. In the opposed sides themselves must the reconciliation be accomplished. There are, consequently, two ways possible, either from the position of the material side, to explain the ideal, or from that of the ideal side to explain the material. And in effect both ways were almost simultaneously attempted. From this point begins each of the two series of views which have divided the

intellectual world since, that, namely, of *Idealism* one-sidedly on the one hand, and that of *Realism* (empiricism, sensualism, materialism), equally one-sidedly on the other.

VII. LOCKE

The originator of the realistic series, the father of modern materialism and empiricism, was the English *John Locke*. He possessed a precursor, indeed, in his countryman, *Thomas Hobbes* (1588-1679); whom, however, we merely mention in this place, as his influence concerned rather the history of political science.

John Locke was born at Wrington in 1632. His early studies were directed to philosophy, and, in particular, to medicine. His delicate health, however, precluded the practice of the latter; and, little interrupted by any claims of business, he lived a life of merely literary activity. Not without considerable influence on his life and circumstances was his connexion with the celebrated statesman Lord Ashley, afterwards Earl of Shaftesbury, in whose house he was always welcome, and where he enjoyed intercourse with the most distinguished men in England. In the year 1670, at the instigation of some of his friends, he sketched the first plan of his celebrated *Essay concerning Human Understanding*. The complete work, however, was published only in 1690. Locke died in 1704, at the age of seventy-two. Precision and clearness, perspicuity and distinctness, are the characteristics of his writings. Acute rather than deep in his thinking, he is true to the character of his nationality. The fundamental thoughts and chief results of his system are now elements of *popular or general information everywhere*, especially in England; but we are not to forget on that account that he was the first to give scientific position to that standard of intelligence, and that he occupies, therefore, however much his principle may fail in any internal capability of development, a legitimate place in the history of philosophy.

Locke's philosophy (that is, his theory of knowledge, for that is the scope of his entire inquiry) rests on two thoughts, the subjects of constant repetition : first (negatively), that there are

no innate ideas; and second (positively), that all our knowledge springs from experience.

Many are of opinion, says Locke, that there are innate ideas, received into the soul at birth, and brought with it into the world. In proof of these ideas, they appeal to the universal existence of them in every human being, without exception. But, even granting this to be the fact, it would prove nothing, if the universality of the agreement could be explained otherwise. But the alleged fact is not fact. Principles, universally admitted, there are none such,—whether in the theoretical or in the practical world. Not in the practical world,—for the spectacle of the various nations, and at the various periods of their history, teaches us that there is no moral rule observable by all. Not in the theoretical world,—for even the propositions which have the greatest pretensions to universal validity, as ‘What is, is’, or, ‘It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be’, are not by any means universally admitted. Children and idiots have no conception of these principles, and neither do the uneducated know anything about such abstract propositions; how, then, can they be implanted in them by nature? Were ideas innate, we should all, of necessity, be aware of them even from our earliest childhood. For ‘to be in the mind’ is the same thing as ‘to be known’. The reply that these ideas are implanted in the mind, only it is unconscious of them, is therefore a manifest contradiction. As little is gained by the plea, that, *so soon as* men make use of their reason, they become conscious of these principles. This allegation is simply false, because said axioms come much later into consciousness than many other particulars of knowledge, and children, for example, give numerous proofs of their exercise of reason before they know that a thing cannot possibly be, and not be. It is certainly correct to say that nobody attains to a consciousness of the principles in question without reason; but it is untrue that, with the first act of reason, they become present to consciousness. The first facts of knowledge, rather, are not general principles, but particular instances (impressions). The child knows that sweet is not bitter, long before it understands the

logical proposition of contradiction. Whoever attentively reflects, will hardly maintain that the particular propositions, 'sweet is not bitter,' for instance,—flow from the general ones. Were these latter innate, they ought to constitute for the child, the first elements of consciousness, for what nature has implanted in the soul must plainly be earlier present to consciousness, than what she has not implanted. The existence of innate ideas, consequently, whether theoretical or practical, is an assumption as much to be rejected as that of an innate existence of arts and sciences. The understanding (or the soul) is in itself a *tabula rasa*, a void surface, a blank page on which nothing has been written.

How, then, does the mind acquire its ideas? They are due to experience, on which all knowledge is founded,—on which, indeed, as its principle, all knowledge depends. Experience, however, is in itself twofold: it is either the perception of the external objects through the special senses, in which case it is named *sensation*; or it is the perception of the internal operations of the soul, in which case it is named the internal sense, or, better, *reflection*. Sensation and reflection furnish the understanding with all its ideas. These faculties are to be regarded as the single window by which the light of the ideas falls into the *camera obscura* of the mind. The external objects supply the ideas of sensible qualities; the internal object again, the life of the soul, supplies the ideas of its own operations. The problem of the philosophy of Locke, then, is to derive and explain the ideas generally, by a reference to these two sources. They are divided, in the first place, into the *simple* and the *complex*. Simple ideas are such as the mind receives from elsewhere, in the same manner as a mirror receives the images of the objects presented to it. They are *partly* such as reach the mind through a single sense, as ideas of colour through sight, of sound through hearing, and of solidity, or impenetrability, through touch; *partly* such as are contributed by several senses, as the ideas, for instance, of extension and motion, which are due to the senses of touch and sight combined; *partly* such as are derived from reflection, as the ideas of thought, and of will; *partly* such,

finally, as spring from sensation and reflection together, as the ideas, for example, of power, unity, succession, etc. These simple ideas constitute the materials, as it were the letters, of all our knowledge. As language now, by means of various combinations of the single letters, forms syllables and words, so the minds, by means of various combinations of the simple ideas, forms the compound or *complex ideas*. These may be reduced to three classes, to ideas, namely, of *modes*, of *substances*, and of *relations*. The ideas of the first class consist of the modifications of space (distance, linear measure, immensity, surface, figure, etc.), of time (duration, eternity), of thought (perception, memory, abstraction), of number, and so on. In particular, Locke subjects to a strict examination the *notion of substance*. He explains its origin in this way: we learn as well from sensation as reflection; that a certain number of simple ideas frequently present themselves together. Being unable to think, now, these simple ideas as self-supported, we accustom ourselves to conceive a self-subsistent substrate as their basis, and to this substrate we give the name of substance. Substance is the unknown something which is thought as the vehicle of such qualities as produce in us the simple ideas. It follows not, however, that substance, though product of our own subjective thought, does not at the same time exist without us. It is rather distinguished from all the other complex ideas, by the fact that it does possess an objectively real archetype without us; while these, spontaneously formed by the mind, are devoid of any correspondent reality. What the archetype of substance is, we know not; we only know the attributes of substances. From the notion of substance Locke passes, in the last place, to that of *relation*. A relation takes place whenever the mind so unites two things that on observation of the one it immediately reverts to the other. All things are capable of being placed in relation by the understanding, or, what is the same thing, of being converted into relatives. It is thus impossible completely to enumerate relations. Locke considers, therefore, only a

few of the more important relations, that of identity and difference among other, but above all, cause and effect. The idea of this relation arises on our perception of how something, whether a substance or a quality, begins to exist in consequence of the action of another something. Thus far the ideas; to the combinations of which, further, we owe the conception of knowledge in general. Knowledge, indeed, is related to the simple and complex ideas as a proposition to its component letters, syllables, and words. It follows from this that our knowledge extends not beyond the range of our ideas, and, consequently, of experience.

These are the principal thoughts of Locke's philosophy; and its empiricism is obvious in them. The mind to it is in itself void, a mere mirror of the external world, a dark room into which the images of the things without fall, without any contribution or action on its part; its entire contents are due to the impressions made on it by material things. *Nihil est in intellectu, quod, non fuerit in sensu*, is the watchword of the position. And if Locke undoubtedly pronounces in these propositions the precedence of matter to mind, he makes the same opinion still more manifest when he thinks it possible, nay, probable, that the soul is a material substance. The converse possibility, that material are subordinate to spiritual things as but a species of the latter, is not entertained by Locke. The soul to him, then, is but secondary to matter, and he takes his place on that position of realism which has been already characterized (vi.). Locke, it is true, has, in the prosecution of his views, not always remained consistent to his principles. Empiricism in his hands is not, in several respects, a perfect structure. We can see already, however, that the subsequent course of this mode of thinking will incline towards a complete denial of the ideal factor.

The empiricism of Locke, so well adapted as it is to the character of his nation, soon became, in England, the dominant philosophy. As occupying the general position, we may name *Isaac Newton*, the great mathematician, (1642-1727), *Samuel Clarke*, a disciple of Newton's, principally interested in moral

philosophy (1675-1729); further, the English moralists of period, *William Wollaston* (1659-1724), the Earl of *Shaftesbury* (1671-1713), *Francis Hutcheson* (1694-1747); and even opponents of Locke, as *Peter Brown* (d. 1735).

VIII—HUME

Locke, as just remarked, was neither consistent nor successful in the completion and realization of empiricism. Although assigning material things a decided superiority to the thinking subject, he made thought, in one respect (in the notion of substance), the prescribing power of the objective world. Of all the complex ideas constructed by subjective thought, one alone, substantiality, possesses for Locke an exceptional character of objective reality; whilst the others, purely subjective, are devoid of any correspondent objectivity. Subjective thought does not only introduce a notion of its own formation, substance, into the objective world, but it asserts, as correspondent to this notion, an objective relation, an objective connexion of things themselves, an existent rationality. In this reference, subjective reason stands, in a certain sort, as dominant over the objective world; for the relation of substantiality is not immediately derived from the world of sense,—it is no product of sensation and perception. On a position purely empirical—and such is the position Locke himself assumes—it was an inconsistency to allow substantiality an objective validity. If the mind is in itself a dark empty room, a blank sheet of paper; if its entire provision of objective knowledge consists merely of the impressions made on it by material things; then the notion of substantiality must be also declared a merely subjective conception, an arbitrary conjunction of ideas; and the subject must be completely emptied and deprived of the last support on which to found any claim of superiority to the world of matter. This step in the direction of a self-consistent empiricism was, in his critique of Causality, taken by Hume.

David Hume was born at Edinburgh in 1711. Engaged in his youth in the study of law, and then in mercantile pursuits, he

devoted himself, at a later period, exclusively to history and philosophy. His first literary attempt attracted scarcely any attention. His *Essays*,—of which there eventually appeared, from 1742 to 1757, five volumes,—experienced a more favourable reception. Hume has discussed in these a variety of philosophical subjects; in the manner of a thoughtful, cultivated, and polished man of the world; to the consequent neglect of any rigorous systematic connexion. After his appointment as librarian, at Edinburgh, in the year 1752, he commenced his celebrated History of England. He was afterwards Secretary of Legation at Paris, where he made the acquaintance of Rousseau; and in 1767 he became Under-Secretary of State, an office, however, which he held only for a short time. His latter years were spent at Edinburgh, in the enjoyment of a tranquil and contented retirement. He died in 1776.

The middle-point of the philosophizing of Hume is his critique of the notion of causality. Locke had already expressed the thought that we owe the notion of substance to the custom of always seeing certain modes together. This thought was taken up seriously by Hume. How do we know, he asks, that two things stand to each other in the relation of causality? We know it neither *a priori*, nor from experience: for knowledge *a priori* extending only to what is identical, and the effect being different from the cause, the former cannot be discovered in the later; and experience, again, exhibits to us only a sequence of two events in time. All our reasonings from experience, therefore, are founded solely on custom. Because we are accustomed to see that one thing follows another in time, we conceive the idea that it *must* follow, and *from* it; of a relation of succession we make a relation of causality. Connexion in time is naturally something different, however, from connexion in causality. In this notion we exceed experience, then, and proceed to the creation of ideas for which in strictness we have no authority. What holds good of causality holds good also of all the other relations of necessity. We find we do possess other such notions, as, for example, that of power, and its realization. Let us ask how we obtain this idea, or the idea of necessary con-

nexion in general. Not possibly through sensation, for external objects may show us indeed simultaneous co-existence, but not necessary connexion. Perhaps, then, through reflection? It certainly seems, as if we might get the idea of power from observing that the organs of the body obey the volitions of the mind. But since neither the means by which the mind acts on the body are known to us, nor all the organs of the body yield obedience to the mind, it follows that, even as regards a knowledge of these operations, it is to experience that we are driven; and as experience again is, for its part, able to exhibit only frequent co-existence, but no real connexion, it results that we obtain the notion of power, as that of all necessary connexion in general, only from being *accustomed* to certain transitions on the part of our ideas. All notions expressive of a relation of necessity, all supposed cognitions of an objective connexion in things, rest at last, consequently, only on the association of ideas. From the denial of the notion of substantiality there followed for Hume the denial of that also of the ego itself. Self, or the ego, did it really exist, would be substantial, a persistent vehicle of inherent qualities. But as our notion of substance is something merely subjective, without any objective reality, it results that there is no correspondent reality for our notion of the ego either. The self or ego is nothing else, in fact, than a complex of numerous swiftly succeeding ideas, under which complex we then suppose placed an imaginary substrate, named by us soul, self, or ego. The self or ego, therefore, rests wholly on an illusion. In the case of such presuppositions, there cannot be any talk naturally of the immortality of soul. The soul being only a complex of our ideas, necessarily ceases with these, and consequently, therefore, with the movements of the body.

After these propositions, which represent the principal thoughts of Hume, there is no call for any further argumentation to prove that Hume's scepticism was but a more consistent following out of Locke's empiricism. If we owe all our knowledge to perception of sense, then all determinations of universality and necessity must, in logical result, disappear; for they are not contained in sensation.

IX. CONDILLAC

To carry out the empiricism of Locke into its ultimate consequence, into sensualism and materialism,—this is the task which has been assumed by the French. Though grown on a soil of English principles, and very soon universally prevalent there, empiricism could not possibly be developed amongst the English into the extreme form which presently declared itself among the French,—that is, into the complete destruction of all the foundations of the moral and religious life. This last consequence was not congenial to the national character of the English. On the contrary, as early as the second half of the eighteenth century, there appeared, in opposition not only to the scepticism of Hume, but even to the empiricism of Locke, that reaction which is named *Scottish Philosophy* (*Reid*, 1704-1796, *Beattie*, *Oswald*, *Dugald Stewart*, 1753-1828). The aim of this philosophy was to establish, in contradistinction to the Lockian *tabula rasa* and the Humian despair of any necessity of reason, certain principles of truth innate or immanent in the subject; and this (in a genuinely English manner), as facts of experience, as facts of the moral instinct and healthy human understanding (common sense); as an element empirically so given, and discoverable by means of observation of ourselves, and reflection on our ordinary consciousness. In France, on other hand, political and social circumstances had so shaped themselves in the course of the eighteenth century, that we can recognise writings which drew relentlessly the ultimate practical consequences of the position,—systems, namely, of a materialistic theory of the world and of a deliberately reasoned egoistic morality,—only as natural results of the universal corruption. The declaration of a great lady in regard to the system of Helvetius, that it only spoke out the secret of everybody, is, in this connexion, familiarly known.

The sensualism of the Abbe de *Condillac* stands closest to the empiricism of Locke. Condillac was born at Grenoble in 1715. In his earliest writings an adherent of the theory of Locke, he subsequently went further, and endeavoured to make good a

philosophical position of his own. Made member of the French Academy in 1768 he died in 1780. His collected writings, which bespeak moral earnestness and religious feeling, compose twenty-three volumes.

Condillac, in agreement with Locke, began from the proposition, that all our knowledge springs from experience. Whilst Locke, however, assumed two sources of this empirical knowledge, sensation and reflection, or external and internal sense, Condillac contended for the reduction of both to one, of reflection to sensation. Reflection is for him equally sensation; all mental processes, even will and the combination of the ideas, are in his eyes only modified sensations. The realization of this conception the derivation of the various mental faculties from external sense,—this constitutes the main interest and the main matter of Condillac's philosophy. He endeavours to demonstrate his leading idea by reference to an imaginary statue, in which,—organized internally indeed like a human being, but destitute at first of any ideas,—one sense after another is conceived gradually to awake and to fill the soul with the various impressions. Man as indebted for all his knowledge and for all his motives to external sensation, appears, in this mode of viewing him, quite on the footing of one of the lower animals. In consistency, therefore, Condillac calls men perfect animals, and the other animals imperfect men. He still shrinks, however, from denial of the existence of God, and equally from assertion of the materiality of the soul. These, the ultimate consequences of sensualism, were taken by others after him; and they lie sufficiently on the surface. For if sensualism maintains, that truth, or what really is, can only be perceived by the senses, we need but take this proposition objectively to have the thesis of materialism : only what is sensuous is, there is no being but material being.

X. HELVETIUS

The moral consequences of the sensualistic position were drawn by *Helvetius*. Let theoretic sensualism declare, that all

our knowledge is determined by external sensation, then practical sensualism adds the analogous proposition, that all our volition as well is determined by external sensation, by the requirements of sense. The satisfaction of our sensuous desires was set up by Helvetius accordingly as the principle of morals.

Helvetius was born at Paris in 1715. Appointed in his twenty-third year to the post of a Farmer-General, he found himself, at an early period of life, in possession of an opulent income. Nevertheless, after a few years, he resigned his place in consequence of the many unpleasant complications in which it involved him. The study of the writings of Locke decided his philosophical creed. Helvetius wrote his famous book *De l'Esprit* in the rural retirement that followed the resignation of his post. It appeared in 1758, and excited, both at home and abroad, great, and often favourable attention, but brought him also much bitter persecution, especially from the priests. Helvetius must have thought it fortunate, however, that they were satisfied with attempting to crush the book. The rural tranquillity in which he passed the later years of his life was only interrupted twice : once by a journey to Germany, and again by a voyage to England. He died in 1771. His personal character was estimable, full of good-nature and love to his fellows. In his post of Farmer-General, he was benevolent to the poor, and sternly opposed to the exactions of his subordinates. His works are written with perspicuity and elegance.

Self-love, interest, says Helvetius, is the lever of all our actions. Even our purely intellectual activities, our desire of knowledge, our traffic in ideas, spring from the love of self. But all self-love tends in the end only to bodily enjoyment. All our actions, therefore, mental and other, have no source or spur but the gratification of sense. And in this there is already indicated where the principle of morality is to be sought. It is absurd to expect men to do the good for the sake of the good. This is as little in their power as to will the bad for the sake of the bad. If, then, morality is not to remain completely fruitless, it must return to its empirical source, and dare to proclaim as its principle the true principle of all action, animal feeling,

pleasure and pain, self-interest. As therefore true legislation procures obedience to the laws by the stimulus of punishment and reward, by self interest; so that only is the true moral principle which, regarding the duties of mankind as results of self-love, demonstrates the general nature of what is forbidden us to be the producing of disgust, etc., in short, of pain. If morality bring not men's interest into play,—if it resist them,—then plainly it will be necessarily fruitless.

XI. FRENCH ILLUMINATION AND MATERIALISM.

It has been already remarked (ix.), that the pushing of empiricism to an extreme, as realized in France, has a very close connexion with the general social and political condition of the French people at the time that precedes the Revolution. The struggle characteristic of the middle ages, the external, dualistic relation to the church, was continued in Catholic France to the confusion and corruption of all the interests of life. Men's minds were demoralized everywhere, especially under the influence of a dissolute court; the state was become an unrestrained despotism; the church had sunk into an equally hypocritical and tyrannical hierarchy. All substance and worth, then, having disappeared from the spiritual world, there was left nothing but nature; in the form, too, of an unspiritualized mass, of matter; and an object for man only as it was subservient to his sensuous greeds and needs. It is, however, not specially the extreme of materialism that constitutes the characteristic of the French illumination. The common character of the so-called *Philosophes* of the eighteenth century in France, is rather their tendency to oppose all the tyranny and corruption that were then prevalent in morals, religion, and the state. They directed their polished and sparkling, rather than strictly scientific critical polemic, against the entire world of received opinions, of the traditional, the given, the positive. They endeavoured to demonstrate the

contradiction in which all that was established in church and state stood to the irrefutable demands of reason. What was received and unquestioned, this—if unable to justify its existence in the sight of reason—they strove to shake in the belief of the world at the same time that they vindicated for man, rational man, the full consciousness of his native freedom. Truly to appreciate the immeasurable merit of these men, we must realize to ourselves the condition of things against which their attacks were directed : the licentiousness of a miserable court that demanded slavish obedience; the tyranny and hypocrisy of a priesthood rotten to the core, that insisted on blind submission; the degradation of a disintegrated church that exacted veneration—in short, an administration of the state, a dispensation of justice, a condition of society that must revolt to the utmost every intellectual principle, and every moral feeling of man. To have exposed to hatred and contempt the baseness and worthlessness of existing interests, summoned the minds of men to indifference for the idols of the world, and awakened them to a consciousness of their automony—this, of these men, is the imperishable glory.

2. The most brilliant and influential spokesman of this period is *Voltaire* (1694-1778). Not a professed philosopher, but an infinitely versatile writer, and an unsurpassed master of expression, he acted more powerfully than any of the philosophers of the time on the whole mode of thought of his age and nation. Voltaire was not an atheist. On the contrary, he considered belief in a Supreme Being so absolutely essential that he said, if there were no God, it would be necessary to invent one. As little did he deny the immortality of the soul, though he frequently expressed doubts of it. The atheistic materialism of a La Mettrie he looked upon as mere stupidity. In these respects, then, he is far from occupying the position of his philosophical successors. On the other hand his heart's hatred is to the *positive* of religion,—the simply *dictated*. He regarded the destruction of hierarchical intolerance as his special mission, and he left no stone unturned in order to accomplish this passionately cherished end. His indefatigable strug-

gle against all positive religion, by advancing information generally, however, essentially prepared the way for the later opponents of spiritualism.

3. Markedly more sceptical is the relation of the *Encyclopædists* to the principles and presuppositions of spiritualism. The philosophical Encyclopædia originated by *Diderot* (1713-1784), and edited by him in conjunction with *D'Alembert*, is a remarkable monument of the spirit which prevailed in France in generation before the Revolution. It was the pride of France at that time, because it spoke out, in a brilliant, universally accessible form, its own inmost convictions. With the keenest wit, it reasoned out of the state law, out of morality free-will, out of nature God, and all this only in interrupted, and for the most part half apprehensive hints. In the other writings of *Diderot* we find considerable philosophical talent combined with a certain depth of earnestness. Still his philosophical views cannot be easily assigned or accurately determined; for both they themselves were of very gradual growth, and *Diderot* trusted himself to express them not without accommodation and reserve. On the whole, however, his mode of thought approached, in the course of its development, nearer and nearer to the extreme of the prevailing philosophical tendency. A deist in his earlier writings, the drift of those subsequently produced amounts to the belief that all is God. At first a defender of the immateriality and immortality of the soul, he peremptorily declares at last, that only the genus endures, that individuals pass, and that immortality is nothing but life in the remembrance of posterity. The consequent extreme of materialism, *Diderot*, however, refused to accept : from that he was rescued by his moral earnestness.

4. The last word of materialism, nevertheless, was, with unhesitating hardihood, spoken out by *Diderot's* contemporary, the physician *La Mettrie* (1709-1751). Anything spiritual, namely, is now a delusion, and physical enjoyment is the chief end of man. As for belief in a God in the first place, *La Mettrie* pronounces it equally groundless and profitless. The world will never be happy till Atheism is universal. Only then shall

we have no more religious wars; only then will those fearfulest of fighting men, the theologians, disappear, and leave the world they have poisoned to return to itself. As for the soul, there can be no philosophy but materialism. All the observations and experiments of the greatest physicians and philosophers pronounce for this. Soul is nothing but an empty name, which gets sense only when understood as that part of the body that thinks. This is the brain, which has its fibres of cogitation, as the legs have their muscles of motion. That man has the advantage of the lower animals, is owing, firstly, to the organization of his brain, and, secondly, to the education it receives. Man, otherwise is an animal like the rest,—in many respects inferior to them. Immortality is an absurdity. The soul, as a part of the body, goes with the body. At death all is 'up', *la farce est jouée !* Moral : let us enjoy while we can, and never throw a chance away.

5. What La Mettrie threw out with levity and a grin, the *Système de la Nature*, as the representative book of philosophical materialism, endeavoured to establish with the seriousness and precision of science,—the doctrine, namely, that nothing exists but matter, and mind is either naught, or only a finer matter.

The *Système de la Nature* appeared pseudonymously in London, in the year 1770, under the name of the deceased Mirabaud, secretary of the Academy. Without doubt it originated in the circle of *beaux esprits* who frequented the table of Baron Holbach, and took its tone from Diderot, Grimm, and others. Whether it was Holbach himself, or his domestic tutor Lagrange, or several together, who wrote the work, it is impossible now to decide. The book is not a French book : the writing is tame and tedious.

There is nowhere anything, says the *Système de la Nature*, but matter and motion. Both are inseparably combined. When matter is at rest, it is at rest only as prevented from moving; it is not itself a dead mass. There are two sorts of motion, attraction and repulsion. From these two we have the various other motions, and from these, again, the various combinations, and so, consequently, the entire multiplicity, of things. The laws

according to which these actions take place are eternal and immutable. The most important results are these :—(a) The materiality of man : man is *equivocal*, as is erroneously supposed, of mind and matter. If we ask, for instance, what then is this thing that is called mind, the usual answer is, that the most accurate philosophical investigations demonstrate the motive principle in man to be a substance which, in its essence, is incomprehensible indeed, but which is known, for all that, to be indivisible, unextended, invisible, etc. But how are we to find anything definite or conceivable in a being that is but a negation of all that constitutes knowledge—a being, the very idea of which is but the absence of all idea whatever ? Moreover, how is it explicable, on the supposition in view, that a being, not material, itself, can act on, and give movement to, beings which are material, although plainly there can exist no point of contact between them ? The truth is, that those who distinguish their soul from their body, only distinguish their brain from their body. Thought is only a modification of the brain, as will is but another modification of the same corporeal organ. (b) On a par with this duplication of himself into soul and body, there is in man another chimera—belief in the existence of a God. This belief has its origin, like the assumption of a soul, in a false distinction of mind from matter, in an unwarrantable doubling of nature. Man referred the evils he experienced, and of which he was unable to detect the natural causes, to a God, a God which he had fabled for himself. Fear, suffering, ignorance,—these, then, are the sources of our first ideas of a God. We tremble, because our forefathers, thousands of years ago, trembled before us. This is not a circumstance to create any favourable pre-judgment. But it is not only the cruder conception of God that is worthless, the more elaborate theological theory is equally so, for it explains not one single phenomenon of nature. It is full, too, of absurdities, for in ascribing moral attributes to God, it humanizes him, and yet, by means of a mass of negative attributes, it would, at the very same moment, distinguish him, and in the most absolute manner, from all other beings. The true system, the sys-

tem of nature, is consequently Atheism. Such a creed requires, on the one side, education, and, on the other, courage; for it is not the possession as yet of all, nor even of many. If by atheist there is understood a man who believes only in *dead* matter, or if by God, the *moving power* in nature, then, certainly, a single Atheist cannot possibly exist, unless he were a fool. But if by Atheist is understood one that denies the existence of an immaterial being, of a being whose imaginary qualities can only disturb mankind, then, in that sense, there are Atheists, and there would be still more of them, were a sound understanding general, and did a true idea of nature more commonly obtain. But Atheism being truth, it must be spread. There are many, it is true, who having rescued themselves from the yoke of religion, still believe in its necessity for the herd, in order to keep it in bounds. But this is nothing else than to poison a man to prevent him from abusing his gifts. Any deism is necessarily but a direct step to superstition, for pure deism is a position not possibly tenable. (c) With such presuppositions there can be no talk of the immortality and free-will of man. Man is not different from the other things of nature. Like them, he is a link in the indissoluble chain, a blind tool in the hands of necessity. Did anything possess the ability to move itself, that is, to produce a motion not referable to any other cause, it would have power to bring to a stop the motion of the universe; but that is impossible, for the universe is an infinite series of necessary motions, which continue and propagate themselves to all eternity. The assumption of individual immortality is a nonsensical hypothesis. For to maintain that the soul endures after the destruction of the body, is to maintain that a function may remain when its organ has disappeared. Other immortality there is none than that of fame in the future. (d) The results, practically, of the theory, afford a powerful support to the system of nature; and the utility of a theory is always the best criterion of its truth. Whilst the ideas of theologians can only disquiet and torment man, the system of nature relieves him from all such anxieties, teaches him to enjoy the present, and furnishes him with that apathy for the compliant

bearing of his lot, which everybody must esteem a happiness. Morality, to be practical, must be founded on self-love, on interest; it must be able to show the individual in what his well-understood advantage lies. That man who follows his own interest so that other men for their interest must contribute to his, is a good man. A system of self-interest, then, promotes the union of mankind mutually, and consequently also true morality.

This consistent dogmatic materialism of the *Système de la Nature* is the utmost extreme of the empirical tendency, and closes, consequently, the systems of abstract realism that began with Locke. The derivation and explanation of the ideal from and by the material world, initiated by Locke, have terminated in materialism, in the reduction of the spiritual to the material principle, in the denial of spirit generally. We have now, before going further to consider, as already intimated (vi.), the other or idealistic series which runs parallel with the realistic one. And at its head is *Leibnitz*.

XII.—LEIBNITZ

If empiricism was animated by a desire to subordinate mind to matter, to materialize mind, idealism will seek, on the contrary, to spiritualize matter, or so to construe the idea of spirit that matter shall be subsumed under it. If to the former, spirit was nothing but a finer matter, matter to the latter will prove itself, conversely, only crassified spirit (or, as Leibnitz expresses it, only 'confused ideation'). The one, indeed, was, in logical consistency, driven to the proposition. There are only material things; the other, again (in Leibnitz and Berkeley), will take stand by the opposed result. There are only spirits (souls), and the thoughts of spirits (ideas). For the one-sided realistic stand-point, material things were the veritable substantial element; while, contrariwise, for the correspondent idealistic stand-point, this element will be only spiritual beings, egos. Spirit was to one-sided realism in itself empty, a *tabula rasa*, dependent on the external world for its entire provision. One-sided idealism,

on the contrary, will strive to the proposition. That nothing can come into the soul, that is not at least preformed within it. That all its knowledge must be derivative from itself. To the former mode of view, knowledge was a passive relation; to the latter, it will appear an active one. Lastly, if abstract realism prefer to explain the becoming and eventuality of nature by real grounds, or mechanically (*L'Homme Machine* is the title of a work by La Mettrie), abstract idealism will seek its explanation, *ex contrario*, in ideal grounds, or teleologically. Or if the former asked, by predilection, for efficient causes, and often even ridiculed the demand for final causes, it will be to these that the latter will direct its principal aim. The notion of design, in short, the teleological harmony of all things (pre-established harmony), will now be looked to for the means of union between spirit and matter, between thinking and being. In this way the stand-point of the philosophy of Leibnitz may be briefly characterized.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz was born in 1646 at Leipsic, where his father held a professor's chair. Having chosen Law for his profession, he entered the university in 1661; he defended, in 1663, for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, his dissertation *De Principio Individui* (a characteristic thesis when we regard his subsequent philosophizing); thereafter he went to Jena, later to Altdorf, where he took the degree of Doctor of Laws. A chair of jurisprudence offered him in Altdorf he declined. His further career is an erratic, busy life of movement, chiefly at courts, where, as an accomplished courtier, he was employed in the most multiform affairs, diplomatic and other. In the year 1672 he went to Paris, charged in effect with a commission to persuade Louis xiv to attempt the conquest of Egypt, and so divert that monarch's dangerous military inclinations from Germany. From Paris he passed to London; thence, in the capacity of councillor and librarian of the learned Catholic duke, John Frederic, to Hanover, where he spent the most of his remaining life, not without the interruption, however, of numerous journeys to Vienna, Berlin, etc. He stood on terms of intimacy with the Prussian Queen, Sophia Charlotte, a talented lady

who gathered around her a circle of the most eminent *savants* of the period, and for whom Leibnitz, at her own instigation, had undertaken the composition of his *Theodicee*. His proposal for the institution of an academy in Berlin obtained effect in 1700, and he became its first president. Similar proposals in regard to Dresden and Vienna were without result. By the Emperor Charles vi., he was made a member of the imperial aulic council in 1711, and raised to the rank of Baron. Soon afterwards he made a considerable stay at Vienna, where, at the suggestion of Prince Eugene, he composed his *Monadologie*. He died in 1716. Leibnitz, after Aristotle, is the polymath of the greatest genius that ever lived. He united the greatest, the most penetrating power of intellect with the richest and most extensive erudition. Germany has a special call to be proud of him, for, after Jacob Bohm, he is the first important philosopher whom we Germans can claim. Through him philosophy was naturalized among us. Unfortunately, partly the multiplicity of his engagements and literary undertakings, partly his wandering way of life, prevented him from accomplishing any connected exposition of his philosophy as a whole. His views are chiefly set out only in short occasional papers, or in letters, and generally in French. For this reason an inwardly coherent summary of his philosophy is by no means easy, although none of his opinions can be said to be isolated from the rest, but all of them stand in sufficiently exact connection with each other. The following are the main points of view :

1. The System of Monads—The fundamental characteristic of the teaching of Leibnitz is its difference from that of Spinoza. Spinoza had made the one universal substance the single *positive* element in existence. Leibnitz, too, takes the notion of substance for the foundation of his philosophy, but he defines it differently; conceiving substance as eminently the living activity, the working force, and adducing as example of this force a bent bow, which asserts its power so soon as all external obstacles are withdrawn. That active force constitutes

the quality of substance, is a proposition to which Leibnitz always returns, and with which the other elements of his philosophy most intimately cohere. This is applicable at once to the two further determinations of substance (also quite opposed to the theory of Spinoza), firstly, that substance is individual, a monad, and, secondly, that there is a plurality of monads. Substance, in exercising an activity similar to that of an elastic body, is essentially an excludent power, repulsion : but what excludes others from itself is a personallty, an individuality or *individuum*, a monad. But this involves the second consideration, that of the plurality of the monads. It is impossible for one monad to exist, unless others exist. The notion of an *individuum* postulates *individua*, which as excluded from it, stand over against it. In antithesis to the philosophy of Spinoza, therefore, the fundamental thesis of that of Leibnitz is this : there is a plurality of monads which constitutes the element of all reality, the fundamental being of the whole physical and spiritual universe.

2. The Exacter Specification of the Monads is the next consideration. The monads of Leibnitz are, in general, similar to the Greek atoms. Like the latter, they are punctual unities, insusceptible of influence from without, and indestructible by any external power. If similar, they are also, however, dissimilar, and in important characteristics. Firstly, the atoms are not distinguished from one another; they are qualitatively alike: the monads, on the other hand, are qualitatively different; each is a special world apart; none is like the other. To Leibnitz, no two things in the world are quite alike. Secondly, the atoms, as extended, are divisible; the monads, on the contrary, are actual (indivisible) points, metaphysical points. In order not to be repelled by this proposition (for it is natural to object that no aggregate of inextended things, like the monads, can ever account for extended things), it is necessary for us to recollect that Leibnitz regards space, not as real, but only as confused subjective conception. Thirdly, the monad is a living spiritual being, a soul. In the atomists there is nothing whatever of this idea; but with Leibnitz it plays a very important part.

Everywhere in the world, there is to Leibnitz life, living individuality, and living connexion of individualities. The monads are not dead, as mere extended matter is; they are self-subsistent, self-identical, and indeterminable from without. Considered (*a*) in themselves, however, they are to be thought as centres of living activity, living mutation. As the human soul, a monad of elevated rank, is never, even when unconscious, free from the action of at least obscure thought and will, so every other monad continually undergoes a variety of modifications or conditions of being, correspondent to its own proper quality. Everywhere there is movement, nowhere is there dead rest. And (*b*) as it is with the human soul, which sympathizes with all the varying states of nature, which mirrors the universe, so it is with the monads universally. Each—and they are infinitely numerous—is also a mirror, a centre of the universe, a microcosm : everything that is or happens is reflected in each, but by its own spontaneous power, through which it holds ideally in itself, as if in germ, the totality of things. By him, then, who shall look near enough, all that in the whole huge universe happens, has happened, or will happen, may, in each individual monad, be, as it were, read. This livingness of the monads themselves, and of their relation to the rest of the world, is more particularly characterized by Leibnitz in this way, that he represents the life of the monads to consist in a continuous sequence of perceptions, that is, of dimmer or clearer ideas of their own states, and of those of all the rest; the monads proceed from perception to perception; all, consequently, are souls; and that constitutes the perfection of the world.

3. The Pre-established Harmony.—The universe, then, is but sum of the monads. Everything, or everything that is composite, is an aggregate of monads. Every body is an organism, not a single substance but a complex of substances, a plurality of monads, just as a machine, even in its minutest parts, consists of machines. Leibnitz compares bodies to a fish-pond, the component parts of which live, though it cannot be said that the pond itself lives. The usual conception of

things is thus completely turned upside down; from the point of view of the monadology, it is not the body, the aggregate, that is the substantial element, but its constituent parts. There is no such thing as matter in the vulgar sense of insensible extension. How then are we to think the inner connexion of the universe? In the following manner. Every monad is a perceiving being, but each is different from each. This difference, plainly, must be essentially a difference of perception; there must be as many various degrees of perception as there are monads, and these degrees may be arranged in stages. A main distinguishing difference is that of the more confused and the more distinct cognition. A monad of the lowest rank (*une monade toute nue*), is one that just conceives and no more, that has its place, that is, on the stage of the most confused cognition. Leibnitz compares this state to a swoon, or to our condition in a dreamless sleep, in which we are not indeed without ideas (else we should have none on awaking), but in which the ideas neutralize themselves by their own number, and never attain to consciousness. This is the stage of inorganic nature, on which the life of the monads expresses itself only in the form of motion. Those are higher monads in which thought is formative vitality, but still without consciousness. This is the stage of plants. It is a further advance in the life of the monads when they attain to sensation and memory, which is the case in the animal world. Whilst the inferior monads only sleep, the animal monads dream. When the soul rises to reason and reflection it is named spirit. The distinction of the monads, then, is that, though each mirrors the whole universe and the same universe, each at the same time mirrors it differently, the one less, and the other more perfectly. Each contains the entire universe, entire infinitude within itself. Each, then, resembles God in this, or is a *parvus in suo genere deus*. The difference is this only, that God knows all with perfect distinctness, while the monads perceive with less or more confusion. The limitation of any one monad, then, consists not in its possessing less than any other, or even than God, but, in its possessing the common fund in a more imperfect manner, inasmuch as it

attains not to a distinct knowledge of all. So conceived, the universe affords us a spectacle, as well of the greatest possible unity, as of the greatest possible variety; for if each monad mirrors the same universe, each also mirrors it differently. But this is a spectacle of the greatest possible perfection, or of *absolute harmony*. For variety in unity is harmony. In another respect also the universe is a system of harmony. Since the monads act not on one another, and each follows the laws of own being, there is a risk of the inner agreement of the universe being disturbed. In what manner is this risk precluded? In this way, that each monad stands in living relation to the whole universe and the same universe, or that the universe and the life of the universe are completely reflected in each. In consequence of this reciprocal correspondency of their perceptions, the alterations of all the monads are mutually parallel; and precisely in this (as pre-established by God) consists the harmony of the all.

4. What is the relation of God now to the monads? What part does the *notion of God* play in the system of Leibnitz? One certainly, without much to do. In strict consistency, Leibnitz ought not to have entertained any question of Theism; for in his system the harmony of the whole must be regarded as having taken the place of God. He usually designates God as the sufficient reason (*la raison suffisante*) of all the monads. But he commonly regards the final cause of a thing as its sufficient reason. Leibnitz, then, on this question, is not far from identifying God with the absolute final cause. At other times he designates God as the primitive simple substance, or as the single primitive unity, or again as pure immaterial actuality, *actus purus* (the actuality of the monads, on the other hand, is matter, an actuality—a *nisus*, *appetitus*—not in pure freedom, but limited, obstructed, by a principle of passive resistance to the movement of spontaneity), or even again as monad (this however in evident contradiction to his other specifications). It was a hard matter for Leibnitz to bring—without abandoning the presuppositions of both,—his monadology and his Theism into unison. If he assumes the substantiality of the

monads, he runs the risk of losing their dependence on God, and in the opposite case, he relapses into Spinozism.

5. The Relation of Soul and Body admits of a particular explanation with reference to the pre-established harmony. On the presuppositions of the *Monadologie*, this relation might easily appear enigmatic. If one monad cannot act on another, how is it possible for the soul to act on the body, to put it in motion, to guide it in motion? The pre-established harmony solves this problem. Soul and body certainly do follow, each in independence of the other, the laws of its own being,—the body, laws that are mechanical; the soul, laws that are ends. But God has instituted so harmonious an agreement of the two factors, so complete a parallelism of both functions, that, in point of fact, there is a perfect unity of soul and body. There are, says Leibnitz, three views of the relation between soul and body. The first, the usual one, assumes a mutual action of both. This view is untenable; for between spirit and matter there can be no reciprocity. The second, that of occasionalism (iv. I), attributes this reciprocity to the continual assistance of God; but that is as much as to make God a *Deus ex machina*. There remains, then, for the solution of the problem only the assumption of a pre-established harmony. Leibnitz illustrates these three views by the following example. Let us suppose two watches, the hands of which always indicate exactly the same time. This agreement may be explained, firstly, by the assumption of an actual union between the hands of both watches, in such a manner that the hands of the one draw those of the other along with them (the usual view); secondly by assuming that a watchmaker always sets the one watch by the other (the occasionalistic view); and finally, by a third assumption, that both watches possess so complete a mechanism, that each, though in perfect independence, goes also in perfect agreement with the other (the pre-established harmony). That the soul is immortal (indestructible), follows of itself from the nature of the theory. Properly there is no such thing as death. What is called death consists only in the loss to the soul of a part of the monads which constituted the machine

of its body, at the same time that the living principle returns to a condition similar to that which it possessed before it appeared on the theatre of the world.

6. On the Theory of Knowledge the consequences of the *Monadologie* have a very important bearing. As with reference to ontology, the philosophy of Leibnitz is conditioned by its opposition to Spinozism, so with reference to the theory of cognition, it is conditioned by its opposition to the empiricism of Locke. Locke's inquiry into the human understanding interested Leibnitz without satisfying him; and, in his *Nouveaux Essais*, he set on foot, therefore, a counter inquiry, in which he was led to defend *innate ideas*. But Leibnitz freed this hypothesis from the imperfect conception of it which had justified the objections of Locke. Innate ideas are not to be supposed *expliciter* and consciously, but only *impliciter* and potentially, contained in the soul. The soul has power to bring them into existence out of its own self. All thoughts are properly innate: they come not into the soul from without, but are produced by it from its own self. An external influence on the soul is incapable of being thought; even for the sensations of sense, it is not in want of any outer things. If Locke compares the soul to a blank sheet of paper, Leibnitz, for his part, compares it to a block of marble in which the veins prefigure the shape of the statue. The usual contrast between rational and empirical knowledge shrinks for Leibnitz, therefore, into the graduated difference of less or more distinctness. Amongst the innate theoretical ideas, two, as principles of all cognition and of all reasoning, occupy for Leibnitz the first rank,—the proposition of contradiction (*principium contradictionis*), and the proposition of the sufficient reason (*principium rationis sufficientis*). To these, as a proposition of the second rank, he adds the *principium indiscernibilium*, or the proposition that there are not in nature two things perfectly alike.

7. The theological opinions of Leibnitz are expressed at fullest in his *Theodicee*. This however, is his weakest book, and stands only in a very loose connexion with his remaining philosophy. Originating in the request of a lady, it belies this ori-

gin neither in its form nor in its matter. Not in its form, for in its striving to popularity of statement it becomes diffuse and unscientific. Not in its matter, for it carries further its accommodation to the positive dogma and the presuppositions of theology than the scientific principles of the system permit. Leibnitz discusses in this work the relation of God to the world, in order to demonstrate design in this relation, and vindicate God from the imputation of having, in his works, done anything without purpose, or against reason. Why has the world precisely *this* form? God surely might have made it quite different from what it is. Without doubt, Leibnitz replies, God saw the possibility of infinite worlds; but out of them all he chose this. This is the famous doctrine of a best of all possible worlds, according to which any more perfect world than the existent world is impossible. But how, then? Does not the existence of evil contradict this? In answer to this objection, Leibnitz distinguishes evil into three sorts,—into metaphysical evil, physical evil, and moral evil. Metaphysical evil, or the imperfection and finitude of things, is as inseparable from finite existence, and therefore unconditionally willed by God, necessary. Physical evil (pain, etc.), is certainly not unconditionally willed by God, but only conditionally, as in the form of punishment, or of corrective. Moral evil, or the bad, can, on the contrary, not be willed by God. To explain its existence, then, and remove its apparent contradiction to the notion of God, Leibnitz tries several shifts. He says, at one time, that the bad is only permitted by God as a *conditio sine qua non*, for without the bad there were no free will, and without free will there were no virtue. At another time he reduces moral to metaphysical evil. The bad, he says, is not anything real; it is only absence of perfection, negation, limitation: it plays the same part as shading in a painting, or dissonance in music, neither of which lessens the perfection present, but enhances it by contrast. At another time, again, he distinguishes between what is material and what formal in an act that is bad: the material element of sin, or the power to act, comes from God; but the formal element, or what is bad in the

act, belongs to man, is the result of his limitation : or, as Leibnitz sometimes expresses it, of his eternal self predestination. In no case is the harmony of the universe disturbed by the bad.

These are the fundamental ideas of the philosophy of Leibnitz. The preceding exposition will have substantiated the general summary which heads the section.

XIII. BERKELEY

Idealism in Leibnitz has not yet reached its ultimate extreme. On the one hand, indeed, space, motion, material things, were to him phenomena that existed only in confused perception; but, on the other hand, the existence of the material world was not directly denied by him; rather, on the contrary, its essential reality was acknowledged in the very conception of the world of monads. The world of sense is supposed to possess in the monads its fixed and substantial foundation. And thus, then, Leibnitz, idealist though he be, has not yet quite broken with realism. To have declared corporeal existences *mere* phenomena, mere subjective perceptions or conceptions without foundation of objective reality, or, in other words, entirely to have denied the reality of an objective world of sense,—this would have been the ultimate consequence of a perfectly pure idealism. This consequence—the idealistic counterpart of the realistic extreme, materialism—was taken by *George Berkeley* (b. in Ireland 1685, made bishop 1734, d. 1753). We must therefore rank him—as completer of idealism—in the same series as Leibnitz, although he stands in no external connexion with the latter, but is related rather to the empiricism of Locke.

Our sensations, says Berkeley, are altogether subjective. When we believe ourselves to feel or perceive independent external objects, that is an error : what we so feel and perceive are only our sensations and perceptions themselves. It is evident, for example, that neither the distance, nor the size and

form of objects are, properly, through the sensations of sense *seen* : these qualities we *infer* rather in consequence of having experienced that a certain sensation of sight is attended by certain sensations of touch. What we *see* are only colours, light, dark, etc., and it is therefore altogether untrue to say that we see and feel *one and the same thing*. In the case, then, of the very sensations to which we attach the most specially objective character, we are still within ourselves. The proper objects of our mind are only our own affections, and all objective ideas, therefore, are but our own sensations. An idea can just as little as a sensation exist apart from the subject of it. What are called things consequently exist only in our percipient mind : their *esse* is a mere *percipi*. Almost all philosophers are misled by the fundamental error of conceiving material things to exist apart from the mind that perceives them, and of failing to see that things are only something mental. How could material things possibly produce anything so utterly different from themselves as sensations and perceptions ? There exists not, then, any *material* external world : *only spirits exist*, thinking beings whose nature consists of conception and volition. But whence then do we receive our sensations, which come to us without our help, which are not products of our own will, like the forms of phantasy ? We receive them from a spirit superior to our own (for only a spirit were able to produce ideas in us), we receive them from God. God, then, gives us the ideas; but it were a contradiction for a being to communicate ideas and yet have none : the ideas consequently, which we receive from God, exist *in God*. In God they may be called archetypes, in us ectypes. This theory, according to Berkeley, nevertheless, does not deny to objects a reality independent of us; it denies only the possibility of their existing anywhere but in a mind. Instead, therefore, of speaking of a connected nature in which the sun (say) were the cause of heat, etc., we ought to express ourselves with accuracy thus : through the visual sensation, God announces to us that we shall soon experience a tactual one of heat. By nature we must understand, therefore, only the succession or co-existence of ideas; by laws of nature, again,

the constant order in which they accompany or follow one another, that is, the laws of their associations. This consistent pure idealism is, in its complete denial of matter in the strict sense, the surest way, according to Berkeley, of destroying scepticism and atheism.

XIV. WOLFF

The idealism of Berkeley remained naturally without any further development. The philosophy of Leibnitz, on the other hand, found continuation and rearrangement at the hands of *Christian Wolff* (b. 1679 at Breslau; removed, by a cabinet-order of Nov. 8, 1723, from his chair of philosophy at Halle, after a long course of disagreement with the theological professors there, because the doctrines he taught were opposed to the revealed truth of the Word of God, and required, under penalty of the halter, to quit the Prussian territory within forty-eight hours; then Professor in Marburg, recalled by Frederic II immediately on his accession to the throne; subsequently raised to the rank of Baron of the Empire; d. 1754). In his main thoughts (with omission, it is true, of the bolder ideas of his predecessor) he adhered to the philosophy of Leibnitz,—an adhesion which he himself admits, though he resists the identification of his philosophy with that of Leibnitz, and rejects the name *Philosophia Leibnitio-Wolfiana*, originated by his disciple Bilfinger. Wolff's historical merit is threefold. He was the first, in especial, to claim again, in the name of philosophy, the entire field of knowledge—the first who attempted to construct again a systematic whole of doctrine, an encyclopædia of philosophy in the highest sense of the word. If he has not indeed contributed much new material to the work, he has at least skilfully availed himself of that already provided to his hand, and arranged it with a certain architectonic spirit. Secondly, he again made philosophical method as such an object of attention. His own method, indeed, as the mathematical (mathematico-syllogistic) method recommended by Leibnitz, is a method quite external to the matter; but even

this platitudinizing formalism (for example, the eighth theorem in Wolff's *Elements of Architecture* runs thus : 'A window must be wide enough to allow two persons to place themselves conveniently at it,' a theorem which is then proved thus : 'It is a common custom to place one's-self at a window, and look from it in company with another person. As now it is the duty of the architect to consult in all respects the intentions of the builder [Sect. I] he will necessarily make the window wide enough to allow two persons to place themselves conveniently at it—*q. e. d.*'), even this formalism possesses the advantage of rendering philosophical matter more readily intelligible. Wolff, finally, first taught philosophy to speak German, an accomplishment which it has never since unlearned. To him (after Leibnitz, to whom the first impulse is due) belongs the merit of having for ever raised the German language into the organ of philosophy.

As regards the matter and scientific classification of the Wolfian philosophy, the following remarks may suffice. Wolff defines philosophy to be the science of the possible, as such. Possible is what involves no contradiction. Wolff defends this definition from the reproach of assumption. He does not pretend by it, he says, that he or any philosopher knows all that is possible. He means by it only to claim for philosophy the whole field of human knowledge; and he thinks it always better, in defining philosophy, to have in view the highest perfection of which it is capable, however much it may, in actuality, fall short of it. Of what does this science of the possible consist? Wolff, relying on the empirical fact, that there are in us two faculties, one of the cognition and another of volition, divides philosophy into two great branches, into theoretical philosophy (an expression, however, which is first employed by his disciples) or metaphysics, and into practical philosophy. Logic precedes both as propædeutical of the study of philosophy in general. Metaphysics, again, are subdivided into (a.) Ontology, (b.) Cosmology, (c.) Psychology, (d.) Natural Theology; while the subdivisions of practical philosophy are (a.) Ethics (the object of which is man as man), (b.) Econo-

mics (the object of which is man as member of the family), and (c.) Politics (the object of which is man as member of the state).

(a) *Ontology*, then, is the first part of metaphysics. It treats of what are now called categories, of those radical notions of thought which as applicable to all objects, must be first investigated. Aristotle was the first to propose a table of such principles, but he had got at his categories only empirically. Nor does it succeed much better with the ontology of Wolff, which looks like a philosophical vocabulary. At the top of it Wolff places the proposition of contradiction : the same thing cannot at once be and not be. The notion of possibility comes next. Possible is what involves no contradiction. That is necessary, the contrary of which is a contradiction : that contingent, the contrary of which is equally possible. All that is possible, though only imaginary, is something; while whatever neither is, nor is possible, is nothing. When one thing is made up of many things, the former is a whole, the latter are parts. The magnitude of anything lies in the number of its parts. If one thing A implies something that renders it intelligible why another thing B is, then that in A that renders B intelligible is the ground of B. The whole A that contains the ground is a cause. What contains the ground of its other qualities is the principle (nature) of the thing. Space is the order of things that are together; place the special manner in which one thing exists simultaneously with all others. Motion is change of place. Time is the order of what is successive, etc. (b) *Cosmology*.—Wolff defines the world to be a series of mutable things which exist beside and follow after one another, but as a whole are so connected with one another that the one always contains the ground of the other. Things are connected together either in space or time. The world, by reason of this universal connexion, is one, a compound. The mode of composition constitutes the nature of the world. This mode is incapable of change. Ingredients can neither be added to it, nor taken from it. All alterations in the world must arise from its own nature. In this reference the world is a machine. Events in the world are

only hypothetically necessary, so far, that is, as those that preceded them have been so and so; they are contingent, so far as the world might have been constituted differently. As regards the question whether the world has a beginning in time, Wolff vacillates. As God is independent of time, the world again eternally *in* time, the latter cannot be eternal in the same manner as God. Neither space nor time is to Wolff anything substantial. A body is what is composed of matter, and possesses moving force. The forces of a body are named collectively its nature, and the sum of all beings is nature in general. What has its ground in the nature of the world, is natural; what not, is supernatural, or a miracle. Wolff treats, lastly, of the perfection and imperfection of the world. The perfection of the world lies in this, that all things, whether simultaneous or successive, mutually agree. But as everything has its own special rules, each individual must dispense with as much perfection as is necessary to the symmetry of the whole. (c) *Rational psychology*.—What in us is conscious of its own self, that is soul. The soul is conscious of other things also. Consciousness is distinct or indistinct. Distinct consciousness is thought. The soul is a simple, incorporeal substance. It possesses the power of perceiving the world. In this sense a soul may be conceded to the lower animals; but a soul possessed of understanding and will, is spirit, and spirit is the possession of man alone. A spirit which is in union with a body is properly a soul, and this is the distinction between man and the superior beings. The movements of the soul and those of the body mutually agree by reason of the pre-established harmony. The freedom of the human will consists in the power to choose which of two possible things appears the better. But the will does not decide without motives; it always chooses that only which it esteems preferable. The will would appear thus to be compelled to act by its ideas; but the understanding is not compelled to accept something as good or as bad; and neither is the will, therefore, under compulsion, but free. Our souls, as simple, are indivisible, and therefore imperishable; the lower animals, however, being devoid of understanding, are incapable after

death of reflecting on their bypast life. Only the human soul is capable of this, and only the human soul, therefore, is immortal. (d) *Natural Theology*.—Wolff here proves the existence of God by the cosmological argument. God might have created many worlds, but *this* world he created as the best. This world is called into existence by the will of God. His intention in creating it was the expression of his perfection. The evil in the world springs not from the will of God, but from the limited nature of human things. God permits it only as means to the good.

This brief aphoristic exposition of Wolff's metaphysics will show how closely it is related to that of Leibnitz. The latter loses, however, in speculative depth, in consequence of the exclusively popular form (form of *understanding* proper) which it receives at the hands of Wolff. What with Wolff recedes most into the background is the specific peculiarity of the monadology: his simple beings are not concipient like the monads, but return more to the nature of the atoms: hence in his case numerous inconsistencies and contradictions. His special metaphysical value lies in the ontology, to which he has given a much more accurate development than his predecessors. A multitude of technical terms owe to him their formation and introduction into the language of philosophy.

The philosophy of Wolff, clear and readily intelligible as it was, more accessible, moreover, than that of Leibnitz, in consequence of being composed in German, soon became popular philosophy, and acquired an extensive influence. Among those who have made themselves meritorious by its scientific extension, are particularly to be mentioned *Thümming* (1687-1728), *Bilfinger* (1693-1750), *Baumeister* (1708-1785), *Baumgarten* (of æsthetic renown, 1714-1762), and *Meier* (1718-1777), the disciple of Baumgarten.

XV. THE GERMAN ILLUMINATION

Under the influence of the Leibnitz-Wolfian philosophy, but without any scientific connexion with it, there arose in

Germany, during the second half of the eighteenth century, a popular philosophy of an eclectic nature, the many forms of which have been comprehended under the general name of the *German illumination*. The importance of this movement consists less in its relation to the history of philosophy than in its relation to the history of general culture : for it is at *formation* and *information*, the intellectual production of people of liberal minds (*Basedow*), that it aims; and thus enlightened reflection, intelligent moralization (in soliloquies, letters, morning meditations, etc.) is the form in which it philosophizes. It is the *German* counterpart of the *French* illumination. As the latter closes the *realistic* series with its own extreme, materialism or objectivity devoid of mind, so the former brings the *idealistic* series to an end in its tendency to an extreme of subjectivity from which all objectivity has been banished. To people of this way of thinking, the empirical individual ego, as such, ranks as the absolute, as exclusive authority; for it they forget all else, or rather all else has value for them only in proportion as it relates to the subject, subserves the subject, contributes to the advancement and internal satisfaction of the subject. It is thus that the question of the immortality of the soul is now the chief philosophical problem (in which reference *Mendelssohn*, 1729-1786, is particularly to be named as the most important individual in the movement); the eternal duration of the soul is the chief object of interest; the more objective ideas or articles of faith, as the personality of God, for instance, are not by any means questioned, but in general, little interest can be felt in them, for that nothing can be known of God is now a fixed conviction. Both being of subjective interest, scientific attention is bestowed in the second place on moral philosophy (*Garve*, 1742-1798, *Engel*, 1741-1802, *Abbt*, 1738-1766) and æsthetics (particularly *Sulzer*, 1720-1779). In general the consideration of what is profitable, of the particular end, is what occupies the foreground; utility is the special criterion of truth; what serves not the subject, advances not the interests of the subject, is thrown aside. In harmony with this intellectual tendency is that towards a predominatingly teleological mode of viewing

nature (*Reimarus*, 1694-1765), as well as the eudæmonistic character of the ethical principles in vogue. The happiness of the individual is regarded as the highest principle, as the supreme end (*Basedow*, 1723-1790). *Reimarus* wrote a work on the 'advantages' of religion, and endeavoured to prove in it that the tendency of religion is not to injure earthly enjoyments, but rather to add to them. In the same way *Steinbart* (1738-1809) laboured in several works to establish the thesis, that all wisdom consists in the attainment of happiness, that is of enduring pleasure, and that the Christian religion, far from forbidding this, is itself a system of eudæmonism. For the rest, there was entertained towards Christianity only a moderate respect; any claim, on its part, to an authority that might seem disagreeable to the subject (as in the dogma of a Hell) was resisted; the desire, on the whole, was to replace the positive dogma, so far as possible, by natural religion; *Reimarus*, for example, the most zealous defender of theism and natural theology. is the author also of the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments*. The new-won consciousness of his own rights was exercised by the subject in criticising the positive and traditional element (the evangelical history), and in rationalizing the supernatural. Finally, the subjective character of the period reveals itself in the prevalent literary mannerism of autobiographies, confessions, etc.; the isolated ego is an object to itself of admiring study (*Rousseau*, 1712-1778, and his *Confessions*); it holds the mirror up to its own particular states, its own sentiments, its own excellent intentions—a coquetting with its own self that often rises to morbid sentimentality. From what has been said, then, it will now appear that the extreme of subjectivity constitutes the character of the illumination in Germany. This illumination, therefore, forms the completion and the close of the previous idealistic tendency.

XVI. TRANSITION TO KANT.

Idealism and realism, the objects of our attention for some
MP.10

time now, have both ended in one-sided extremes. Instead of reconciling from within, as it were, the contradiction of thought and existence, they have both issued in a denial of the one or the other factor. To realism matter was one-sidedly the absolute, to idealism the empirical ego, extremes both which threatened to convert philosophy into unphilosophy. In Germany, as in France, indeed, it had sunk to the flattest popular philosophy. But now *Kant* appeared, and again united in a common bed the two branches that, isolated from each other, seemed on the point of being lost in the sands. Kant is the great restorer of philosophy, again conjoining into unity and totality the one-sided philosophical endeavours of those who preceded him. Polemically or ironically he is related to all of them, to Locke as much as to Hume, to the Scottish philosophers not less than to the earlier English and French moralists, to the Leibnitz-Wolfian philosophy as well as to the materialism of the French, and the eudæmonism of the German illumination. As regards his relation, in particular, to the one-sided realistic and idealistic tendencies, it was constituted as follows. While, on the one hand, empiricism, assigned to the ego, in subordination to the world of sense, a *role* of pure passivity, and while idealism, on the other hand, assigned to it, in superiority to the world of sense and in its sufficiency for its own self, a *role* of pure activity, Kant, for his part, endeavoured to harmonize the pretensions of both. He proclaimed the ego, as practical ego, free and autonomous, the unconditioned arbiter of itself, if as theoretical ego, receptive certainly, and conditioned by the world of sense. Further, he proclaimed the existence of both sides in the theoretical ego itself; for it is true with empiricism, that experience is the only field of knowledge, that to experience we owe all the *matter* of knowledge, it is equally true with idealism that there exists in our knowledge, notwithstanding, an *a priori* factor, that we use notions *in* experience, inderivative *from* experience, but provided *for* experience *a priori* in the mind.

In order still further to facilitate a general view of the vast and complicated structures which compose the philosophy of

Kant, we proceed to add a preliminary explanation of its fundamental notions, together with a concise exposition of its chief propositions and chief results. As object of his critical inquiry, Kant took the function of cognition in man, or, more simply, the origin of our experience. It is as exercising this scrutiny of cognition, that his philosophy is critical, is criticism. Again, it is in consequence of Kant having called his consideration of the relation of cognition to the objects of cognition a *transcendental reflection* that his philosophy has received the further name of transcendental; and *that* to Kant is a transcendental (this word is to be distinguished from transcendent), cognition, 'which has to do not so much with the objects, as with our *knowing* of the objects, so far as there is any possibility of an *a priori* knowing of them.' The mentioned scrutiny now occurs in the *Kritik of Pure Reason*, and yields the following results. All cognition is the product of two factors, —the cognising subject and the cognised objects. The one factor, the external object, contributes the material, the empirical material, of knowledge; the other factor, the subject, contributes the form—those notions, namely, by virtue of which alone any connected knowledge, any synthesis of individual perceptions into a whole of experience, is possible. Were there no external world, there were no perceptions; and were there no *a priori* notions, these perceptions were an indefinite plurality and *maniness*, without mutual combination, and without connexion in the unity of an understood whole. In that case there would not be any such thing as experience. Therefore : whilst perceptions without notions are blind, and notions without perceptions are void, cognition (knowledge) is a union of both, in this way, that it fills up the frames of the notions with the matter of experience, or disposes the matter of experience into the net of the notions. Nevertheless, we do not know things as they are in themselves. *First*, because of the forms native to the mind, that is, because of the categories. In adding to the given manifold of perception, as the matter of cognition, our own notions as its form, we must, it is plain, produce some change in the objects : these objects, evidently, are not thought

as they are in themselves, but only as we apprehend them; they appear to us only as modified by categories. Besides this there is another subjective addition. In the *second* place, that is, we cognise things not as they are in themselves, because the very perceptions which we embrace in the frames of our notions, are not pure and uncoloured, but have been equally obliged to traverse a subjective medium, time and space namely, which are the universal forms of all objects of sense. Space and time are also subjective additions, then, forms of sensuous perceptions, and no less native to the mind than the *a priori* notions, the categories themselves. Whatever is to be perceived, must be perceived in time and space; without them perception is impossible. It follows, then, that we only know appearances, not things themselves, in their own true nature, as divested of space and time.

If these propositions of Kant be superficially taken, it may appear as if the Kantian criticism were nowise substantially in advance of the empiricism of Locke. Nevertheless, it is in advance, even if for nothing else than the investigation of the *a priori* notions. That the notions cause and effect, substance and accident, and others, the like, which the human mind finds itself obliged to *think into* all perceptions of sense, and under which it really thinks everything that it does think,—that these arise not from sensuous experience, this Kant is compelled to acknowledge as well as Hume. For example, when affections reach us from several directions, when we perceive a white colour, a sweet taste, a rough surface, etc., and now speak of a single thing, a piece of sugar perhaps, it is only the manifold of the sensations that is given us from without, while the notion of unity cannot come to us through sensation, but is a notion added to the manifold, a category. But Kant now, instead of denying the reality of these notions, took a different step, and assigned to the mental activity (which supplies these forms of thought to the matter of experience) a special and peculiar province. He demonstrated these forms of thought to be immanent laws of the intellect, necessary principles of action in the understanding that are essential to every experience, and

he endeavoured to attain the complete system of them by an analysis of the faculty of thought. (They are twelve in number : unity, plurality, totality; reality, negation, limitation; substantiality, causality, reciprocity; possibility, actuality, necessity.) Kant's philosophy, then, is not empiricism, but idealism. It is not that dogmatic idealism, however, which transfers all reality to conception, but rather a critical subjective idealism that distinguishes in the conception (perception) an objective and a subjective element, and vindicates for the latter a place as important in every act of cognition as is that of the former.

From what has been said, there result—and the one in consequence of the other—the three chief propositions under which the Kantian cognitive theory may be comprehended : 1. *We know only appearances, not things in themselves.* The empirical matter that comes to us from without is in consequence of our own subjective additions (for we receive this matter first of all into the subjective frames of time and space, and then into the equally subjective forms of the innate notions), so worked up and relatively altered that, like the reflection of a luminous body variously bent and broken by the surface of a mirror, it no longer represents the thing itself, in its original quality, pure and unmixed. 2. *Nevertheless, experience alone is our field of knowledge, and any science of the unconditioned does not exist.* And naturally so : for as every act of cognition is a product of empirical matter and intellectual form, or is founded on the cooperation of sense and understanding, any cognition of things is impossible where the factor of empirical matter fails. Knowledge through intellectual notions alone is illusory, inasmuch as for the notion of the unconditioned, which understanding sets up, sense is unable to show the unconditioned object which should correspond to it. The question, therefore, which Kant placed at the head of his entire critique. How are synthetic judgments (judgments of extension as in contradistinction to analytic judgments, judgments of explanation), possible *a priori*? can we, *a priori*, by thought alone, extend our knowledge beyond experience of sense? is knowledge of the supersensuous possible?—must be answered by an unconditional No. 3. If,

nevertheless, human cognition *will* overstep the limits of experience assigned to it, that is to say, if it *will* become transcendent, then it can only involve itself in the greatest contradictions. The three *ideas of reason*—namely, (*a.*) the psychological idea of an absolute subject, that is, of the soul or of the immortality; (*b.*) the cosmological idea of the world as totality of all conditions and phenomena; (*c.*) the theological idea of an all-perfect being—are so much without application to empirical reality, so much mere fabrications of reason, regulative, not constitutive principles, to which no objective sensuous experience corresponds, that they rather lead—if applied to experience, or conceived, that is, as actually existent objects—to the most glaring logical errors, to the most striking paralogisms and sophisms. Kant has attempted to demonstrate these errors, whether unavoidable contradictions of reason with its own self, or only subreptions and false conclusions, in the case of all the ideas of reason. By way of example, let us take the cosmological idea. Directly reason, in reference to this idea, in reference to the cosmical whole, proceeds to give utterance to its transcendental dicta, directly it seeks to apply, that is, the forms of the finite to the infinite, it is at once seen, that in all cases the antithesis of the dictum is quite as demonstrable as the thesis. The thesis, The world has limits in space and a commencement in time; the antithesis, The world has no limits in space and no commencement in time : these propositions are both susceptible of an equal proof. It follows, consequently, that speculative cosmology is but an assumption of reason. The theological idea, for its part again, rests on mere logical subreptions and vicious conclusions, as (with great acuteness) was proved by Kant in the case of the various arguments hitherto dogmatically proposed for the existence of God. It is impossible, therefore, in the theoretical sphere, and with perfect stringency in all respect, to prove and comprehend the existence of the soul as a *real* subject, the existence of the world as a single system, and the existence of God as a supreme being : the metaphysical problems proper lie beyond the limits of philosophical knowledge.

This is the negative of the Kantian philosophy ; its supplementing positive is to be found in the *Kritik of Practical Reason*. If mind, theoretically or cognitively, is under condition and control of the objects of sense—no complete act of knowledge being possible without an element of perception,—practically, or as regards action, it directly transcends the *given* element (the motive of sense), it is determined only by the categorical imperative, by the moral law, by its own self, and is therefore free and autonomous. The ends it pursues are such as it—a moral spirit—gives itself. External objects are no longer arbiters and masters for it; it has no longer to adapt itself to them when it would become participant of truth; it is they now must serve it, mere selfless (unconscious) means for the realization of the moral law. If the theoretical spirit was bound to the phenomenal world in its blind obedience to mere necessity, the practical spirit, on the contrary, belongs, through its relation to the absolute end, through its own essential freedom, to a purely intelligible, to a supersensuous world. This is Kant's practical idealism, which directly leads to the three (as theoretical verities previously declared insufficient) practical postulates—the immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will, and the existence of God. So much by way of introduction : we proceed now to the more systematic exposition of the philosophy of Kant.

XVII. KANT

Immanuel Kant was born, April 22, 1724, at Königsberg in Prussia. His father, an honest, worthy saddler, and his mother, a woman of piety and intelligence, exercised over him from his earliest years a wholesome influence. In the year 1740 he entered the university as a student of theology, but applied himself by inclination to the study of philosophy, mathematics, and physics. He opened his literary career in his twenty-third year, 1747, with an essay 'Thoughts on the true Estimate of Motive Forces'. For several years, he was obliged by circumstances to act as domestic tutor in various families in the neigh-

bourhood of Königsberg. In the year 1755 he settled at the university as a private lecturer (where he remained as such for fifteen years), and gave courses of logic, metaphysics, physics, mathematics, and, at a later period, of morals, anthropology, and physical geography, mostly in the sense of the Wolfian school, though not without an early expression of his doubts with respect to dogmatism. At the same time, after the publication of his first dissertation, he was indefatigable as an author, although his decisive great book, the *Kritik of Pure Reason*, appeared only in his fifty-seventh year, 1781, and was followed by his *Kritik of Practical Reason* in 1788, as by his *Kritik of Judgment* in 1790. In the year 1770, at the age of forty-six, he became an ordinary professor of logic and metaphysics, the duties of which position he continued actively to carry on till 1797, after which year he was prevented from lecturing by the increasing frailties of age. Calls to Jena, to Erlangen, to Halle, he declined. Soon the noblest as well as the most studious of knowledge thronged from the whole of Germany to Königsberg, in order to place themselves at the feet of the Prussian sage. One of his admirers, Reuss, professor of philosophy at Würzburg, and who was able to make only a very short stay at Königsberg, entered the room of Kant with the words: 'He had come no less than 760 miles just to see him and speak to him'. During the last seventeen years of his life he occupied a small house with a garden in a retired part of the town, where he was able to pursue his own quiet and regular mode of life without disturbance. He lived extremely simply, but liked a good table and a comfortable social meal. Kant was never out of his own province—never as far even as Dantzic. His longest journeys were to neighbouring country houses. Nevertheless he acquired by the reading of descriptions of travels a very accurate knowledge of the surface of the globe, as indeed is specially proved by his lectures on physical geography. He was well acquainted with all Rousseau's works, and the *Emile*, in particular, on its first appearance, prevented him for several days from taking his usual walks. Kant died February 12, 1804, in the eightieth year of his age. He was of middle

size, slenderly built, with blue eyes, and always healthy, till in his old age he became childish. He never married. A strict regard for truth, pure integrity, and simple modesty distinguished his character.

Though Kant's great, era-making work, the *Kritik of Pure Reason*, only appeared in 1781, its author had in smaller works long been making efforts in the same direction; and this was particularly the case with his inaugural dissertation 'On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World', which was published in 1770. The internal genesis of his critical position was attributed by Kant especially to Hume. 'It was reflection on David Hume that several years ago first broke my dogmatic slumber, and gave a completely new direction to my inquiries in the field of speculative philosophy.' The critical idea first developed itself in Kant, then, on the occasion of his abandonment of the dogmatic metaphysical school, the Wolfian philosophy, in which he had been educated, for the study of empiricism in the sceptical form which had been impressed upon it by Hume. 'Hitherto', says Kant at the close of his *Kritik of Pure Reason*, 'there was no choice but to proceed either dogmatically like Wolff, or sceptically like Hume. The critical path is the only one that is still open. If the reader has had the courtesy and the patience to travel it thus far in my society he may now contribute his help towards the conversion of this footpath into a high-way, by which, what many centuries were unable to effect, what, indeed, was impossible before the expiration of the present century, there shall be attained complete satisfaction for human reason in that which has always occupied its curiosity, but always hitherto in vain.' Kant, lastly, possessed the clearest consciousness of the relation of criticism to all preceding philosophy. He compares the revolution effected by himself in philosophy to that effected by Copernicus in astronomy. 'Hitherto the assumption was, that all our knowledge must adapt itself to the objects; but every attempt to ascertain anything in regard to them *a priori* by no-

tions, in order to extend our knowledge, was by such a presupposition necessarily rendered vain. Suppose we now try, then, whether better success may not attend us in the problems of metaphysics, if we assume objects to be under a necessity of adapting themselves to the nature of our cognition. The proposal, at all events, evidently harmonizes better with the desired possibility of an *a priori* knowledge which should be able to determine something in regard to objects before they were yet given to us. It is with us here as it was at first with the idea of Copernicus, who, dissatisfied with the theory of the heavens, on the assumption that the starry host circled round the spectator, tried whether it would not succeed better, as regarded explanation, if, on the contrary, he supposed the spectator to move and the stars to remain at rest.' In these words, the principle of subjective idealism is expressed in the clearest manner and with the most perfect consciousness.

In the succeeding exposition of the Kantian philosophy we follow, as the most appropriate, the course which has been taken by Kant himself. Kant's principle of division and disposition is a psychological one. All the faculties of the soul, he says, may be reduced to three, which three admit not of being again reduced to any other. They are, cognition, emotion, will. For all the three the first contains the principles, the regulating laws. So far as cognition contains the principles of its own act, it is theoretical reason. So far again as it contains the principles of will, it is practical reason. And so far, lastly, as it contains the principles of the emotion of pleasure and pain, it is a faculty of judgment. The Kantian philosophy (on its critical side) falls thus into three *Kritiken* (critiques): 1. The *Kritik* of (pure) Theoretic Reason; 2. The *Kritik* of Practical Reason; and 3. The *Kritik* of Judgment.

1. The Kritik of Pure Reason

The *Kritik* of Pure Reason, says Kant, is the groundplan of all our possessions through pure reason (of all that we can know *a priori*), systematically arranged. What are these possessions?

What is our contribution to the effecting of an act of perception? With this object before him, Kant passes under review the two main stadia of our theoretical consciousness, the two main factors of all cognition : sense and understanding. First, then, what is the *a priori* possession of our perceptive faculty, so far as it is sensuous, and, *second*, what is the *a priori* possession (applicable in perception) of our understanding? The first question is considered in the *Transcendental Æsthetic* (a term which is to be taken naturally not in its usual, but in its etymological import, as 'science of the *a priori* principles of sense'); the second, in the *Transcendental Logic* (specially in the *Analytic*). Sense and understanding, namely—explanatorily to premise this—are the two factors of all perceptive cognition, the two stems, as Kant expresses it, of knowledge which spring, perhaps, from a common but unknown root. Sense is the receptivity, understanding the spontaneity of our cognitive faculty; by means of sense, which alone affords us intuitions (in the signification of the *sensuous* perceptive elements), are objects *given* to us; by means of understanding, which forms notions, are objects *thought* (but still in a perceptive reference). Notions without intuitions (perceptive elements strictly sensuous) are empty : without notions such intuitions (or perceptions) are blind. Perceptions (proper) and notions constitute the mutually complementary constituents of our intellectual activity. What now are the *a priori* ('lying ready in the mind from the first') principles of our sensuous, what those of our thinking faculty, in the operation of cognition? The first of these questions is answered, as said, in

1. *The Transcendental Æsthetic*. To anticipate at once the answer : the *a priori* principles of sense, the innate forms of sensuous perception, are space and time. Space, namely, is the form of external sense by means of which objects are given to us as existent without us, and as existent also apart from and beside one another. If we abstract from all that belongs to the *matter* of sensation (in any perception), there remains behind only space, as the universal form into which all the materials of the external sense dispose themselves. If we abstract from

all that belongs to the matter of our inner sense, there remains the time which the mental movement occupied. Space and time are the ultimate forms of external and internal sense. That these forms are contained *a priori* in the human mind, Kant proves, first directly in what he calls the *metaphysical exposition*, from the nature of the very notions of them, and second, indirectly, in what he calls the *transcendental exposition*, by demonstrating that, unless these notions were really *a priori*, certain sciences of undoubted truth would be altogether impossible, (1.) The *metaphysical exposition* has to show, (a.) that time and space are given *a priori*, (b.) that both, nevertheless, belong to sense (to the 'æsthetic,' then), and not to the understanding (not to the 'logic'), that is to say, that they are perceptions (proper), and not conceptions (notions). (a.) That space and time are *a priori* is evident from this, that every experience, if only to be able to take place, always presupposes time and space as already existent. I perceive something external to myself: but this *external to myself* presupposes space. Further, I have sensations either together or after one another: these relations, it is obvious, presuppose the existence of time. (b.) Space and time are not on this account, however, *notions*, but forms of sensuous perception, or simply perceptions. For general notions contain their particulars only *under* them, and not as parts *in* them; whereas all particular spaces and all particular times are contained in space and time generally. (2) In the *transcendental exposition* Kant makes good his indirect proof by showing that certain universally accepted sciences are inconceivable without assuming the *a-priority* of space and time. Pure mathematics is only possible, if space and time are pure and not empirical perceptions. Kant, therefore, placed the whole problem of the transcendental æsthetic in the single question, How are the pure mathematical sciences possible? Time and space, says Kant, are the elements in which pure mathematics moves. But mathematics takes it for granted that its propositions are necessary and universal. Necessary and universal propositions, however, can never originate in experience; they must have a foundation *a priori*: time and space, conse-

quently, from which mathematics takes its principles, cannot possibly be given *a posteriori*, but necessarily *a priori*, as pure (non-empirical) intuitions or perceptions of—general not special—sense. There is, therefore, an *a priori* knowledge, a science founded on *a priori* grounds; and he who would deny this must deny at the same time the possibility of mathematics. But if the foundations of mathematics are *a priori* perceptions, it is natural to infer further that there will also be *a priori* notions, and the possibility consequently of a pure science of metaphysics, consisting as well of the *a priori* perceptions as of the *a priori* notions. This is the positive result of the transcendental æsthetic, and with this positive side there is connected, precisely enough, a negative one. Perception, or direct, immediate cognition, is possible to us only through sense, the universal forms of which are only space and time. But as these intuitions or perceptions of space and time are not (externally) objective relations, but only subjective forms, a certain subjective element must be held to mingle in all our perceptions : we perceive not things as they are in themselves, but only as they appear to us through this subjective-objective medium of space and time. This is the sense of the Kantian dictum that we know not things in themselves, but only appearances. It were too much to assert, however, that all things are in space and time. This is so only *for us*, and in such manner too, that all appearances of outer sense are in space as well as in time, whereas all appearances of inner sense are only in time. Kant by no means intends, however, to convey by this, that the world of sense is a mere show. What he maintains, he says, is, transcendently, the subjective ideality, but, empirically nevertheless, the objective reality of space and time. Things without us as certainly exist as we ourselves, or our own states within us : only they exhibit themselves to us not as, independent of space and time, they are in themselves. As regards the thing in itself that lies behind the appearance of sense, Kant, in the first edition of his work, expressed himself as if it were possible that it and the ego might be one and the same thinking substance. This thought, which Kant only threw out as a conjecture, has

been the source of the whole subsequent evolution of philosophy. That the ego is affected, not by an alien thing "in itself," but purely by its own self,—this became the leading idea of the system of Fichte. In his second edition, however, Kant expunged the conjecture.

Space and time being discussed, the transcendental æsthetic is at an end: it is now ascertained what is *a priori* in sense. But the mind of man is not contented with the mere receptivity of sense: it does not merely receive objects, but applies to them its own spontaneity, embracing them in its intelligible forms, and striving to think them by means of its notions (still possibly in a *perceptive* reference). The investigation of these *a priori* notions or forms of thought, 'lying ready in the understanding from the first,' like the forms of space and time in the sensible faculty, is the object of the *transcendental analytic* (which forms the first part of the *transcendental logic*).

2. *The Transcendental Analytic*—The first task of the analytic will be the discovery of the pure intelligible notions. Aristotle has already attempted to construct such a table of categories; but, instead of deriving them from a common principle, he has merely empirically taken them up as they came to hand: he has committed the error also of including space and time among them, which, however, are not intelligible, but sensible forms. Would we have, then, a complete and systematic table of all pure notions, of all the *a priori* forms of thought, we must look about us for a principle. This principle, from which the pure notions are to be deduced, is the logical judgment. The primitive notions of understanding may be completely ascertained, if we will but completely examine all the species of judgments. This examination Kant accomplishes by means of ordinary logic (which, however, is *a priori* in its nature as well as a demonstrated doctrine for thousands of years). In logic there are four species of judgments, namely, judgments of

<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Quality</i>	<i>Relation</i>	<i>Modality</i>
Universal,	Affirmative,	Categorical,	Problematic,
Particular,	Negative,	Hypothetical,	Assertoric,
Singular.	Infinite or Limitative.	Disjunctive.	Apodictic.

From these judgments there arises an equal number of primitive pure notions, the categories, namely, of

<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Quality</i>	<i>Relation</i>	<i>Modality</i>
Totality,	Reality,	Substance and Accident,	Possibility and Impossibility,
Plurality,	Negation,	Causality and Dependence,	Existence and Non-existence,
Unity.	Limitation.	Community (reciprocity).	Necessity and Contingency.

From these twelve categories, in combination with each other (or with the pure *modi* of sense), all the other pure or *a priori* principles may be derived. The adduced categories having demonstrated themselves to be the *a priori* possession of the intellect, these two consequences follow : (1.) These notions are *a priori*, and possess, therefore, a necessary and universal validity; (2) *per se* they are empty forms, and obtain filling only by perceptions. But as our perception is only a sensuous one, these categories have validity only in application to sensuous perception, which, for its part, is raised into experience proper (perfected perception), only by being taken up into the pure notions (and so brought to an objective synthesis). And here we arrive at a second question : How does this take place ? How are objects (at first mere blind blurs of special sensation, and the perceptive forms of general sense), subsumed under the empty intelligible forms (and so made, for the first time, properly *objects*) ?

This subsumption would have no difficulty if objects and notions were homogeneous. But they are not so. The objects as coming into the mind through sense, are of sensuous nature. The question is, then, How can *sensible* objects be subsumed under *intelligible* notions ? how can the categories be applied to objects ? how can principles be assigned in regard to the manner in which we have to think (perceive) things in correspondence with the categories ? This application cannot be direct, a third something must step between, which shall unite in itself, as it were, both nature, which, on one side, then, shall be pure or *a priori*, and on the other side sensuous. But such are

the two pure perceptions of the transcendental æsthetic, such are time and space, especially the former, and such are time and space alone. A quality of time, such as simultaneousness, is, as *a priori*, on one side homogeneous with the categories; while on another side, inasmuch as all objects can only be perceived in time, it is homogeneous with objects. In this reference Kant calls the quality of time a transcendental *schema*, and the use to which the mind puts it, he calls the transcendental schematism of the pure intellect. The schema is a product of imagination, which spontaneously determines inner sense so; but the schema is not to be confounded with the mere image. The latter is always an individual perception; the former, on the contrary, is a universal form which imagination produces as picture of a category, through which this category itself becomes capable of application to the appearance in sense. For this reason a schema can exist only in the mind, and can never be sensuously perceived. If, looking closer now at this schematism of the understanding, we ask for the transcendental time-quality of each category, the answer is this : (1) The relation of time that constitutes the schema of *quantity* is *series in time* or number,—a conception that consists of the successive addition of like unit to like unit. The pure notion of magnitude I cannot otherwise conceive than by figuring in imagination a succession of units. If I arrest the movement in the very beginning, I have unity; if I allow it to continue longer, plurality; and if I allow it to continue without limit, totality. The notion of magnitude, then, is applicable to appearances of sense only through the scheme of this homogenous succession. (2) The *contents of time* constitute the schema of *quality*. If I would apply the pure notion of reality (due to logical quality) to anything sensuous, I conceive to myself a filled time, a contained matter of time. Real is what fills time. Similarly to conceive the pure notion of negation, I figure an empty time. (3) The categories of *relation* find their schemata in the *order of time*. For if I want to conceive a determinate relation, I call up always a determinate order of things in time. Substantiality appears thus as permanence of reality in time, causality as

regular sequence in time, reciprocity as regular co-existence of the states of one substance with the states of another. (4) The categories of *modality* derive their schemata from connexion with time as a whole, that is, from the manner in which an object belongs to time. The schema of possibility is agreement with the conditions of time in general; the schema of actuality is existence in a certain time; the schema of necessity is existence in all time.

We are now, then, equipped with all the appliances necessary for the subsumption of *sensible* appearances (phenomena) under *intelligible* notions, or for the application of the latter to the former, in order to show how, from this application, experience, coherent cognitive perception, results. We have (1.) the various classes of categories, of those *a priori* notions, namely, which, operative for the whole sphere of perception render possible a synthesis of perceptions in a whole of experience. And we have (2.) the schemata through which to apply them to the objects of sense. With every category and its schema there is conjoined a special mode of reducing the objects of sense under a universal form of intellect, and, consequently, of bringing unity into cognition. Or with every category there are principles of cognition, *a priori* rules, points of view, to which the objects of sense must be subjected in order to perfect them into a coherent experience. These principles, the most universal synthetic judgments regulative of experience, are, in correspondence with the four categorical classes, as follows : (1) All objects of sense are, as only apprehended in time and space, in their form, magnitudes, *quanta*, multiples, supplied by the conception of a definite space or a definite time, and consequently *extensive magnitudes* or wholes consistent of parts successively added. All perception depends on our imagination apprehending objects of sense as extensive magnitudes in time and space. For this reason too, then, all perceptions will be in subjection to the *a priori* laws of extensive quantity, to those of geometrical construction, for instance, or

to that of the infinite divisibility, etc. These principles are the *axioms of intuition or general perception*—laws obligatory on perception as a whole. (2) In reference to reality, all objects of sense are *intensive magnitudes*, inasmuch as without a greater or less degree of impression on sense, no definite object, nothing real, could be at all perceived. This magnitude of reality, the object of sensation, is merely intensive, or determinable according to degree, for sensation is not anything extended either in space or time. All objects of perception are intensive as well as extensive magnitudes, and subjected to the general laws of the one not less than to those of the other. All the powers and qualities of things, accordingly, possess an infinite variety of degrees, which may increase or decrease; anything real has always some degree, however small; intensive may be independent of extensive magnitude, etc. These principles are the *anticipations of sensation*, rules which precede all sensation, and prescribe its general constitution. (3) Experience is possible only through the conception of a *necessary connection of perceptions*; without a necessary order of things and their mutual relation in time, there cannot be any knowledge of a definite system of perceptions, but only contingent individual perceptions. (a) The first principle in this connexion is, that amid all the changes of phenomena, *the substance remains the same*. Where there is nothing permanent, there cannot be any definite relation of time, any duration of time: if in the conditions of a thing, I am to assume one certain condition as earlier or later, if I am to distinguish these conditions in time, I must oppose the thing itself to the conditions it undergoes, I must conceive it as persistent throughout all the vicissitudes of its own conditions, that is, I must conceive it as self-identical substance. (b) The second principle here is, That all mutations obey the law of the connexion of *cause and effect*. The consequence of several conditions in time is only then a fixed and determinate one. when I assume the one as cause of the other, or as necessarily preceding it in obedience to a rule or law, the other as effect of the former, or as necessarily succeeding it; its determinate succession in time is only possible through

the relation of causality; but without a determinate succession in time there were no experience; the causal relation consequently is a principle of all empirical knowledge; only this relation it is that produces connexion in things; and without this relation we should only have incoherent subjective states. (c) A third principle further is, that all co-existent substances are in *complete reciprocity*; only what acts in community is determined as inseparably simultaneous. These three principles are the *analogies of experience*, the rules for cognising the relations of things, without which there were for us mere piecemeal units, but no whole, no *nature* of things. (4) The *postulates of empirical thought* correspond to the categories of modality. (a) What agrees with the formal conditions of experience is possible, or may exist. (b) What agrees with the material conditions of experience is actual, or does exist. (c) What is connected with actual existence through the universal conditions of experience, is necessary, or must exist. These are the only possible and authentic synthetic judgments *a priori*, the first lines of all metaphysics. But it is to be rigidly understood, that of all these notions and principles we can make only an empirical use, or that we can apply them, never to things in themselves, but always only to things as objects of possible experience. For the notion without object is an empty form; an object can be found for it again only in perception; and, lastly, perception, the pure perceptions of time and space, can acquire filling only through sensation. Without reference to human experience, the *a priori* notions and principles, therefore, are but a play of the imagination and understanding with their own ideas. Their special function is, that by their means we are able to spell actual perceptions, and so read them as experience. But here we encounter an illusion which it is hard to avoid. As, namely, the categories are not derived from sense, but have their origin *a priori*, it easily seems as if they might be extended beyond sense in their application also. But this idea, as said, is an illusion. Of a knowledge of things in themselves, of noumena, our notions are not capable, inasmuch as, for their *filling*, perception provides

only appearances (phenomena), and the thing in itself is never present in any possible experience; our knowledge is restricted to phenomena alone. To have confounded the world of phenomena with the world of noumena, this is the source of all the perplexities, errors, and contradictions of metaphysics hitherto.

Besides the categories, which in strictness are intended only for experience, although, indeed, they have been often erroneously applied beyond the bounds of experience, there are certain other similar notions which from the first are calculated for nothing else than to deceive, notions which have the express function to transgress the bounds of experience, and which therefore may be named transcendent. These are the fundamental notions and propositions of former metaphysics. To investigate these notions, and to strip from them the false show of objective knowledge, this is the business of the second part of the transcendental logic, or of the *transcendental dialectic*.

3. *The Transcendental Dialectic*—Reason is distinguished from understanding in the more restricted sense. As the understanding has its categories, reason has its ideas. As the understanding forms axioms from the notions, reason from the ideas forms principles in which the axioms of the understanding reach their ultimate unity. The first principle of reason is, to find for the conditioned knowledge of understanding the unconditioned, and so complete the unity of knowledge in general. Reason, then, is the faculty of the unconditioned, or of principles. As it refers, however, not to objects directly, but only to understanding, and to the judgments of understanding concerning objects, its true function is only an immanent one. Were the ultimate unity of reason understood, not merely in a transcendental sense, but assumed as an actual object of knowledge, this were, on our part, a transcendent use of reason; we should be applying the categories to a knowledge of the unconditioned. In this transcendent or false use of the categories originates the *transcendental show* (*Schein*) which amuses us with the illusion of an enlargement of understanding beyond the bounds of experience. The detec-

tion of this transcendental show is the object of the transcendental dialectic.

The speculative ideas of reason, derived from the three forms of the logical syllogism, the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive, are themselves threefold :—

(1) The psychological idea, the idea of the soul as a thinking substance (the object of preceding rational psychology).

(2.) The cosmological idea, the idea of the world as totality of all phenomena (the object of preceding cosmology).

(3) The theological idea, the idea of God as ultimate condition of the possibility of all things (the object of preceding rational theology).

Through these ideas, in which reason attempts to apply the categories to the unconditioned, it gets only entangled in unavoidable show and deception. This transcendental show, or this optical illusion of reason, displays itself variously in the various ideas. In the psychological ideas reason commits a simple paralogism (*the paralogisms of pure reason*) : in the cosmological ideas it is the fate of reason to find itself compelled to make contradictory assertions (*the antinomies*) : and in the theological ideas reason is occupied with a void ideal (*the ideal of pure reason*).

(a.) *The psychological idea, or the paralogisms of pure reason.*—What Kant propounds under this rubric is intended completely to subvert the traditional rational psychology. This doctrine viewed the soul as a psychical thing with the attribute of immateriality; as a simple substance with the attribute of indestructibility; as an intellectual, numerically identical substance with the predicate of personality; as an inextended thinking substance with the predicate of immortality. All these statements are, according to Kant, subreptions, *petitiones principii*. They are derived one and all of them from the simple 'I think' : but the 'I think' is neither perception nor notion; it is a mere consciousness, an act of the mind which attends, unites, supports all perceptions and notions. This act of thought now is falsely converted into a thing; for the ego as subject, the existence of an ego as object, as soul, is substituted; and what

applies to the former analytically is transferred to the latter synthetically. To be able to treat the ego as an object and apply categories in its regard, it would have required to have been empirically given in a perception, which is impossible. From this it follows, too, that the arguments for the immortality rest on sophisms. I can certainly ideally separate my thought from my body, but it by no means follows on that account that my thought, if really separated from the body, would continue. The result that Kant claims for his critique of rational psychology is this : There is no rational psychology as a doctrine which might procure us an addition to the knowledge of ourselves, but only as a discipline which sets insurmountable bounds to speculative reason in this field, in order, on the one hand, that we may not throw ourselves into the lap of a soulless materialism, and on the other hand that we may not lose ourselves in the fanaticism of a spiritualism that is inapplicable to life. We may view this discipline, too, as admonishing us to regard the refusal of reason perfectly to satisfy the curious in reference to questions that transcend this life as a hint of reason's own to withdraw our attempts at knowledge from fruitless extravagant speculation, and apply them to the all-fruitful practical field.

(b) *The antinomies of cosmology.*—For a complete list of the cosmological ideas, we require the cue of the categories. In (I.) a quantitative reference to the world, time and space being the original *quanta* of all perception, it were necessary to determine something in regard to their totality. (2.) As regards quality, some conclusion were required in reference to the divisibility of matter. (3.) On the question of relation, we must endeavour to find for all the effects in the world the complete series of their causes. (4.) As for modality, it were necessary to understand the contingent in its conditions, or, in other words, the absolute system of the dependency of the contingent in the phenomenal world. Reason, now, in attempting a determination of these problems, finds itself involved in contradiction with its own self. On each of the four points contradictory conclusions may be proved with equal validity. As

(1.) the thesis : The world has a beginning in time and limits in space; and the antithesis : The world has neither beginning in time nor limits in space. (2.) The thesis : Every compound consists of simples, nor does there exist in the world anything else than simples and their compounds; and the antithesis : No compound consists of simples, nor does there exist in the world anything that is simple. (3.) The thesis : Causality according to the laws of nature is not the only one from which the phenomena of the world may be collectively derived, there is required for their explanation a causality of free-will as well; and the antithesis : Free-will there is none, all happens in the world solely by law of nature. Lastly, (4.) the thesis : There is something in the world, which, either as its part or as its cause, is an absolutely necessary being; and the antithesis : Neither within the world nor without the world does there exist any absolutely necessary being as its cause. This dialectical conflict of the cosmological ideas demonstrates its own nullity.

(c) *The ideal of pure reason or the idea of God.*—Kant shows first of all how reason attains to the idea of an all-perfect being, and then directs himself against the attempt of former metaphysicians to prove the existence of this all-perfect being. His critique of the traditional arguments for the existence of God is essentially as follows :—(1) The *ontological* proof reasons thus: There is possible a being the most real of all. But in all reality, existence is necessarily included; if I deny this existence, then, I deny the possibility of a being the most real of all, which is self-contradictory. But, rejoins Kant, existence is nowise a reality, or a real predicate, that can be added to the notion of a thing; existence is the position of a thing with all its qualities. But the suppression of existence suppresses not one single significate of a notion. Though, then, it possesses every one of its significates, it does not on that account possess existence also. Existence is nothing but the logical copula, and nowise enriches the (logical) comprehension of the subject. A hundred actual crowns, for example, contain no more than a hundred possible ones : only for my means are the cases different. A being the most real of all may, consequently, be quite

correctly thought as the most real of all, even when also thought as only possible, and not at actual. It was therefore something quite unnatural, and a mere revival of school-wit, to propose to dig out of an arbitrary idea the existence of its correspondent object. All the pains and trouble, then, of this famous argument are only lost; and a man is no more likely to be made, by mere ideas, richer in knowledge, than a merchant in means by the addition to his balance of a few ciphers. While the ontological proof reasoned *to* necessary existence, (2) the *cosmological* proof takes its departure *from* necessary existence. If anything exists, there must exist an absolutely necessary being as its cause. But I myself at all events exist, therefore there exists also an absolutely necessary being as my cause. This proof, so far, is now criticised by reference to the last of the cosmological antinomies. The conclusion perpetrates the error of inferring from the phenomenal contingent a necessary being in excess of experience. But were this inference even allowed, it implies no God. It is reasoned further, then, that it is possible only for that being to be absolutely necessary who is the sum of all reality. But if we invert this proposition and say, that being who is the sum of all reality is absolutely necessary, we are back in the ontological proof, with which, then, the cosmological must fall also. The cosmological proof resorts to the stratagem of producing an old argument in a new dress, in order to have the appearance of appealing to two witnesses. (3) But if, in this way, neither notion nor experience is adequate to prove the existence of God, there is still left a third expedient, to begin, namely, with a specific experience and so determine whether it may not be possible to conclude from the frame and order of the world to the existence of a supreme being. This is the object of the *physico-theological proof*, which, taking its departure from the existence of design in nature, proceeds, in its main moments, thus : everywhere there is design; design in itself is extrinsic or contingent as regards the things of this world; there exists by necessity, therefore, a wise and intelligent cause of this design; this necessary cause is necessarily also the most real being of all beings : the most real

being of all beings has consequently necessary existence. Kant answers, the physico-theological proof is the oldest, the clearest, and the fittest for common sense; but it is not apodictic. It infers from the form of the world a cause proportioned to the form. But even so we have only an originator of the form of the world, only an architect of the world : we have no originator of matter, we have no author and creator of the universe. In this strait a shift is made to the cosmological argument again, and the originator of the form is conceived as the necessary being whom things imply. We have thus an absolute being whose perfection corresponds to the perfection of the universe. In the universe, however, there is no absolute perfection; we have thus, then, only a very perfect being; and for a most perfect being we must have recourse once more to the ontological argument. The teleological argument, then, implies the cosmological; the cosmological the ontological; and out of this circle the metaphysical demonstration is unable to escape. The ideal of a supreme being, accordingly, is nothing else than a *regulative* principle of reason which leads us to view all connexion in the world, *as if* it were due to an all-sufficient necessary cause, as source of unity and foundation of the rule of explanation : in which case, indeed, it is unavoidable that in consequence of a transcendental subreption, we should mistake a merely formal principle for a *constitutive* one, and hypostasize it withal into a creative absolute intelligence. In truth, however, a supreme being constitutes, so far as the speculative exercise of reason is concerned, a mere but faultless ideal, a notion which is the close and the crown of human knowledge, but whose objective reality, nevertheless, can, with apodictic certainty, neither be proved nor refuted.

The preceding critique of the ideas of reason leaves one more question to answer. If these ideas are without an objective value, why do they exist in-us? Being necessary, they will possess, of course, their own good reason. And this good

reason has just been pointed out on occasion of the theological idea. Though not constitutive, they are regulative principles. In arranging our mental faculties, we never succeed better than when we proceed 'as if' there were a soul. The cosmological idea gives us a hint to regard the world 'as if' the series of causes were infinite, without exclusion however of an intelligent cause. The theological idea enables us to consider the entire world-complex under the point of view of an organized unity. In this way, then, these ideas, if not constitutive principles to extend our knowledge beyond the bounds of experience, are regulative principles to arrange experience and reduce it under certain hypothetical unities. If they compose not an organon for the discovery of truth, they still constitute—the whole three of them, psychological, cosmological and theological—a canon for the simplification and systematization of our collective experiences.

Besides their regulative import, the ideas possess also a practical one. There is a species of certainty, which, though not objectively, but only subjectively competent, is pre-eminently of a practical nature. and is called belief or conviction. If the liberty of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God, are three cardinal tenets, such that, though not necessary for knowledge, they are still urgently pressed on us by reason, then without doubt they will have their own value in the practical sphere as regards moral conviction. This conviction is not logical, but moral certainty. As it rests, then, entirely on subjective grounds of the moral feeling, I cannot say, It is morally certain, but only, I am morally certain that there is a God, etc. That is to say, belief in God and another world is so interwoven with my moral feeling, that, as little as I run risk of losing this latter, so little am I apprehensive of being deprived of the former. With this we are already within the sphere of *practical reason*.

II. The Kritik of Practical Reason

With the Kritik of Practical Reason we enter an entirely

different world, in which reason is amply to recover all that has been lost in the theoretical sphere. The problem now is essentially, almost diametrically, different from the problem then. The speculative Kritik had to examine whether pure reason is adequate to an *a priori* knowledge of objects: the object of the practical Kritik is to examine whether pure reason is capable of an *a priori* determination of the will in reference to objects. The question of the former concerned the *a priori* cognisableness of objects: that of the latter concerns, cognisableness of objects, but the motives of the will, and all that is capable of being known in the same connexion. All therefore, in the Kritik of Practical Reason presents itself in an order precisely the reverse of the Kritik of Pure Reason. The primitive determinants of cognition are perceptions; those of volition are principles and notions. The Kritik of Practical Reason must begin, therefore, with the moral principles, and, only after their establishment, proceed to any question of the relation of practical reason to sense. The results, too, of these two Kritiken are opposed the one to the other. If in the theoretical sphere, because reason that sought the thing in itself became transcendent (perceptionless), the ideas remained only on the whole negative, the contrary is now the case in the practical sphere. In this sphere the ideas demonstrate themselves true and certain, in a manner direct and immanent, without once quitting the limits of self-consciousness and inner experience. The question here is of the relation of reason, not to outer things, but to an internal element, the will. And the result is, that reason is found to be capable of influencing the will purely from its own self, and hence now the ideas of free-will, immortality, and God, recover the certainty which theoretical reason had been unable to preserve to them.

That there is a determination of the will by pure reason, or that reason has practical reality, this is not immediately* certain, inasmuch as the actions of men appear conditioned, in the first instance, by the sensuous motives of pleasure and pain, of passion and inclination. The Kritik of Practical Reason will require to examine, then, whether these determinants of

will are actually the only ones, or whether there is not also a higher active faculty in which not sense, but reason, gives law, and where will follows not mere incentives from without, but obeys in pure freedom a higher practical principle from within. The demonstration of all this belongs to the analytic of practical reason, while to the dialectic of practical reason it belongs to consider and bring to resolution the antinomies which result from the relation between the practical authority of pure reason, and that of the empirical instigations of sense.

1. *Analytic.*—The reality of a higher active faculty in us, is made certain by the fact of the *moral law*, which is nothing else than a law spontaneously imposed on the will by reason itself. The moral law stands high above the lower active faculty in us, and, with an inward irresistible necessity, orders us, in independence of every instigation of sense, to follow it absolutely and unconditionally. All other practical laws relate solely to the empirical ends of pleasure and happiness; but the moral law pays no respect to these, and demands that we also shall pay them none. The moral law is no hypothetical imperative that issues only prescripts of profit for empirical ends; it is a *categorical imperative*, a law, universal and binding on every rational will. It can derive consequently only from reason, not from animal will, and not from individual self-will; only from pure reason, too, and not from reason empirically conditioned: it can only be a commandment of the autonomous, one, and universal reason. In the moral law, therefore, reason demonstrates itself as practical, reason has direct reality in it. The moral law it is that shows pure reason to be no mere idea, but a power actually determinative of will and action. This law it is, also, that procures perfect certainty and truth for another idea, the idea of free-will. The moral law says, 'Thou canst, for thou shouldst', and assures us thus of our own freedom, as indeed it is, in its own nature, nothing but the will itself, the will in freedom from all sensuous matter of desire, and constituting therefore our very highest law of action. But now there is the closer question, What then, is it that practical reason categorically commands? For an answer to this question we

must first consider the empirical will, the natural side of mankind.

Empirical will consists in the act of volition being directed to an object in consequence of a pleasure felt in it by the subject; and this pleasure again roots in the nature of the subject, in the susceptibility for this or that, in natural desires, etc. Under this empirical will must be ranked all appetite for any precise object, or all *material* volition; for nothing can be an object of subjective will unless there exist a natural sensibility in consequence of which the object is not indifferent, but suggests pleasure to the subject. All material motives of will come under the principle of agreeableness or felicity, or, in the subject of self-love. The will, so far as it follows such, is dependent on, and determined by, empirical natural ends, and is, consequently, not autonomous, but heteronomous. But from this it follows that any law of reason unconditionally obligatory on all rational beings, must be totally distinct from all material principles, must contain, indeed, nothing material whatever. Material principles are of empirical, contingent, variable nature. For men are not at one about pleasure and pain, what is pleasant to one being unpleasant to another; and even were they at one in this respect, the agreement would only be contingent. Material motives, consequently, are not capable, like laws, of being considered binding on every one; every single subject is at liberty to select other motives. Subjective rules of action are named by Kant *maxims* of volition, and he censures those moralists who set up such maxims as universal moral principles.

Maxims, nevertheless, though not the supreme principle of morality, are yet necessary to the autonomy of the will, as without them there were no definite object of action. Only union of the two sides, then, can conduct us to a true principle of morals. To that end the maxims must be relieved of their limitation, and enlarged into the *form* of universal laws of reason. Only those maxims must be adopted as motives which are susceptible of being made universal laws of reason. The *supreme principle* of morals is consequently this : act so that the

Kant finds the solution of this antinomy in the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible world. In the world of sense virtue and felicity are certainly not correspondent; but rational beings, noumenally, are citizens of a supersensuous world where conflict between virtue and felicity does not exist. Here felicity is always adequate to virtue; and with his translation into the supersensuous world man may expect as well the realization of the supreme good. But, as observed, the supreme good has two constituents; (1) supreme virtue, and (2) supreme felicity. The necessary realization of the first moment postulates the *immortality of the soul*, that of the second the *existence of God*.

(1.) For the supreme good, there is required in the first place perfected virtue, holiness. But now no sensuous being can be holy. A being composed of reason and sense is only capable of approaching in an infinite series nearer to holiness as to an ideal. But such infinite progress is only possible in an infinite duration of personal existence. If then the supreme good is to be realized, the soul's immortality must be presupposed.

(2.) For the supreme good there is required, in the second place, perfected felicity. Felicity is the condition of a rational being in the world, for whom everything happens according to his wish and his will. But this can only be realized when entire nature agrees with his objects, and this is not the case. As active beings we are not causes of nature, and the moral law affords no ground for a connexion of morality and felicity. Still we *ought to*, or we *are to* endeavour to promote the supreme good. It must be possible therefore. The necessary union of these two moments is consequently postulated, that is to say, the existence of a cause of nature distinct from nature, and which will constitute the ground of this union. A being must exist, as common cause of the natural and the moral world; such a being withal as knows our minds, an intelligence, and, according to this intelligence, distributes to us felicity. Such a being is God.

Thus from practical reason there flow the idea of immorta-

lity and the idea of God, as previously the idea of free-will. The idea of free-will derived its reality from the possibility of the moral law; the idea of immortality derives its reality from the possibility of perfected virtue, and that of God from the necessity of perfected felicity. These three ideas, therefore, which to speculative reason were insoluble problems, have acquired now, in the field of practical reason, a firmer basis. Nevertheless, they are not even now theoretical dogmas, but, as Kant names them, practical postulates, necessary presuppositions of moral action. My theoretical knowledge is not extended by them : I know now only that there are objects correspondent to these ideas, but of these objects I know nothing more. Of God, for example, we possess and we know no more than this idea itself. Should we construct a theory of the supersensuous founded on categories alone, we should only convert theology into a magic lantern of chimeras. Practical reason, nevertheless, has still procured us certainty as regards the objective reality of these ideas which theoretical reason was obliged to leave in abeyance, and so far therefore the former has the advantage. This respective position of the two faculties has been wisely calculated in reference to the nature and destiny of man. For the ideas of God and immortality remaining dubious and dark *theoretically*, introduce not any impurity into our moral principles through fear or hope, but leave free scope for awe of the law.

So far the Kantian critique of practical reason. By way of appendix we may here give a summary of Kant's *religious views* as expressed in his work, *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*. The fundamental thought of this work is the reduction of religion to morals. Between morals and religion there may exist a double relation : either the former founds on the latter, or the latter on the former. In the first case, however, fear and hope would become the motives of moral action : there remains for us, then, only the second way. Morality leads necessarily to religion, for the supreme good is necessarily the ideal of rea-

son, and is capable of being realized only by God; but religion must not by any means alone impel us to virtue, for the idea of God ought never to become a mere moral motive. Religion is to Kant the recognition of all our duties as commandments of God. It is revealed religion when through it I must first of all know that something is a commandment of God before I can also know that it is my duty: it is natural religion when I must first of all know that something is a duty before I can know that it is a commandment of God. A church is an ethical community which has for object the fulfilment and the greatest possible realization of the moral prescripts,—an association of such as with united efforts will resist sin and advance morality. The church, so far as it is not an object of possible experience, is the invisible church: it is then a mere idea of the union of all good men under the moral government of God. The visible church, again, is that church which represents the kingdom of God on earth, so far as that is possible by man. The requisites, and consequently the criteria of the true visible church (which dispose themselves according to the table of the categories, because this church is one given in experience), are as follows: (a) With reference to *quantity*, the church must possess totality or *universality*, and, though divided indeed into contingent opinions, must still be established on such principles as necessarily unite all these opinions in a single church. (b) The *quality* of the true visible church is *purity*, as it is animated only by moral motives at the same time that it is purified as well from the fatuousness of superstition as from the mania of fanaticism. (c) The *relation* of the members of the church reciprocally rests on the principle of liberty. The church is a *free state*, therefore; neither a hierarchy nor a democracy, but a free, universal, permanent spiritual union. (d) In *modality*, the church aims at immutability of constitution. The laws themselves must not be changed, though the right of modification be reserved for more contingent arrangements that concern administration alone. What alone is able to constitute the foundation of a universal church is moral, rational belief, for only such belief is capable of being communicated to every one with conviction. But in

consequence of the peculiar weakness of human nature, this pure belief can never be counted on as the sole foundation of a church; for it is not easy to convince mankind that striving to virtue, a good life, is all that is required by God : they suppose always that they must render to God a particular traditional worship, in regard to which all the merit depends on the rendering of it. For the establishment of a church, therefore, there is still necessary an historical and statutory belief that is founded on certain facts. This is the so-called creed. In every church, then, there are two elements, the pure moral, rational belief, and the historico-statutory creed. On the relation of these two elements it depends, whether a church shall possess worth or not. The statutory is in function always only the vehicle of the moral element. Whenever the statutory element becomes an independent object, claims an independent authority, the church sinks into corruption and unreason; whenever the church assumes the pure belief of reason it is in the way to the kingdom of God. This is the distinction between true worship and false worship, religion and priestcraft. The dogma has value only so far as it has a moral core. Without this moral belief the apostle Paul himself would have hardly put faith in the legends of the creed. The doctrine of the Trinity, for example, contains, in the latter, absolutely nothing for practice. Whether three or ten persons are to be worshipped in the Godhead, is indifferent, inasmuch as no difference of rule results thence for the conduct of life. Even the Bible and the interpretation of the Bible are to be placed under the moral point of view. The revealed documents must be interpreted in accordance with the universal rules of rational religion. Reason is in matters of religion the supreme interpreter of Scripture. Such interpretation may in reference to the text often appear forced : nevertheless it must be preferred to such a literal interpretation as yields nothing for morality, or is directly opposed to ethical principles. The possibility of such moral interpretation, without distortion of the literal sense, lies in the fact of the instinct to moral religion having been always present in the reason of man. The representations of the Bible

have only to be divested of their mystical husk (and Kant has given examples of this in his moral interpretations of the most important dogmas) in order to obtain a universal rational sense. The historical element of the sacred writings is in itself indifferent. The riper reason becomes, the more it is capable of being satisfied with the exclusive moral interpretation, the less indispensable become the statutory dogmas of the creed. The transition of the creed into a purely rational faith, is the coming of the kingdom of God, towards which, however, we can draw near only in an infinite progress. The actual realization of the kingdom of God is the end of the world, the close of history.

III—*The Kritik of Judgment*

Kant sketches the notion of this science as follows. The two mental faculties which have been hitherto considered, are those of cognition and volition. As regards the former (cognition), that only understanding is possessed of constitutive *a priori* principles, was proved in the *Kritik of Pure Reason*. As regards the latter (volition), that only reason is possessed of constitutive *a priori* principles, was proved in the *Kritik of Practical Reason*. Whether *judgment* now, as middle-term between *understanding* and *reason*, supplies its object, the *emotion* of pleasure and pain, as middle-term between *cognition* and *volition*, with constitutive (not merely regulative) *a priori* principles of its own,—this is what the *Kritik of Judgment* has to determine. This faculty, judgment, is by virtue of its peculiar function a middle-term between understanding (simple apprehension) as faculty of notions, and reason (reasoning) as faculty of principles (syllogistic premises). Theoretical reason has taught us to comprehend the world only according to laws of nature: practical reason has disclosed to us a moral world in which all is under the control of liberty. There were, then, an insurmountable cleft between the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of liberty (free-will), should judgment prove unable to replace this cleft by the notion of a common ground

of unity for both. The warrant of such expectation lies in the notion of judgment itself. The function of this faculty being to think the particular as contained under a universal, it will naturally refer the empirical plurality of nature to a supersensual transcendental principle as ground of unity to this plurality. This principle, as object of judgment, will, therefore, be the notion of *design* in nature, for design is nothing else than this supersensual unity which constitutes the reason of the reality of objects. Then all design, all realization of a proposed end, being attended with satisfaction, it will be easily understood why judgment has been said to contain the laws for the emotion of satisfaction and dissatisfaction.

Adaptation in nature, however, may be either subjectively or objectively conceived. In the first case, I experience pleasure or pain directly on the presentation of an object, and before I have formed any notion of it. An emotion of this nature can be referred only to a harmonious relation subsisting between the form of the object and the faculty that perceives it. Judgment in this subjective aspect is *æsthetic judgment*. In the second case I form first of all a notion of the object, and then decide whether the object corresponds to this notion. That my perception should find a flower beautiful, it is not necessary that I should have formed beforehand a notion, of this flower. But to find contrivance in the flower, to that a notion is necessary. Judgment as the faculty cognisant of objective adaptation is named *teleological judgment*.

1. *Critique of æsthetic judgment.*—(a) *Analytic.*—The analytic of æsthetic judgment is divided into two principal parts, the analytic of the *beautiful* and the analytic of the *sublime*.

To discover on what the naming of an object *beautiful* depends, we must analyse the judgments of Taste as the faculty that is cognisant of the beautiful. (1) In *quality* the beautiful is the object of a satisfaction that is wholly disinterested. This disinterestedness distinguishes the satisfaction of the beautiful as well from that of the *agreeable* as from that of the *good*. In the agreeable and in the good also, I am interested. In the case of the agreeable my satisfaction is accompanied by a

feeling of desire. My satisfaction in the good is at the same time motive to my will for the realization of it. Only in the case of the beautiful is my satisfaction free from interestedness. (2) In *quantity* the beautiful gives a *universal* satisfaction. As regards the agreeable every one is convinced that his pleasure in it is only a personal one; but whoever says, This picture is beautiful, expects every one else to find it so. Nevertheless, this decision of taste does not arise from notions; its universality, therefore, is merely subjective. My judgment is not that all objects of a class are beautiful, but that a certain particular object will appear beautiful to all beholders. The judgments of taste are *singular* judgments. (3) As regards *relation* the beautiful is that in which we find the form of adaptation without conceiving at the same time any particular *end* of this adaptation. (4) In *modality*, the beautiful is, without notion, object of a *necessary* satisfaction. Every consciousness may be at least conceived as capable of causing pleasure. The agreeable actually does cause pleasure. But the beautiful *must* cause pleasure. The necessity of the æsthetic judgment, then, is a necessity of the agreement of all in a judgment which is regarded as example of a universal rule, which rule again it is impossible to assign. The subjective principle which underlies the judgments of taste, therefore, is a *sensus communis* that determines only by feelings and not by notions what should please or displease.

Sublime is what is absolutely or beyond all comparison great,—that compared with which all else is small. But there is nothing in nature that may not be surpassed by yet a greater. The infinite alone is absolutely great, and the infinite is only to be found in ourselves as idea. The sublime is not properly in nature, then, but is only reflected from the mind to nature. We call that sublime in nature which awakens in us the idea of the infinite. As with the beautiful, it is principally quality that is in question, so with the sublime it is principally quantity; and this quantity is either magnitude of extension (the mathematical sublime) or magnitude of power (the dynamical sublime). In the sublime the satisfaction con-

cerns formlessness rather than form. The sublime excites a powerful mental emotion, and gives pleasure only through pain, or by occasioning a momentary feeling of obstructed vitality. The satisfaction of the sublime, then, is not so much positive pleasure, as rather wonder and awe,—what may be called negative pleasure. The moments of the æsthetic appreciation of the sublime are the same as in that of the beautiful. (1) In quantitative reference that is sublime which is absolutely great, and in comparison with which all else is small. The æsthetic estimation of magnitude, however, does not lie in number but in the mere perception of the subject. The magnitude of a natural object, in the comprehension of which imagination vainly exerts its entire faculty, infers a supersensual substrate great beyond all measure of sense, and with which properly the feeling of the sublime is connected. It is not the object, the raging sea, for example, that is sublime, but rather the mental emotion of him who contemplates it. (2.) As regards *quality*, the sublime creates not pleasure like the beautiful, but rather in the first instance pain, and only through pain pleasure. The feeling of the inadequacy of imagination in the æsthetic estimation of magnitude produces pain; but again the consciousness of our independent reason in its superiority to imagination produces pleasure. Sublime, then, in this respect is that which in its opposition to the interest of the senses directly pleases. (3.) As concerns *relation*, the sublime causes nature to appear as a power in relation to which we possess nevertheless a consciousness of our superiority. (4) As for *modality*, our judgments in reference to the sublime are as necessarily valid as those in reference to the beautiful—with this difference only, that the former are accepted by others with greater difficulty than the latter, because for our sense of the sublime culture and developed moral ideas are necessary.

(b.) *Dialectic*—A dialectic of æsthetic judgment is possible, like every other dialectic, only where there are judgments that pretend to an *a priori* universality. For dialectic consists in the contrariety of such judgments. The antinomy of the principles of taste depends on the two opposed moments of the relative

judgment, that it is purely subjective, and yet claims universality. Hence the two commonplaces : In matters of taste there can be no dispute; and, Tastes differ. This gives rise to the following antinomy, (1.) Thesis : The judgment of taste is not founded on notions, otherwise dispute were possible (proofs might be led). (2.) Antithesis : The judgment of taste is founded on notions, otherwise, despite its diversity, dispute were impossible. This antinomy, says Kant, is only an apparent one, and disappears as soon as the two propositions are more precisely understood. The thesis, namely, should run so : The judgment of taste is not founded on definite notions, or, it is not susceptible of strict proof; the antithesis again so : The judgment of taste is founded on a notion; but an indefinite notion, that, namely, of a supersensual substrate of the phenomena. In this construction there is no longer any contradiction between the two propositions.

Now, at the close of the inquiry, an answer is possible for the question : does the adaptation of things to our judgment of them (their beauty and sublimity), lie in us or in them ? *Æsthetic* realism assumes that the supreme cause of nature has willed the existence of things which should appear to imagination as beautiful and sublime. The organized forms are the principal witnesses for this view. But, again, even in its merely mechanical forms, nature seems to testify such a tendency to beauty, that it is possible to believe in a mere mechanical production even for those more perfect forms as well, and the adaptation, consequently, would lie, not in nature, but in us. This is the position of idealism, and renders possible an explanation of the capacity to pronounce *a priori* on the beautiful and the sublime. The highest mode of viewing the *æsthetic* element, however, is to regard it as a symbol of the moral good. And thus, in the end, taste, like religion, is placed by Kant as a corollary to morals.

2. *Critique of teleological judgment*—In the preceding, the subjectively *æsthetic* adaptation of the objects of nature has been considered. But these objects stand to each other also in a relation of adaptation. This objective adaptation is now to

be the consideration of teleological judgment.

(a) *Analytic of teleological judgment*—This analytic has to determine the kinds of objective (material) adaptation. These are two : an external, and an internal. External adaptation, as it designates merely the utility of one thing for another, is only something relative. The sand, for example, deposited on the sea-shore is good for pine-trees: For animals to live on the earth, the latter must produce the necessary nourishment, etc. These examples of external adaptation show that the means in such a case possess not adaptation in themselves, but only contingently. The sand is not understood in consequence of it being said that it is means for pine trees : it is intelligible *per se* quite apart from any notion of use. The earth produces not food because men must necessarily live on the earth. In short, this external or relative adaptation is to be understood by a reference to the mechanism of nature alone. Not so the internal adaptation, which exhibits itself principally in the organic products of nature. These are so constituted that each of their parts is end, and each also instrument or means. In the generative process the product of nature generates itself as a genus; in the process of growth the product of nature produces itself as an individual; in the process of formation each part of the individual produces its own self. This organism of nature is inexplicable by mere mechanical causes : it admits of being explained only teleologically, or by means of final causes.

(b) *Dialectic*—This antithesis of natural mechanism and of teleology, it is the business of the dialectic of teleological judgment to reconcile. On the one side we have the thesis : All production of material things must be held possible only according to mechanical laws. On the other side the antithesis is : Some products of material nature cannot be held possible on the mere supposition of mechanical laws, but demand for their explanation the existence of final causes. If these two propositions were assumed as constitutive (objective) principles for the

possibility of objects themselves, they would contradict each other; but as mere regulative (subj-ctive) principles for the investigation of nature they are not contradictory. Earlier systems treated the notion of design in nature dogmatically; they either affirmed or denied it as—with reference to nature—an actual thing in itself. We, however, aware that teleology is only a regulative principle, are indifferent as to whether internal adaptation belongs to nature or not: we maintain only that our judgment must regard nature as implying design. We look the notion of design, so to speak, *into* nature, leaving it quite undetermined whether, perhaps, another understanding, not discursive like our own, might not find any such notion quite unnecessary for the comprehension of nature. Ours is a discursive understanding, that, proceeding ever from the parts, conceives the whole as product of them. The organic products of nature, therefore, in which, on the contrary, the whole is originating principle and prius of the parts, it cannot otherwise conceive than under the point of view of the notion of design. Were there, however, an intuitive understanding which should recognise in the universal the particular, in the whole the parts, as already co-determined, such an understanding would, without resorting to the notion of design, comprehend the whole of nature by reference to a single principle.

If Kant had been but serious with this notion of an intuitive understanding, as well as with the notion of immanent adaptation, he would have surmounted in principle the position of subjective idealism, to escape from which he had made several attempts in his *Kritik of Judgment*. In effect, however, he has only casually suggested these ideas, and left their demonstration to his successors.

XVIII. TRANSITION TO THE POST-KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY

The Kantian philosophy soon acquired in Germany an almost absolute sovereignty. The imposing, boldness of its general position, the novelty of its results, the fertility of its

principles, the moral earnestness of its view of the universe, above all, the spirit of liberty and moral autonomy which breathed in it, and which powerfully supported the tendencies of the time, procured it a reception equally enthusiastic and universal. It excited an interest in philosophical inquiries that extended itself throughout all the educated classes, and in such proportions as were never before witnessed in any other nation. In a short time a numerous school sprang up around it, and there were soon few universities in Germany where it was not represented by talented disciples. It presently exerted an important influence on all departments of science and literature, particularly on theology, morals, and the liberal sciences (*Schiller*). The majority of the writers, however, of the Kantian school, confine themselves to popular explanatory applications of the received doctrine, and even the most talented and independent of the supporters or improvers of the Critical Philosophy (as *Reinhold*, 1758-1813; *Bardili*, 1761-1808; *Schulze*, *Beck*, *Fries*, *Krug*, *Bouterweck*), sought only to find for it a firmer basis of support, or to remove from it certain faults and defects, or to demonstrate its position generally in a manner more logical and exact. Among those who continued and further developed the Kantian philosophy there are only two men, *Fichte* and *Herbart*, who have earned the prominence of an epoch making position, and the praise of actual progress; while amongst its opponents (*Hamann*, *Herder*), only one man, *Jacobi*, was of philosophical importance. These three philosophers, therefore, are next to be considered; but, before entering on the exacter analysis, we shall premise a brief preliminary characterization of their relation to Kant.

(1) Kant had critically annihilated dogmatism; his *Kritik of Pure Reason* had for result the theoretic indemonstrability of the three ideas of reason,—God, free-will, and immortality. True, he had recalled in a practical interest (as postulates of practical reason), these very ideas which had just been banished in a theoretical one. But as postulates, as mere practical pre-suppositions, they afford no theoretic certainty, and remain exposed to doubt. In order to remove this uncertainty, this des-

pair of knowledge, which appeared to be the end of the Kantian philosophy, *Jacobi*, a younger contemporary of Kant's, opposed as antithesis to the position of criticism the position of the philosophy of belief. Certainly the highest ideas of reason, the eternal, the divine, are not to be attained or proved by means of demonstration : but this indemonstrableness, this inaccessibleness, is the very nature of the divine. For certain apprehension of the highest, of what lies beyond understanding, there is but one organ,—feeling. In feeling therefore, in intuitive cognition, in belief, *Jacobi* expected to find that certainty which Kant had in vain laboured to attain through discursive thought.

(2) *Fichte* bears to the Kantian philosophy the relation of direct consequence, as *Jacobi* that of antithesis. The dualism of Kant, which represents the ego, now as theoretical ego in subjection to the external world, and now as practical ego in superiority to it, in other words, now as receptive and now as spontaneous in regard of objectivity—this dualism *Fichte* eliminated by being in earnest with the primacy of practical reason, by regarding reason as exclusively practical, as will, as spontaneity, and by conceiving its theoretical, receptive relation to objectivity as only lessened power, as only a limitation imposed by reason itself. For reason, so far as it is practical, objectivity there is none unless what shall be due to itself. The will knows no fixed existence, but only what is to be or ought to be. That truth is any definite object is thus denied, and the unknown thing-in-itself must of itself, as an unreal shadow, fall to the ground. 'All that is, is ego', this is the principle of the *Fichtian* system; which system, therefore, exhibits subjective idealism in its consequence and completion.

(3) Whilst *Fichte's* subjective idealism found its continuation in the objective idealism of *Schelling*, and in the absolute idealism of *Hegel*, there sprang up contemporaneously with these systems a third result of the criticism of Kant, the philosophy of *Herbart*. It connects, however, rather subjectivo-genetically than objectivo-historically with the philosophy of Kant, and occupies in principle, for the rest, all historical continuity being

broken down in its regard, only an isolated position. Its general basis is to this extent Kantian, that it also adopts for problem, a critical investigation and construction of subjective experience. We have given it a place between Fichte and Schelling.

XIX. JACOBI

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi was born in 1743 at Düsseldorf. His father intended him for business. After having studied at Geneva (and acquired there a taste for philosophy), he undertook the business of his father; but gave it up again on becoming Jülich-Bergian acting councillor of the exchequer and commissioner of customs, as well as privy councillor at Düsseldorf. At Düsseldorf, or at his country-seat, Pempelfort, in the neighbourhood, he spent the greater part of his life; devoting himself, in by-hours, with zeal and interest, to philosophy; gathering around him, from time to time, in his summer quarters, a variety of friends; keeping up his connexion with the absent ones by means of a constant correspondence; and renewing old acquaintanceships, or forming fresh ones, through occasional journeys. In the year 1804 he was called to the newly-founded Academy of Sciences at Munich, where, in 1819, having been President of the Academy from 1807, he died. Jacobi was amiable and talented, a man of action, and a poet as well as a philosopher; hence in the last capacity his want of logical order and precision in the expression of thought. His writings form not a systematic whole; but are in their character occasional, composed 'rhapsodically, as the grasshopper jumps,' and generally in the shape of letters, dialogues, and novels. ~ 'It was never my object,' he says himself, 'to construct a system for the school; my writings sprang from my innermost life, they followed an historical course; in a certain way I was not the author of them, not with my own will so, but under compulsion of a higher and irresistible power.' This want of systematic connexion and unity of principle renders the due statement of Jacobi's philosophy difficult. We adopt the three following

points of view as the best for our purpose : (1) Jacobi's polemic against indirect, mediate, or conditional knowledge; (2.) his principle of direct or intuitive knowledge; (3.) his position to contemporary philosophy, especially that of Kant.

(1.) Jacobi places his negative point of departure in Spinoza. In his essay *On the System of Spinoza, in Letters to Moses Mendelssohn* (1785), he again drew public attention to the quite forgotten philosophy of Spinoza. The correspondence is introduced thus :—Jacobi discovers that Lessing was a Spinozist and communicates this to Mendelssohn; Mendelssohn refuses to believe it; and so then the further historical *pro* and *contra* develops itself. The positive philosophical affirmations contained in this essay may be reduced to three : (1) Spinozism is fatalism and atheism. (2) Every method of philosophical demonstration conducs to fatalism and atheism. (3) In order to escape these we must set limits to demonstration, and acknowledge that belief is the element of all human knowledge. (1) Spinozism is atheism, for the cause of the world is to it not a person, not a being endowed with reason and will, and action on design, and therefore 'not a God. It is fatalism, for it asserts the human will to be only erroneously considered free. (2) This atheism and fatalism, however, are only the necessary results of all philosophical demonstration. To comprehend a thing is, Jacobi says, to deduce it from its proximate causes : it is to find for the actual the possible, for the conditioned the unconditioned, for the direct the indirect. We comprehend only what we can explain from something else. And so our intellection proceeds in a chain of conditioned conditions, and this concatenation forms a natural mechanism, in the exploration of which our understanding has its immeasurable field. As long as we desire to comprehend and prove, we must assume for every object ever a higher one which conditions it; where the chain of the conditioned ceases, there cease also comprehension and proof; unless we abandon demonstration, we reach no infinite. If philosophy would with the finite understanding seek to grasp the infinite, it must drag down the divine into finitude. All philosophy as yet is in this strait; and yet it appears self-evi-

dently absurd to attempt to discover conditions for the unconditioned, to convert the absolutely necessary into a possible, in order to be able to construe it. A God that were capable of proof were no God, for the ground of proof must always be higher than that which is to be proved; the latter, indeed, can hold its reality only in fee of the former. If the existence of God is to be proved, consequently, God must consent to be deduced from some ground which were at once before God and above God. Hence Jacobi's paradox: It is the interest of science that there should be no God, no supernatural, supra-mundane being. Only on the hypothesis that there is nothing but nature, that nature alone is what is self-subsistent and all in all, is it possible for science to reach its goal of perfection, or to flatter itself with the hope of being able to become adequate to its object, and itself all in all. This, then, is the conclusion which Jacobi draws from the 'drama of the history of philosophy': 'There is no philosophy but that of Spinoza. Whoever can suppose that all the works and ways of men are due to the mechanism of nature, and that intelligence has no function but, as an attendant consciousness, to look on,—him we need no longer oppose, him we cannot help, him we must leave go. Philosophical justice has no longer a hold on him; for what he denies cannot be philosophically proved, nor what he asserts philosophically refuted.' In this emergency what resource is there? 'Understanding, isolated, is materialistic and irrational; it denies mind, and it denies God. Reason, isolated, is idealistic and illogical; it denies nature, and makes itself God'. But this being so we are driven to ask (3) for another mode of cognising the supersensual, and this is belief. This flight from finite cognition to belief, Jacobi calls the *salto mortale* of human reason. Every certainty which may require to be understood, demands another certainty; and this regression necessitates at last an immediate certainty, which, far from requiring grounds and reasons, shall even absolutely exclude these. But such feeling of certainty as depends not on reasons of the understanding is belief. The sensuous and the supersensuous we know only through belief. All human knowledge originates in reve-

lation and belief.

These conclusions of Jacobi, contained in his letters on Spinoza, could not fail to give universal umbrage to the German philosophical world. He was reproached with being an enemy of reason, a preacher of blind faith, a scorner at once of science and philosophy, a fanatic, a papist. In order to repel these reproaches, and justify the position he had assumed, he wrote, in 1787, a year and a half after the publication of this work on Spinoza, his dialogue entitled *David Hume on Faith, or Idealism and Realism*, in which he more definitely and fully developed his principle of faith, or of immediate (intuitive) knowledge.

(2) First of all, Jacobi distinguishes between his faith, and faith on authority. Blind belief is such as is supported not on rational grounds, but on the authority of another. This is not the nature of his belief, which is supported rather on the inmost conviction of the subject himself. His belief again is no arbitrary imagination: we may imagine all manner of things, but to conceive a thing real, for that there is required an inexplicable conviction of feeling which we can only call belief. Of the relation in which belief stands to the various aspects of human cognition, Jacobi, who is nowise consistent in his terminology, expresses himself vacillatingly. In his earlier terminology he placed belief (or, as he also named it, the faculty of belief) beside sense or receptivity, and opposed it to understanding and reason, which two faculties as synonymous he identified with the finite and conditioned knowledge of preceding philosophy. Later, however, by the example of Kant, he opposed reason to understanding, calling that now reason that had been previously named sense and belief. Belief of reason, intuition of reason, is now the organ for apprehension of the supersensuous. As such it stands opposed to understanding. There must be assumed to exist in us a higher faculty, to which what is true in and beyond the phenomena of sense, must, in a manner that is beyond the ken of sense and understanding, make itself known. Opposed to the explanatory understanding, we must acknowledge a non-explanatory,

positively revelatory, unconditionally deciding reason or belief of reason. As there is a perception of sense, so also there must be a perception of reason, against which latter demonstration will as little avail as against the former. In excuse of the expression *a perception of reason*, Jacobi refers to the absence of any other that were preferable. Language, he says, possesses no other terms for the denotation of the mode and manner in which our all-teeming feeling masters what is inaccessible to the senses. Should any one affirm that he knows something, he may be justifiably asked whence or how he knows it; and then he is inevitably compelled to appeal either to the sensation of sense or to sentiment of mind, the latter being as superior to the former as man to the brute. And so, says Jacobi, I admit without hesitation that my philosophy founds on feeling, pure objective feeling, the authority of which is to me the highest authority. The faculty of feeling is the highest faculty in man; it is that which specifically distinguishes him from the brute; it is identical with reason, or from the faculty of feeling (sentiment) reason wholly and solely arises. Of the antithesis, in which, with this principle of intuitive cognition, he stood to preceding philosophy, Jacobi possessed a perfectly clear consciousness. 'There has arisen', he says, in the introduction to his collected works, 'since Aristotle, an increasing effort on the part of the schools to subordinate, nay even to sacrifice immediate to mediate knowledge, the faculty of perception on which all is originally founded to the faculty of reflection, conditioned as it is by the action of abstraction, the archetype to the ectype, the substance to the word, reason to understanding. Nothing is henceforth to be considered here that has not demonstrated itself, twice demonstrated itself, now in perception, and now in the notion, now in matter of fact, and again in its image, the word, and only in the word, indeed, is the matter of fact to be conceived truly to lie and actually to be cognised. But every philosophy that assumes a reflective reason alone must

disappear at last in a nullity of knowledge. Its end is nihilism.

(3.) What position Jacobi, in consequence of his principle of belief, would assume to the philosophy of Kant, may be surmised from what has been already said. Jacobi, indeed, has explained himself in this reference, partly in the dialogue 'David Hume' (particularly in the appendix to it which treats of 'the transcendental idealism,') and partly in the essay on *The Attempt of Kritikismus to bring Reason to Understanding* (1801). The relation concerned may be reduced to the following three heads : (1.) Jacobi dissents from the Kantian theory of sensuous cognition. He defends, instead, the position of empiricism, maintains the truth of sensuous perception, and denies the apriority of time and space. He represents Kant as attempting to prove that objects as well as the relations of objects are mere determinations of our own selves, and wholly in-existent in externality to us. For even if it be said that there is something correspondent to our perceptions as their cause, what this something is still remains unknown to us. On Kant's theory the laws of perception and thought are destitute of any objective validity, or our entire knowledge contains nothing whatever of an objective nature. But it is absurd to assume that the phenomena disclose nothing of the truth that is concealed behind them. On such an assumption it were better entirely to eliminate the unknown thing-in-itself, and carry idealism out to its natural conclusion. 'Kant cannot in consistency assume objects for the impressions on our minds : he ought to maintain the most decided idealism.' (2) Jacobi essentially, on the other hand, assents to the Kantian critique of the understanding. Like Jacobi, Kant too maintained the incompetency of the understanding to knowledge of the supersensuous, and the possibility of any apprehension of the highest ideas of reason only by belief. Jacobi conceives the main merit of Kant to lie in the clearing away of the *ideas* as logical phantasms and mere products of reflection. 'It is easy for understanding, forming notions of notions from notions, and so gradually rising to ideas, to fancy that, by means of these mere logical phantasms, which surpass for it the percep-

tions of sense, it too possesses not only the power but the most manifest vocation really to transcend the world of sense and attain in its flight to a higher science, a science of the supersensuous, and that is independent of perception. This error, this self-deception, was detected and destroyed by Kant. And thus there was obtained, in the first place, at least room for *genuine* rationalism. This is, in truth, the great achievement of Kant, and the foundation of his immortal glory. The sound sense of our Sage, however, saved him from failing to perceive that this room would of necessity directly transform itself into an abyss for the swallowing up of all knowledge of the truth, unless—a God appeared. Here it is that my opinions and the opinions of Kant meet.’ Jacobi, however, (3.) does not quite accept the Kantian denial to theoretic reason of any capacity for objective knowledge. He censures Kant for lamenting the inability of human reason to demonstrate theoretically the reality of its ideas. Kant, to him, is still thus in bondage to the dream that sees the indemonstrability of the ideas to lie not in their own nature, but in the inadequacy of our faculties. And so it was that Kant was compelled to seek in the practical field a sort of scientific demonstration: a shift and circuit that to every deeper thinker must appear absurd, all proof in any such case being at once impossible and unnecessary.

Jacobi extends not his favour for Kant to the post-Kantian philosophy. The pantheistic tendency of the latter was peculiarly repugnant to him. ‘For Kant, that deep thinking, candid philosopher, the words God, free-will, immortality, religion, had quite the same meaning that they possess, and have always possessed, for common-sense in general. Kant played no tricks with them. It gave offence that he irrefutably demonstrated the inadequacy to these ideas, of all speculative philosophical proofs. For the destruction of the theoretical proof he made amends by the necessary postulates of pure practical reason. And by this expedient, according to his own assertion, philosophy was perfectly relieved; and the good, which it had always hitherto missed, at length happily reached. But now, critical philosophy’s own daughter (Fichte), makes a god of the moral

order of the universe, a god, then, expressly without consciousness and personality. These bold words, which were quite openly and unhesitatingly spoken, excited, indeed, some little apprehension. But the alarm soon ceased. Directly afterwards, indeed, when the second daughter of the critical philosophy (Schelling), completely withdrew what had been left sacred by the first—the distinction between natural and moral philosophy, between liberty and necessity, and without farther preamble declared nature alone all and nothing above nature, the result was no astonishment at all : this second daughter is an inverted or beatified Spinozism, an ideal materialism.' The latter expression in reference to Schelling, with which, in the same work, other and severer allusions were connected, provoked the latter's well known reply (*Schelling's Memorial of the Work : On Divine Things*, 1812).

Throwing back a critical glance now on the philosophical position of Jacobi, we may designate its distinctive peculiarity to be the abstract separation of understanding and feeling. These Jacobi was unable to bring to agreement. 'In my heart,' he says, 'there is light, but directly I would bring it into the understanding, it disappears. Which of the two elements is the true one ? That of the understanding, which displays indeed forms that are firm, but behind them only a bottomless abyss ? Or that of the heart, which, lighting with promise upwards, fails still in definite knowledge ? Is it possible for the human mind to attain to truth, unless through union of both elements into a single light ? And is such a union attainable without the intervention of a miracle ?' When now, however, Jacobi, in order to reconcile this difference of the heart and the understanding, attempted to replace mediate (finite) cognition by immediate (intuitive) cognition, he only deceived himself. That very immediate cognition, which is supposed by Jacobi to be the special organ of the supersensuous, is in truth mediate, has already described a series of subjective intermediating movements, and can pretend to immediacy only in entire oblivion of its own nature and origin.

XX. FICHTE

Johann Gottlieb Fichte was born in 1762 at Rammenau in Upper Lusatia. A Silesian nobleman interested himself in the boy, and placed him first with a clergyman and then at the institute of Schulpforte. In his eighteenth year, Michaelmas 1780, Fichte entered the university of Jena as a student of theology. He soon found himself attracted to the study of philosophy; and the system of Spinoza in particular took a powerful hold on him. The straits of his external position served only to harden his will and his energy. In the year 1784, and afterwards, he held the position of tutor in various families in Saxony, but, on applying in 1787 for the situation of country pastor there, he was rejected in consequence of his religious views. He was obliged now to quit his native country, to which he was devotedly attached, and accept a tutorship in Zürich, where he made the acquaintance of his future wife, a niece of Klopstock's. He returned in Easter of 1790 to Saxony, and assumed the position of a *privatim docens* in Leipzig. Here he became acquainted with the philosophy of Kant in consequence of being engaged to give private lessons to a student of his system. In the spring of 1791 we find him, as a family-tutor again, in Warsaw, and shortly afterwards in Königsberg, whither he had gone to make acquaintance with Kant, whom he enthusiastically admired. Instead of a letter of introduction he handed to Kant his *Critique of all Revelation*, a work composed by him in four weeks. Fichte attempted, in this work, to deduce from practical reason the possibility of a revelation. He proceeds not quite *a priori*, however, but under a certain empirical condition—this, namely, that it be presumed that man has fallen into such moral ruin that the moral law has lost all its influence on will, or, in short, that all morality is extinct. In such a case, it is reasonable to expect on the part of God, as moral regent of the universe, the communication to men of pure moral principles through the medium of the senses, or the revelation of himself as lawgiver to them by means of a special and appropriate manifestation in the world of sense. And actu-

al revelation would be here, then, a postulate of practical reason. Even the possible matter of such a revelation Fichte attempted to determine *a priori*. We stand in need of no knowledge but that of God, free-will, and immortality; the revelation, therefore, will substantively contain nothing more. But, on the one hand, it will contain these doctrines in an intelligible form; and, on the other, it will not invest them in such symbolical dress as will claim for itself unlimited reverence. This tractate, which appeared anonymously in 1792, excited the greatest attention, and was universally regarded as a work of Kant's. It was partly the cause of Fichte—then in Zürich for the celebration of his marriage—receiving soon afterwards (in 1793) a call to the chair of philosophy at Jena, which Reinhold, invited to Kiel, had just vacated. At this time, also, Fichte published his anonymous *Contributions in Correction of the Judgments of the Public on the French Revolution*, a work which sat badly on the memories of the governments. Fichte entered on his new office at Easter in 1794, and speedily saw his reputation established. In a series of publications (the *Wissenschaftslehre* appeared in 1794, the *Naturrecht* in 1796, and the *Sittenlehre* in 1798), he endeavoured to approve and complete his new principle in transcendence of that of Kant; and exercised in this manner a powerful influence on the scientific movement in Germany, and all the more that Jena was one of the most flourishing universities, and the focus then of all energizing intellects. Here Fichte stood in intimate relation with Goethe, Schiller, the Schlegels, W. Humboldt, and Hufeland. Unfortunately in a few years these relations came to a rupture. In 1795 Fichte had become co-editor of Niethammer's *Philosophical Journal*. Forberg, rector at Saalfeld, a contributor, offered, in 1798, for insertion in this journal, an article on 'the determination of the notion of religion.' Fichte, who had advised against it, was still induced to insert it, but he premised an introduction 'on the grounds of our faith in a divine government of the world,' the purpose of which was to remove or lessen anything that might appear offensive in the article itself. Both contributions, however, were followed by a vehement

cry of atheism. The Electorate of Saxony confiscated the journal throughout its territories, and despatched a requisition to the Ernestine Dukes, the common protectors of the University of Jena, for the calling of the author to account, and the infliction of condign punishment on conviction. Fichte, in answer to the edict of confiscation, published (1799) a justification of himself in his *Appeal to the Public: a Work which Petitions to be Read before it is Confiscated*. With reference to his own government, he vindicated himself in the *Formal Defence of the Editors of the Philosophical Journal against the Accusations of Atheism*. The government of Weimar, which desired to consider as well him as the Electorate of Saxony, procrastinated with its decision. Meantime Fichte, however, having been secretly informed, rightly or wrongly, that it was intended to make an end of the whole affair by dismissing the accused with a reprimand for their imprudence, wrote, in his desire either for legal conviction or signal satisfaction, a private letter to a member of the government, in which he declared his resolution to send in his resignation in case of a reprimand, and concluded with the threat that several of his friends would with him quit the University, and found a new one elsewhere in Germany. The government accepted this declaration as a letter of resignation, thereby indirectly pronouncing the reprimand as inevitable. Religiously and politically suspect, Fichte looked about him in vain for an asylum. The Prince of Rudolstadt, to whom he turned, refused him his protection, and even in Berlin his arrival (1799) at first excited commotion. Here, in familiar intercourse with Friedrich Schlegel, and also with Schleiermacher and Novalis, his views gradually modified themselves. The Jena catastrophe had diverted him from the one sided moral position which, by example of Kant, he had hitherto occupied, to the sphere of religion; and now it was his endeavour to reconcile religion with his position in the *Wissenschaftslehre*, through adoption of a certain mysticism (second form of the philosophy of Fichte). After he had lectured privately, and delivered philosophical discourses in Berlin for several years, he received, in 1805, on the recommendation

of Beyme and Altenstein to the Chancellor of State (Hardenberg), a chair of philosophy at Erlangen, with the permission at the same time of returning to Berlin in winter to lecture, as usual, to a general audience, on philosophical subjects. Thus, in the winter of 1807-8, while a French marshal governed Berlin, and while the voice of the orator was often drowned by the noise of the enemy's drums in the street, he delivered his celebrated 'addresses to the German nation.' Fichte promoted in the most zealous manner the establishment of the Berlin University: for only to a complete change of the system of education did he look for the regeneration of Germany. On the opening of the new university in 1809, he was made dean of the philosophical faculty the first year, and rector the second. On the outbreak of the war of liberation, Fichte, both by word and by deed, took the liveliest interest in it. His wife in attending the wounded and sick contracted a nervous fever: she, indeed, was saved; but her husband fell under the same malady, and died on the 28th of January 1814, before completion of his fifty second year.

In the following exposition of his philosophy we distinguish, first of all, between the two (internally different) periods, that of Jena and that of Berlin. Under the first period, again, we have the *Wissenschaftslehre* in one division, and Fichte's practical philosophy in another.

I. The Philosophy of Fichte in its Earlier Form

(1) *Fichte's theoretical philosophy, or his Wissenschaftslehre (theory of knowledge, gnology)*—That Fichte's subjective idealism is only the consequence of the principles of Kant, has been already briefly explained. It was unavoidable that Fichte should wholly reject Kant's incognizable (but, nevertheless, supposed real) thing-in-itself, and should refer that outer impact which Kant attributed to these things in themselves, to the inner action of the mind itself. That only the ego is, and that what we regard as its limitation by external objects, is but its own self-limitation—this is the fundamental thesis of the

Fichtian idealism.

Fichte himself lays the foundations of his gnosology thus :— In every perception there are present at once an ego and a thing, or intelligence and its object. Which of the two sides shall be reduced to the other? Abstracting from the ego the philosopher obtains a thing-in-itself, and is obliged to attribute the ideas to the object; abstracting from the object again, he obtains only an ego in itself. The former is the position of dogmatism, the latter that of idealism. Both are incapable of being reconciled and a third is impossible. We must choose one or the other then. To assist decision, let us observe the following : (1) The ego is manifest in consciousness; but the thing-in-itself is a mere fiction, for what is in consciousness is only a sensation, a feeling. (2) Dogmatism undertakes to explain the origin of an idea; but it commences this explanation with an object in itself; that is, it begins with something that is not and never is in consciousness. But what is materially existent produces only what is materially existent—being produces only being—not feeling. The right consequently lies with idealism, which begins not with being (material existence), but with intelligence. To idealism intelligence is only active, it is not passive, because it is of a primitive and absolute nature. For this reason its nature is not being (material outwardness), but wholly and solely action. The forms of this action, the necessary system of the acts of intelligence, we must deduce from the principle (the essential nature) of intelligence itself. If we look for the laws of intelligence in experience, the source from which Kant (in a manner) took his categories, we commit a double blunder,—(1) In so far as it is not demonstrated *why* intelligence must act thus, and *whether* these laws are also immanent in intelligence; and (2) In so far as it is not demonstrated how the object itself arises. The objects, consequently, as well as the principles of intelligence are to be derived from the ego itself.

In assuming these consequences, Fichte believed himself to

be only following the true meaning of the tenets of Kant. 'What my system specially is, whether, *as I believe*, genuine, *Kriticismus* duly followed out, or however otherwise it may be named, is nothing to the point.' Fichte maintains his system to entertain the same view of the subject as that of Kant, and he conceives the numerous adherents of the latter to have only misunderstood and misrepresented their master. In his second introduction to the *Wissenschaftslehre* (1797) Fichte grants these expositors of the *Kritik of Pure Reason* that this work contains passages in which Kant demands sensations, given to the subject from without, as material conditions of objective reality. He shows, however, that these passages are wholly irreconcilable with innumerable assertions of the *Kritik* (to the effect that there cannot be any talk whatever of any operation on the part of a transcendental object in itself and external to us)—if by source of sensations anything else be understood than a mere thought. 'So long', Fichte continues, 'as Kant does not in so many words expressly declare that he derives sensation from the impress of a thing-in-itself, or, to use his own terminology, that sensation is to be explained by reference to a transcendental object independently existent without us, I will not consent to believe what these expositors tell us in regard to Kant. Should he, however, make this declaration, then I will rather believe that the *Kritik of Pure Reason* is a work of chance, than that it is a product of intellect'. The aged Kant did not let the public wait long for his answer, however. In the announcement-sheet of the *Allgemeine Literaturzeitung* (1799), he formally, and with much emphasis, rejected the Fichtian improvement of his system, protested against all interpretation of his writings on any assumed spirit, and stood by the letter of his theory as contained in the *Kritik of reason*. Reinhold in reference to this remarks: 'Since Kant's public declaration as regards the philosophy of Fichte, it is no longer susceptible of doubt, but that Kant conceives his system himself, and wants others to conceive it, quite differently from the manner in which Fichte has conceived it. But the most that we can conclude from this is, that Kant himself does not consider his system inconsequent

because it assumes a something external to subjectivity. It by no means follows, however, that Fichte is wrong in declaring the system in question to be inconsequent because of this assumption.' That Kant himself had a feeling of this inconsequence is proved by his alterations in the second edition of the *Kritik of Pure Reason*, where the idealistic side of his system is made decidedly to recede behind the empirical one.

The general stand point of the *Wissenschaftslehre* appears in what has been said : it would make the ego its principle, and from the ego it would derive all the rest. That we are to understand by this ego, not the particular individual, but the universal ego, universal reason need hardly be remarked. Egoity and individuality, the pure and the empirical ego, are entirely different ideas.

As concerns the form of the *Wissenschaftslehre* we have yet to premise the following. The *Wissenschaftslehre* must according to Fichte find an ultimate principle from which all others shall be derived. This principle must be directly certain in its own self. And unless our knowledge is to be made up of mere incoherent fragments, such a principle there must be. But again, as any such principle is plainly insusceptible of proof, there is nothing left for us but trial. We must institute an experiment, and only in that way is a proof possible. That is, if we do find a proposition to which we may reduce all others, this proposition is the principle sought. Besides the first proposition, however, two others may be thought, of which the one, unconditioned in matter, is conditioned in form by and dependent on, the first, whilst the other is the reverse. These three axioms, finally, will be so related to each other, that the second shall be the opposite of the first, and the third the result of both. On this plan, and in accordance with the previous exposition, the first absolute axiom will start from the ego, the second oppose to it a thing or a non-ego, and the third bring the ego into reaction against the thing or the non-ego. This Fichtian method (Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis), like that of Hegel after it, is a combination of the analytic and synthetic methods. Fichte has the merit of having been able by means

of it to be the first to deduce all the philosophical fundamental notions from a single point, and to bring them into connexion, instead of only taking them up empirically, like Kant, and setting them down in mere juxtaposition. Commencement is made with a fundamental synthesis; in this synthesis opposites are looked for by means of analysis; and these opposites are then re-united in a second, more definite (richer, concreter) synthesis. But analysis will again detect opposites even in this second synthesis. There is thus a third synthesis necessary, and so on, till at last opposites are reached which can only be approximately conjoined.

We are now at the threshold of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, which falls into three parts : (a) first principles of the whole science, (b) the foundations of theoretical knowledge, and (c) the foundations of practical (moral) science.

The first principles are, as said, three in number : one absolutely unconditioned, and the others relatively so. (1) *The absolutely original, directly unconditioned, first principle* must express that action which is known in fact to underlie all consciousness, and alone render it possible. This principle is the *proposition of identity*, $A=A$. This proposition remains behind and will not be thought away when we abstract from all the empirical forms of consciousness. It is a fact of consciousness and must therefore be universally admitted; but at the same time, it is not, like every other empirical fact of consciousness, something conditioned, but, as free act, it is something unconditioned. When we maintain too that without any further ground this proposition is certain, we ascribe to ourselves the power of taking something *for granted*. We do not take for granted in it that A is, but only that A is, if A is. It is the *form* of the proposition only which we consider, and not the *matter* of it. In matter, then, the proposition $A=A$ is conditioned (hypothetical) : it is unconditioned only in form, only in *vis nexus*. Should we seek a proposition unconditioned in matter as well as in form then in place of A we must substitute the ego (and to this we have a perfect right, for the connexion of subject and predicate pronounced by the judgment $A=A$ is in the ego

and the work of the ego). The proposition $A=A$, consequently, is thus transformed into the new proposition, $\text{ego}=\text{ego}$.

This latter proposition now is not only unconditioned in form but also in matter. While it was impossible for us to say with reference to $A=A$, that A is, we can now say with reference to $\text{ego}=\text{ego}$, that the ego is, I am. It is the explanatory ground of all facts of empirical consciousness that before anything can be given in the ego, the ego itself must be given. This directly self-determined, self-grounded ground is the ground of all action in the human mind and is consequently, pure, inherent, independent activity. The ego assumes itself, and it is by this mere self-assumption; it is, only because it has assumed itself. And conversely, the ego assumes its existence by virtue of its mere existence. It is at once the agent and the product of the action. I am is the expression of the only possible original act.

In a logical point of view we have in the first principle of the *Wissenschaftslehre* ($A=A$) the law of identity. From the proposition $A=A$, we proceeded to the proposition $\text{ego}=\text{ego}$. The latter, however, derives not its validity from the former, but contrariwise. The ego is the *prius* of all judgment, and is the foundation of the *nexus* of subject and predicate. The logical law of identity originates, therefore, in the $\text{ego}=\text{ego}$. In a metaphysical point of view we obtain from the first proposition of the *Wissenschaftslehre* the category of *reality*. This we obtain by abstracting from the particular matter concerned, and by reflecting merely on the mode of action of the human spirit. All categories are deduced from the ego as the absolute subject.

(2) *The second fundamental principle*, which, conditioned in matter but unconditioned in form, is as little susceptible of proof or derivation as the first, is equally a fact of empirical consciousness: it is the proposition $\text{non-}A \text{ is not} = A$. This proposition, as a spontaneous conclusion, an original act, is unconditioned in form like the first, nor can it be derived from the first. It is conditioned in matter, because, if a non- A is to be established, there must be first assumed an A . But let us

consider this principle more narrowly. In $A=A$ the form of the act was *thesis*, statement; but here it is *antithesis*, counter-statement. The power of direct, absolute counter-statement (contraposition) is assumed, and this contraposition is, in form, an absolutely possible act, that is unconditioned and independent of any higher ground.

But, in matter, antithesis (contraposition) presupposes thesis (position): if any non- A is to be granted, A must be previously granted. What non- A is, is not made known to me by the possibility of absolute contraposition as such. I know only that non- A must be the opposite, the counterpart of some certain thing A . What non- A is, consequently, I know only under the condition of knowing A . But the ego is A , or in the ego A has absolute position. There is originally nothing else in position (seen and granted) but the ego, and only the ego is directly and absolutely in position (seen and granted). Absolute contraposition consequently is possible only of the ego. But what is contraposed to the ego—its opposite and counterpart—is the non-ego. Opposed to the ego is its absolute counterpart, a non-ego: this is the second fact of empirical consciousness. Whatever belongs to the ego, the counterpart of that must, by virtue of simple contraposition, belong to the non-ego.

From this proposition, now (ego is not= non-ego) we obtain the logical law of contradiction, as from the first that of identity. Metaphysically, too, we obtain from this proposition, by abstracting from the particular act of judgment concerned, and merely referring to the form of the inference, the category of negation.

(3) *The third fundamental principle*, conditioned in form only, is almost entirely susceptible of proof, because there are now two propositions for its determination. With every step we approach nearer to the sphere in which all is susceptible of proof. The third principle is conditioned in form and unconditioned in matter: that is to say, the problem for the act, which it expresses, is given in the two preceding propositions, but not also its solution. This latter results unconditionally

and absolutely from an arbitrary decision of reason.

The problem which the third principle has to solve is the reconciliation, namely, of the contradiction implied in the other two. On the one hand the ego is completely sublated by the non-ego : position is impossible for the ego, so far as the non-ego is in position. On the other hand, the non-ego has position only in the ego, in consciousness ; the ego, consequently, is not sublated by the non-ego, after all the sublated ego is not sublated. The result now, then, is non-A A. In order to resolve this contradiction which threatens to destroy the identity of our consciousness, the only absolute fundament of our knowledge, we must find an X, by virtue of which correctness will be still possible for the first two principles without prejudice to the identity of consciousness. The opposites, the ego and the non ego, must be united set equal. in consciousness without mutual neutralization; they must be taken up into the identity of the one sole consciousness.

How, now, may being and non-being, reality and negation, be thought together without mutual destruction ? They must mutually *limit* each other. Limit then, is the X required : this is the required original action of the ego, and, thought as category, it is the category of determination or limitation. But in limitation the category of *quantity* is already implied : for to limit anything is to sublate its reality by negation not in *whole* but in *part*. In the notion of limit, consequently, there lies, besides the notions of reality and negation, that also of divisibility, of the susceptibility to quantity in general. Through the action of limitation, as well the ego as the non-ego is assumed as divisible.

Further, there results from the third principle, as from the two former, a logical law. Abstraction being made from the matter, the ego and non ego, and only the form of the union of opposites through the notion of divisibility remaining, we have, namely, the logical *proposition of ground or reason*, which may be expressed in the formula. A in part = non-A, non-A in part = A. The ground is ground of relation so far as each opposite is identical with the other in some single significate

(*nota*), while it is ground of distinction again, so far as each equal is opposed to the other in some single significate.

The complex now of what is unconditionally and absolutely certain is in these three principles exhausted. They may be comprised in the following formula : *In the ego I oppose to the divisible ego a divisible non ego*. No philosophy transcends this proposition, but all true philosophy must accept it; and in accepting it philosophy becomes *Wissenschaftslehre*. All that is henceforth to present itself in the system of knowledge must be derived thence and in the first place the further divisions of the *Wissenschaftslehre* itself. In the proposition that ego and non-ego mutually limit each other, there are these two elements : (1.) the ego exhibits itself as limited by the non-ego (that is to say, the ego is cognitive); (2.) conversely the ego exhibits the non-ego as limited by the ego (that is to say, the ego is active). These propositions are the foundation, the one of the theoretical, the other of the practical part of the *Wissenschaftslehre*. The latter part is problematical at first : for a non-ego limited by an active ego does not at first exist, and we have to wait for its realization in the theoretical part.

The elements of theoretical knowledge present a continuous series of antitheses and syntheses. The fundamental synthesis is the proposition that the ego is determined by the non-ego. Analysis demonstrates in this proposition two subordinate mutually opposed propositions : (1.) the non-ego, as active, determines the ego, which is in so far passive. But as all action must originate in the ego, it is (2.) the ego itself that is absolutely self-determinative.

We have here the contradiction of action and passion at once on the part of the ego. As, then, this contradiction would subvert the above proposition, and by consequence also the unity of consciousness, we are under the necessity of finding a point, a new synthesis, in which the apparent opposites may be reconciled. This is accomplished by reconciling in the notion of divisibility the notions of action and passion, falling as they do under those of reality and negation. „ The propositions, ‘The ego determines,’ ‘The ego is determined,’ coalesce

in the proposition 'The ego partly determines itself, and is partly determined.'

But more, both are to be thought as one and the same. With greater precision then : as many parts of reality as the ego determines in itself, so many parts of negation does it determine in the non-ego, and, conversely, as many parts of reality as the ego determines in the non-ego, so many parts of negation does it determine in itself. This determination is *reciprocal determination* or *reciprocity*. In this way Fichte is found to have deduced the last of Kant's three categories of relation.

In same manner (namely, by synthesis of analysed antitheses), he continues to deduce the remaining two categories of this class, or those of *causality* and *substantiality*. For example : so far as the ego is determined, is passive, the non-ego possesses reality. The category of reciprocity, then, in which it is indifferent which side is one or the other, is brought to this form that the ego is passive, and the non-ego active. But the notion expressive of this relation is the notion of *causality*. That to which activity is ascribed is called *cause* (the primitive reality); that to which passivity is ascribed, *effect* : and both in union constitute an action or operation.

Again, the ego determines itself. This is a contradiction : (1) The ego determines itself, it is what acts; (2) It determines itself, it is what is acted on. Thus, in a single relation and action, reality and negation are at once ascribed to it. Solution for such a contradiction as this is only possible in such mode of action as is action and passion at once : the ego must through action determine its passion, and through passion its action.

The solution implies recourse, then, to the aid of the notion of quantity. All reality is in the ego first of all as absolute quantum, as absolute totality, and the ego so far may be compared to a great circle. A determinate quantum of action, or a limited sphere within the great circle of action, is reality indeed, but compared with the totality of action it is negation of

this totality, or passion. Here we have the solution sought : it lies in the notion of *substantiality*.

So far as the ego is considered to comprehend the entire compass, the totality of realities, it is substance; so far as it is referred to a determinate sphere of the entire compass, it is accidental. No accident can be thought without substance, for to be able to recognise anything as a determinate reality, it must be first referred to reality in general or substance. Substance is thought vicissitude in general : the accident is a determinate that changes place with what itself changes. *Originally there is only a single substance, the ego*. In this single substance all possible accidents, and therefore all possible realities, are contained. Ego alone is the absolute infinite : I think, I act, is already limitation. Fichte's philosophy is therefore Spinozism, but as Jacobi felicitously named it, an inverted, idealistic Spinozism.

Glancing back, we perceive that Fichte has abolished the objectivity which Kant had left. *Only the ego is*. But the ego presupposes a non-ego, and so, therefore, a sort of object. How the ego accomplishes the determination of this object, it is now the business of the theoretical *Wissenschaftslehre* to demonstrate.

In regard to the relation of the ego to the non-ego, there are two extreme views, according as we begin with the notion of causality or with that of substantiality. (1) Beginning with the notion of causality there is assumed in the passion of the ego an action of the non-ego. The passion of the ego must have a ground. This ground cannot be in the ego, which assumes for itself action only. It is consequently in the non-ego. Here, then, the difference between action and passion is not conceived as merely quantitative (passion as diminished action), but the passion is opposed qualitatively to the action : a presupposed action of the non-ego is therefore the real ground of the passion in the ego. (2) Beginning with the notion of substantiality, the action of the ego is assumed to imply also a passion in the ego. Here the passion is in quality nothing but action, a diminished action.

Whilst, then, by the first view, the passive ego has a ground qualitatively different from the ego, or a real ground, it has,

by the second view, only a quantitatively diminished action of the ego for its ground, or it has an ideal ground. The first view is dogmatic realism, the second dogmatic idealism. The latter maintains : all reality of a non-ego is simply a transference from the ego. The former maintains : transference is impossible, unless there previously exist an independent real non-ego, a thing-in-itself. There is thus an antithesis, to be resolved only in a new synthesis. Fichte attempts this synthesis of idealism, and realism through the intermediate system of the critical idealism.

For this purpose he endeavours to show that the ideal ground and the real ground are one and the same. Neither the mere action of the ego is ground of the reality of the non-ego, nor the mere action of the non-ego ground of the passion of the ego. The two are to be thought together thus : on the action of the ego there presents itself, but not without help of the ego, an opposed principle of repulsion (the *Anstoss*—the plane of offence), which bends back the action of the ego, and reflects it into itself.

This repelling principle consists in this, that the subjective element cannot be farther extended, that the radiating activity of the ego is driven back into itself, and self-limitation results. What we call objects are nothing but the various breakings of the action of the ego against an incomprehensible obstacle, and these affections of the ego are then transferred by us to something external to us, or are conceived by us as things occupying space.

The Fichtian principle of reflexion consequently is in the main the same thing as the Kantian thing-in-itself, only that it is conceived by Fichte as a product from within. Fichte proceeds next to deduce the subjective faculties of the ego, which, theoretically, mediate or seek to mediate between the ego and the non-ego,—imagination, conception (sensation, perception, feeling), understanding, judgment, reason, and, in connexion with these, the subjective projections of perception, time, and space.

We stand now before the third part of the *Wissenschaftslehre*,

or the *exposition of the practical sphere*. We left the ego an intelligence. But that the ego is intelligent at all, is not brought about by the ego, but by something external to the ego. We were unable to conceive the possibility of a perceptive intelligence unless by presupposing an obstruction and reflexion of the action of the ego, striving otherwise into the infinite and the indefinite. The ego, accordingly, is, as intelligence, dependent on an indefinite and wholly indefinable non-ego, and only through and by means of such a non-ego is it intelligence.

But this limit must be broken through. The ego, in all its attributes, is still to be supposed as absolutely self-affirmed, and completely independent therefore of any possible non-ego whatever, but as intelligence it is finite, dependent; the absolute ego and the intelligent ego, consequently, though still to be supposed one and the same, are mutually opposed. This contradiction may be remedied only by assuming that the ego, as insusceptible of passion, and possessed only of absolute action, does itself spontaneously determine the still unknown non-ego to which the reflexion (*Anstoss*) is attributed. The limit which the ego, as theoretical ego, opposed to itself in the non-ego—this limit the same ego as practical ego must endeavour to withdraw, that is, it must endeavour to reabsorb into itself the non-ego (or comprehend it as self-limitation of the ego).

The Kantian supremacy of practical reason is in this way realized. The transition of the theoretical into the practical part, the necessity of the advance from the one to the other, is more particularly represented by Fichte thus : The business of the theoretical part was to conciliate ego and non ego. To this end, middle term after middle term was intercalated without success. Then came reason with the absolute decision. 'Inasmuch as the non-ego is incapable of union with the ego, non-ego there shall be none,' whereby the knot was not undone indeed, but cut. It is thus, then, the incongruity between the absolute (practical) ego and the finite (intelligent) ego that necessitates the transition from the theoretical to the practical sphere. Nor does the incongruity wholly disappear

even in the practical sphere : action is but an infinite striving to surmount the limit of the non-ego. The ego, as practical, tends, indeed, to transcend the actual world, to found an ideal world, such a world as would exist if all reality were the product of the ego : but this striving remains encumbered with finitude, partly because of the ego itself in its reference to objects (which objects are finite), and partly because the intelligence (the conscious affirming and realizing of itself as itself on the part of the ego), remains perpetually conditioned by an opposing non-ego that checks its action. It is our duty at once, and an impossibility to strive to reach the infinite. Nevertheless just this striving united to this impossibility is the stamp of our destiny for eternity.

And thus, then (so Fichte sums up the results of the *Wissenschaftslehre*), the entire nature of finite rational beings is comprehended and exhausted. An original idea of our absolute being; effort towards reflection on ourselves in accordance with this idea; limitation not of this effort, but of our actual definite existence (which is only realized by this limitation), through an opposing principle, a non-ego, or in general through our own finitude; consciousness of self and in particular of our practical effort; determination of our intelligence, accordingly, and through it of our actions; enlargement of our limits progressively *ad infinitum*.

(2) *Fichte's Practical Philosophy*—Fichte applies the principles which he has developed in his *Wissenschaftslehre* to practical life, and particularly to his theory of rights and duties. With methodic rigour here, too, he seeks to deduce all, without accepting from experience (as mere fact so found) anything unproved. Thus, in these practical interests, even a plurality of persons is not presupposed, but first of all deduced; nay that man is possessed of a body is deduced—not certainly stringently.

The theory of right or rights (natural law), Fichte founds on the notion of the individual. He first deduces the notion of right as follows. A finite rational being cannot realize himself without ascribing to himself a freedom of action. But this as-

cription involves the existence of an external world of sense, for a rational being cannot ascribe action to himself without implying the existence of an object to which this action is to be directed. More particularly still, this freedom of action in a rational being presupposes other rational beings; for without them he would be unconscious of it. We have thus a plurality of free individuals, each possessing a sphere of free action. This co-existence of free individuals is impossible without a relation of right (law). Retaining each his own sphere with freedom, but with limitation of himself, they recognise each other as free and rational beings. This relation of a reciprocity in intelligence and freedom between rational beings—according to which each limits his freedom by leaving possible the freedom of the others, on condition that these others similarly limit themselves in return—is a *relation of right* (natural law). The first principle here then runs thus: Limit your freedom by the notion of that of all the other rational beings (persons) with whom you may come into connexion. After investigation of the applicability of this principle and consequent deduction of the corporeal part or anthropological side of man, Fichte proceeds to the special *theory of right* (jurisprudence). It falls into three parts: (1) Rights which depend on the mere notion of personality, are *primitive rights*. Primitive right is the absolute right of the person to be only a cause in the world of sense, and no mere means. This gives (a) the right of personal freedom, and (b.) the right of property. But still every relation of particular persons is conditioned by the reciprocal recognition of these. Each has to limit the quantum of his freedom in behoof of that of the rest; and only so far as another respects my freedom, have I to respect his. In order to assure the right of the person, then, there must be assumed a mechanical force for application to the case in which the other does not respect my primitive rights, and this is (2.) the *right of coercion*. Coercive or penal laws demand that the volition of every unjust end shall be followed by its own contrary, that every unjust will shall be annihilated, and right restored in its integrity. For the establishment of such penal law, and such universal coer-

cive authority, the free individuals must enter into a mutual contract. But such contract is only possible in a commonweal. Natural law, then, the relation of right (justice) between man and man presupposes (3.) *political rights*, namely (a) a free contract on the part of the political units as a mutual guarantee of rights; (b) positive laws, a political legislature, through which the common will of all becomes law; (c.) an executive power, a political authority which realizes the common will, and in which, therefore, the private and the general will are synthetically united. Fichte's concluding result here is this : on the one side there is the State of reason (philosophical jurisprudence), on the other, the State as it actually exists (positive juristic and political principles). But there arises thus the problem, to make the actual State more and more adequate to the rational State. The science which contemplates this approximation is *politics*. Complete adequacy to the idea is not to be expected on the part of any actual State. Every political constitution is legitimate, provided only it renders not impossible the progress to a better. Wholly illegitimate is only that constitution which would maintain all as it now is.

The absolute ego of the *Wissenschaftslehre* sunders in the *Rechtslehre* (theory of rights) into an infinite number of persons : to restore unity is the problem of the *Sittenlehre* (theory of duties). Rights and morals are essentially different. Right (justice) is the external necessity to do something or to omit something in order not to infringe the liberty of others : the internal necessity to do or to omit something quite independently of external motives constitutes morality. And as the system of rights arose from the conflict of the tendency to freedom in one subject with the tendency to freedom in another subject, so the system of duties arises similarly from a conflict, not however from any external conflict, but, on the contrary, from an internal conflict of different motives in one and the same person. (1.) Every rational being strives to independency, to freedom for the sake of freedom. This is the fundamental and pure spring of action, and it supplies at once the formal principle of morals, the principle of absolute autonomy,

of absolute independency of all that is external to the ego. But (2.) as a rational being in actual existence is empirical and finite, as by force of nature he assumes his own self as a corporeal being to which a non-ego opposes itself, there dwells in him beside the pure spring another and empirical spring, the instinct of self-preservation, the instinct of nature, the aim of which is not freedom but enjoyment. This instinct of nature supplies the material, eudæmonistic principle of a striving for enjoyment for the sake of enjoyment.

These springs seem mutually contradictory; but from a transcendental point of view they are one and the same primitive spring of human action. For even the instinct of self preservation is an emanation of the tendency of the ego towards action, and it cannot be destroyed : destruction of the instinct of nature would be followed by the destruction of all definite effort, of all conscious action. The two principles are to be united, then, but in such a manner that the natural shall be subordinated to the pure principle. This union can only occur in an act which in matter looks (in obedience to the natural principle) to the world of sense; but in ultimate end (obeying the pure principle) to an entire emancipation from the world of sense. Neither mere negative withdrawal from the world of objects, in order to be a pure self subsistent ego, nor yet mere striving to enjoyment is the problem, but a positive action on the world of sense so that the ego shall always become freer, its power over the non-ego greater, and the supremacy of reason over nature more and more realized. This striving to act free in order always to become more free, is, in its combination of the pure and the natural principle, the moral or practical motive. The end of moral action is placed in infinitude, however; it can never be reached, for the ego can never possibly become wholly independent of any limitation, so long as it is destined to remain an intelligence, a self conscious ego. The nature of the moral act is consequently to be defined thus. All action must consist of a series of acts, in continuing which the ego may be able to regard itself as always approaching to absolute independency. Every act must be a term in this series;

no act is indifferent; to be always engaged in an act that lies in this series, this is our moral vocation. The principle of morals therefore is, Fulfil continually your vocation ! It belongs, in a formal, subjective preference, to moral action, that it is an intelligent, free action, an action in accordance with ideas : in all that you do, be free, in order to become free. We ought blindly to follow neither the pure nor the natural spring. We ought to act only in the clear conviction of our vocation or duty. We must do our duty only for the sake of duty. The blind impulses of uncorrupted instinct, sympathy, compassion, benevolence, etc., do indeed, in consequence of the original identity of the natural and the pure principle, advance the same interests as the latter. But as natural impulses they are not moral; the moral motive possesses causality as if it possessed none, for it says, Be free ! Only through free action according to the notion of his absolute vocation is a rational being absolutely self-dependent; only action on duty is such a manifestation of a purely rational being. The formal condition of the morality of our acts, therefore, is, Act always up to the conviction of your duty; or, Act according to your conscience. The absolute criterion of the correctness of our conviction is a feeling of truth and assurance. This instinctive feeling never deceives, for it only exists when there is perfect harmony of the empirical with the pure, original ego. Fichte now develops his system of special duties, which, however, we shall here omit.

The religious opinions of Fichte are contained in the above-mentioned essay, *On the ground of our Belief in a Divine Government of the World*, as well as in his written defences which followed. The moral order of the universe, says Fichte, is that Divinity which we assume. By right action this divine element becomes alive and actual in us. Only under presupposition of it, presupposition, that is, of the moral end being capable of realization in the world of sense by means of a higher order, is each of our acts performed. Faith in such order is the com-

plete and perfect faith; for this moral order, actually operative in life, is itself God : we neither require any other god, nor can we comprehend any other. We possess no ground of reason for going beyond this moral order of the universe, and assuming, on the principle of concluding from the derivative to the primitive, that there is also a particular being who is the cause of it. Is this order, then, at all contingent in its nature ? It is the absolute *first* of all objective knowledge. But even granting your conclusion, what properly have you assumed in it ? This being is to be supposed different from you and the world, it is to be supposed to act in the latter in obedience to ideas; is it to be supposed consequently capable of ideas, possessed of personality, of consciousness ? What then do you call personality, consciousness ? Without doubt that which you have found in yourself, which you have known only in experience of yourself, and which you have named only from experience of yourself. But that it is absolutely impossible for you to think this being without limitation and finitude, the slightest attention to the construction of the notion will readily show you. By the mere attribution of the predicate you convert it into what is finite, into a being that is the fellow of yourself; and you have not, as you intended, thought God, but only multiplied your own self in thought. The notion of God as a particular substance is contradictory and impossible. God veritably exists only in the form of a moral order of the universe. All belief in any divine element that involves more than this notion is to me a horror, and utterly unworthy of a rational being. Morality and religion are here, as with Kant, naturally one : both are a grasping to the supersensual, the one by action, the other by belief. This 'religion of a happy right-doing' we find further developed by Fichte in his written defences against the accusation of atheism. He even maintains in these that nothing but the principles of the new philosophy is capable of restoring to men their lost sense of religion, and of revealing the true nature of the teachings of Christ. This he endeavours to demonstrate particularly in his *Appeal* to the public, where he says : To answer the questions, What is good ?

What is true ? this is the aim of my philosophical system. That system maintains first of all that there is something absolutely true and good; there is something that to the free flight of thought is restrictive and authoritative. A voice that may not die proclaims to man that something is his duty, which do he must, and for no other reason. This principle in our nature opens to us an entire new world; we receive from it a higher existence, which, completely independent of nature, has its foundations wholly and solely in ourselves. This absolute self-sufficiency of reason, this perfect emancipation from dependency, I will name it blessedness. As the single but infallible means of blessedness, conscience points out performance of my duty. An immovable conviction is laid within me, therefore, that there exists a law, an established order which renders blessedness a necessary result of the pure moral character. That the man, who would maintain the dignity of his reason, must establish himself on faith in this order of a moral universe, must regard each of his duties as a provision of that order, must consider all their results as good, as blessed, and joyfully submit to it,—this, absolutely necessary, is the essence of religion. Create within you the spirit of duty, and you will know God, and, whilst you appear to others as in the world of sense, you will, in your own self, know yourself to be even here below, already in the life eternal.

II. The Philosophy of Fichte in its Later Form

All that Fichte has contributed of importance to speculative philosophy is contained in the system which has been just considered. After quitting Jena, however, this system underwent a gradual modification in consequence of several influences. It was naturally difficult to preserve so uncompromising an idealism as that of the *Wissenschaftslehre*; again the intercurrent nature-philosophy of Schelling remained not without effect on Fichte's own mode of thought, although he denied this, and fell into a bitter dispute with Schelling in regard to it; and lastly, his private, not quite easy, external circum-

tances, may have tended to modify his general views of the world. Fichte's writings of this second period are for the most part of a popular nature, and calculated for a general audience. They bear all of them the stamp of his keen spirit and of his lofty manly moral nature. They want, however, the originality and the scientific rigour of his earlier writings. Even those among them which are more particularly scientific, satisfy not the demands for genetic construction and philosophical method, made earlier by Fichte himself with so much earnestness both on himself and others. His teaching now, indeed, has so much the appearance of a loosely connected intertexture of old subjective-idealistic views, and of new objectivo-idealistic ones, that Schelling was justified in characterizing it as the most thorough syncretism and eclecticism. The distinction of his new position, namely, is, that—with points of resemblance to Neo-Platonism in it—he attempts to transform his subjective idealism into objective pantheism, or the ego of his earlier philosophy into the absolute, into the notion of God. God, the idea of whom he had formerly placed only at the end of his system in the equivocal shape of a moral order of the universe, became now the absolute beginning and the single element of his philosophy. This philosophy took on in this manner, then, quite another colour. Religious gentleness assumed the place now of moral severity; instead of the ego and duty, life and love became the principles of his philosophy; in room of the keen dialectic of the *Wissenschaftslehre* a predilection for mystical and figurative modes of expression manifested itself. Especially characteristic of this second period is the leaning to religion and to Christianity, chiefly in the work, *Guidance to a Blessed Life*. Fichte maintains here that his new doctrine is the doctrine of Christianity, and particularly of the Gospel of John. This Gospel Fichte insisted on regarding at that time as the only genuine authority on Christianity, because the other apostles, remaining half Jews, had left standing the fundamental error of Jewry, its doctrine of a creation in time. Fichte attributed special worth to the first part of the prologue of John: in it the creation of the world

out of nothing is refuted, and the true conception of a revelation equally eternal with God, and necessarily given with his being, enunciated. What, on the other hand, is said in the prologue of the incarnation of the Logos in the person of Christ, possesses for Fichte only an historical import. The absolute and eternally true position is, that, at all times and in every one without exception, who vitally perceives his unity with God, and who really and in deed devotes his entire individual life to the divine life within him—in him the eternal word, quite in the same manner as in Jesus Christ, becomes flesh and receives a personally sensuous and human form. The entire community of the faithful, the first born as well as the later born, coalesce in the one common vital source of all, the Godhead. And so, then, Christianity, its end attained, coincides once more with absolute truth, and proclaims that all require to come into unity with God. So long as a man wants to become something for himself, God comes not into him, for no man can become God. So soon, however, as he annuls himself perfectly, completely, and to the last root, there remains but God alone, and He is All in All. Man cannot make for himself a God; nevertheless himself, as the negation proper, he can annul, and then he is merged in God.

The result of his advanced philosophizing, Fichte sums up, briefly and clearly, in the following verses, which we take from two of his posthumous sonnets :

‘Th’ undying one
Lives as thou liv’st, and sees in all thou see’st,
Nought is but God; and God is nought but life.
Quite clear the veil is raised from thee, and lo !
‘Tis self : let die, then, this destructible;
And henceforth God will live in all thy strife.
Consider what survives this strife below;
Then will the veil as veil be visible,
And all revealed thou’lt see celestial life.’

XXI. HERBART

A Peculiar, in many respects estimable, continuation of the

philosophy of Kant was attempted by *Johann Friedrich Herbart* (b 1776 at Oldenburg; 1805, Professor of Philosophy at Göttingen; 1808, Kant's successor at Königsberg; 1833, recalled to Göttingen, where, 1841, he died). The philosophy of Herbart distinguishes itself from most of the other systems in this way, that it sets not up an idea of reason as its principle, but, like the Kantian, finds its problem in a critical investigation and construction of subjective experience. It, too, is criticism, but with results that are at once peculiar, and altogether different from the Kantian. For this reason, from its very principle, it occupies, in the history of philosophy, an isolated position: almost all the earlier systems, instead of appearing as moments of the one true philosophy, are to it mistakes. It is particularly characteristic of it that it is eminently hostile to the post-Kantian philosophy of Germany, especially to Schelling's philosophy of nature, in which it can see only a delusion and a cobweb of the brain. In comparison with the philosophy of Schelling, indeed, it would rather declare its agreement with the philosophy of Hegel, although the latter is its polar opposite. We give a brief exposition of its leading ideas

(1) *The foundation and starting-point of philosophy* is, to Herbart, the common view of things, knowledge gained by the method of experience. A philosophical system is nothing more than an experimental scheme, by means of which some particular thinker attempts to answer certain questions which he has put to himself. Every question that is to be proposed in philosophy must consider wholly and solely the given facts, or rather must owe to them its suggestion; for the sole basal field of certainty for man, is experience alone. *With it* is every beginning in philosophy to be made. Thought must submit to the notions of experience; they shall lead it, not it them. Thus, then, experience is wholly and solely the object and foundation of philosophy; what is no given fact, that cannot be an object of thought; and it is impossible to realize any knowledge in excess of the limits of experience.

(2) The facts of experience are certainly the basis of philosophy; but as simply ready-found, they are still without it

The question occurs, What is the first fact, the beginning of philosophy? Thought has first to free itself from experience, to make clear to itself the difficulties of the investigation. *The beginning of philosophy*, where thought raises itself above the element that is simply given, is therefore deliberative doubt, or *scepsis*. There is a lower and a higher scepticism. The lower doubts only that things are so constituted as they appear to us; the higher transcends the general phenomenal form, and asks whether there be anything at all existent there. It doubts, for example, the succession of time; it asks, in regard to design in natural objects, whether it belongs to them, or is simply thought as in them, etc. And thus we gradually attain to an expression of the problems which constitute the interest of metaphysics. The result of scepticism is thus not negative, but positive. Doubt is nothing but the thinking of the notions of experience, and these are the burthen of philosophy. Scepticism by means of this reflection enables us to perceive that the notions of experience, though referent to a given factum, do not possess, nevertheless, an import that is thinkable, that is free from logical absurdities.

(3) Metaphysics, to Herbert, is the science of what is intelligible in experience. Thus far, namely, we have reached perception of two truths. On the one side it is seen that the sole basis of philosophy is experience, and on the other that *scepsis* has shaken the credibility of experience. First of all, then, this *scepsis* must be converted into a precise knowledge of the metaphysical problems. Notions are obtruded on us by experience which are incogitable; that is to say, they are thought indeed by our ordinary understanding, but this thought is only a confused and obscure thought, that does not distinguish and compare the contradictory attributes (*notæ*, logical significates). Skilled thought, on the contrary, logical analysis, finds in the notions of experience (time, space, origination, motion, etc.), contradictions, contradictory, mutually negating characters (*notæ*). What are we to do then? These notions cannot be rejected, for they are given to us, and we can only hold by what is given; neither can they be accepted, for they

are incogitable, logically impracticable. The only measure that is left us is—to transform them. *Transformation of the notions of experience*, the elimination of their contradictions, is the special act of speculation. Thus it is scepticism that has brought forward the more special problems, and it is the resolution of the contradictions of these that is the business of metaphysics. The most important of these problems are those of inherence, mutation, and the ego.

The relation between Herbart and Hegel is here particularly evident. As regards the contradictory nature of the categories and notions of experience both are agreed. But in the next step they separate. Inherent contradiction, says Hegel, is the very nature of these notions, as of all things in general: becoming, for example, is essentially unity of being and non-being, etc. That, rejoins Herbart, is impossible so long as the principle of contradiction still retains its authority. That the notions of experience present contradictions, that is no fault of the objective world, but of subjective perception, which must redress its erroneous construction by a transformation of these notions and an elimination of their contradictions. Herbart accuses the philosophy of Hegel of empiricism, in that it accepts from experience these contradictory notions unaltered; and, notwithstanding discernment of their contradictory nature regards them, just because they are empirically given, as justified, and even, on their account, transforms the science of logic itself. Hegel and Herbart are related as Heraclitus and Parmenides.

(4) From this point Herbart proceeds in the following manner to his '*reals*.' The discovery, he says, of contradictions in all our notions of experience has that in it to lead to absolute scepticism, to despair of truth. But it is evident at once that if the existence of any basis of reality is to be denied, appearance also (sensation, perception, thought) is sapped and ruined. But that being inadmissible, we must grant this proposition: so much appearance, so much proof of reality. To experience as given we certainly cannot ascribe any true, any absolutely existent reality; it is not independent *per se*, it is in, or

through, or by occasion of, another. *True being* (reality) is an absolute being, that, as such, excludes all relativity, all dependency; it is *absolute position*, which we, for our part, have not to produce, but recognise. So far as this position is to be supposed to imply a something, reality belongs to it. What veritably is, therefore, is always a *quale*, a something, which is regarded as real. In order, now, that this *real* may correspond to the conditions which are implied in the notion of the absolute position, its *what* must be thought, (*a*) as absolutely positive or affirmative, that is to say, as without negation or limitation, which would cancel the absoluteness; (*b*) as absolutely simple, or as not a plurality and not subjected to inner antitheses, (*c*) as insusceptible of any quantitative determinations, that is to say, not as a *quantum*, divisible, extended in time and space, nor yet as a *continuum*.

It is always to be kept in view, too, that this absolute reality is not merely a reality thought, but one that is self-subsistent, self-dependent, and therefore only for the *recognition* of thought. The notion of this reality constitutes the entire foundation of the metaphysics of Herbart. One example of this. The first problem to be resolved by metaphysics is the problem of inherence—the thing and its qualities. Every object of perception appears to the senses as a complex of several qualities. But all these qualities are relative. We say, sound, for example, is the quality of a body. A body sounds—but not without air; what now is this quality in airless space? A body is heavy but only on the earth. It is coloured, but not without light; how then about this quality in the dark? Plurality of qualities, again, is incompatible with the unity of the object. If we ask, what is this thing, the answer is, the sum of its qualities: it is soft, white, sonorous, heavy, but the question was of a one, not of a many. The answer tells what it has, not what it is. The catalogue of qualities, moreover, is always incomplete. The *what* of a thing, therefore, can consist neither in the several qualities, nor in their combination. The only answer that

remains is : a thing is that unknown x , whose *position* is represented by the *positions* implied in the various qualities; in short, it is substance. For if we abstract from the qualities of a thing in order to see what the thing quite in its own self is, we find nothing left at last, and we perceive that it was only the complex of qualities, only their combination into a whole, that we regarded as the particular thing. But inasmuch as every appearance points to a particular reality, and we must assume, consequently, as many realities as there are appearances, the obvious conclusion is that we have to regard the basis of reality that underlies a thing and its qualities, as a complex of realities, a complex of many simple substances or monads, of which monads the quality besides is different in the different (monads). The grouping of these monads repeated in experience is considered by us as a thing. Let us briefly consider now what modification this conception of position (reality) entails on the main metaphysical notions. The notion of causality, in the first place, for example, is evidently no longer able to maintain its usual form. In its regard, in point of fact, we perceive at most the succession in time, but not the necessary connexion of the cause with the effect. The cause itself can neither be transcendent, nor immanent; for, in the first case, real actions of one real upon another real contradict the notion of absolute reality, and, in the other case, substance would require to be thought as one with its qualities, which contradicts the conclusions relative to a thing and its qualities. As little can the reason why particular natures are found together be expected from the notion of the real, for the real is absolutely unalterable. Causality it is impossible to explain otherwise, then, than by conceiving the many reals (which underlie the qualities) to be an equal number of causes of an equal number of appearances, each independently. With causality the problem of change coheres. As, however, there exists to Herbart no inner change, no self-determination, no becoming or life,—as the monads are and remain unchangeable in themselves, they do not *become* different in quality, they *are* different the one from the other, from the first, and each of them preserves its

own quality without alteration. A solution for the problem of change, then, can only be sought in a theory of the disturbances and self-preservations of the monads. But if all that can be called, not merely apparent, but actual change, in the monads is to be reduced to 'self-preservation,' as the last glimmer of action and life, the question still is, how will you explain at least the appearance of change? For an answer it is necessary to have recourse to two expedients, first, that of contingent aspects, and, second, that of intellectual space. The contingent aspects, a conception borrowed from mathematics, import, and in reference to the special problem, that the same notion may, without the least alteration in itself, take on in relation to others a variety of values; thus the same straight line may be regarded as radius or as tangent, the same note as in harmony or not in harmony. By help of this conception, then, it is possible so to regard what actually takes place in the case of a monad brought into contact with others opposed to it in quality, that an actual change shall on the one hand appear to be affirmed, while on the other the monad itself shall remain absolutely unaltered. (A grey colour, for example, beside black is white, beside white, black, without any change of its quality.) The expedient of intellectual space, again, originates in the necessity to think the monads as well together as not together. Through its application elimination is accomplished particularly of the contradictions in the notion of motion. Lastly, it is evident that the notions of matter and the ego (the transformation or psychological explanation of which is the remaining business of metaphysics) are, like the preceding, no less self-contradictory than incompatible with the fundamental real; for it is impossible to derive material extension from inextended monads, and with the loss of matter there follows that also of the usual (apparent) notions of time and space, while as regards the ego, it is not possible for its notion either, representing as it does that of a thing with many changeable qualities (states, powers, faculties), to be admitted without transformation.

Herbart's 'reals' remind of the atoms of Democritus

the 'one' of Parmenides and the monads of Leibnitz. As penetrable, however, they are distinguished from the atoms. Herbart's reals are as capable of being conceived in the same space, as mathematical points of being thought in the same spot. In this respect they have a greater resemblance to the Eleatic One both are simple, and occupy an intellectual space. But then the reals differ from the one, not only as many, but as various, and even opposed. The resemblance of the reals to the monads of Leibnitz has been already alluded to; the latter, however, are essentially intelligent (percipient, concipient, ideating), they are beings with inner states; whereas to Herbart intelligence belongs as little as every other state to the fundamental real itself.

(5). The *physics* and *psychology* connect with the metaphysics. The first explains, in accordance with the third, such matters as repulsion, attraction, affinity, etc. The second relates to the soul, the ego. The ego is firstly a metaphysical problem, as involving contradictions. Again, it is a psychological problem, explanation of its genesis being required. Firstly, then, those contradictions come to be considered which lie in the identity of the subject and the object. The ego affirms itself and is consequently an object to itself. The object affirmed, however, is identical with the subject affirming. The ego consequently is, as Fichte says, a subject-object, and as such full of the most perplexing contradictions; for the subject and the object can never be thought as identical without contradiction. The ego, however is once for all given; we cannot turn our backs upon it; what is left then is to free it from contradiction. This is possible by regarding the ego as intelligence, and the various sensations, thoughts, etc., as the various appearances. The solution here, then, is the same as in the case of inherence. The thing was regarded in that case as a complex of as many reals as there are qualities; and, inner being substituted for outer qualities, the ego is not differently situated. What we call ego, therefore, is nothing but the soul. As a monad, as an absolute real, the soul is simple, eternal, indissoluble, indestructible, and, consequently, immortal in duration.

From this position Herbart directs his polemic against the ordinary psychology that attributes certain powers and faculties to the soul. What takes place in the soul is nothing but self-preservation, a process that differs and varies only in reference to the difference and variety of the other reals. These reals, coming into conflict with the monad that is soul, are the causes of the various states of the latter—of all that apparently infinite multiplicity of sensations, ideas, affections.

This theory of self-preservation is the entire basis of the psychology of Herbart. What ordinary psychology calls feeling, thinking, perceiving, are but specific varieties in the self-preservation of the soul; they represent no special conditions of the inner real, but only relations of the reals generally, relations which, pressing in at once from a variety of directions, partly neutralize, partly intensify, and partly modify one another. Consciousness is the sum of these relations, borne by the soul to the other monads. Neither the relations nor the correspondent ideas, however, are equally definite; as said, neutralizations, intensifications, modifications take place, and a general interaction results, which admits of being calculated by the principles of statics. The neutralized ideas are not conceived wholly to disappear either; they remain as it were at the door of consciousness, till, through combination with others like themselves, they attain the due intensity and are enabled to enter with recognition. This movement of the ideas, which is excellently described by Herbart, is capable of being submitted to the principles of mechanics; and we may form a conception now of what is known as Herbart's application of mathematics to empirical psychology. The repressed ideas, of which, darkly operative at the door of consciousness, we are only half aware, are the feelings. These announce themselves, according as their tendency inwards has more or less success, as desires. Increased by the hope of fruition the desires are will. Will is not any special faculty of the soul, but depends on the relation of the predominant ideas to the rest. Energetic decision, the character of the man, results from the duration in consciousness of a certain mass of ideas to the weakening of others, or their

repulsion to the door of consciousness.

(6) The value of the philosophy of Herbart lies in its psychology and metaphysics. The other spheres of the spirit of man, law, morals, politics, art, religion, are for the most part in its case but very poorly furnished. Not that excellent relative remarks are altogether wanting, but they cohere ill with the speculative principles of the system. Herbart expressly isolates the particular philosophical sciences, and rigorously separates, in especial, theoretical and practical philosophy. He censures the attempts at unity in philosophy, and ascribes to them a variety of errors; for logical, metaphysical, and æsthetical forms are to him essentially disparate. The objects of ethics and of æsthetics as a whole, concern an immediate evidence, while to metaphysics, in which all knowledge is gained only by the elimination of error, any such evidence is, in its very nature, alien. The æsthetical principles, on which practical philosophy founds, are to Herbart independent of the reality of any object, and come forward of themselves, even in the greatest metaphysical darkness, with intuitive certainty. The moral elements, he says, are pleasing and displeasing relations of will. He thus establishes practical philosophy entirely on æsthetic judgments. These are involuntary and intuitive, and attach to objects the predicate of approvableness or disapprovableness without proof. It is in this conclusion that the difference between Herbart and Kant is seen at its greatest.

On the whole the philosophy of Herbart may be described as an extension of the monadology of Leibnitz, full of patient ingenuity, but devoid of inward fertility, or any germ of movement.

XXII. SCHELLING

Schelling originates in *Fichte*; and without further introduction we may proceed at once to an exposition of his philosophy, inasmuch as its derivation from the Fichtian forms part of the history of its growth, and is characterized there.

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling was born at Leonberg in

Württemberg, on the 27th of January 1775. Endowed with unusual precocity, he entered the theological seminary of Tübingen in his fifteenth year, and applied himself partly to the study of philology and mythology, partly and especially to that of the philosophy of Kant. During this period he was in personal relations with *Holderlin* and *Hegel*. He appeared very early as an author : first on taking his degree of master of arts, namely, in 1792, with a dissertation on the third chapter of Genesis, in which he gives an interesting philosophical interpretation of the Mosaic account of the Fall. In the following year, 1793, he contributed to the *Memorabilien* of Paulus his essay of a kindred nature, *Myths and Philosophemes of the Earliest Times*. In the last year of his stay at Tübingen (1794-95) we have his two philosophical works : *On the possibility of a Form of Philosophy in general* and *Of the Ego as Principle of Philosophy, or of the Unconditioned in Human Knowledge*. On completing his university course, Schelling went to Leipzig in the capacity of tutor to the Barons von Riedesel, and shortly afterwards to Jena, where he became Fichte's disciple and fellow-labourer. On Fichte's removal from Jena, he was appointed in his place as teacher of philosophy, and began, gradually abandoning the position of Fichte, to develop more and more his own ideas. At Jena he edited the *Journal of Speculative Physics*, and, in conjunction with Hegel, the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*. In 1803 he was removed as Professor of Philosophy to Würzburg, and in 1807 to Munich, in the capacity of ordinary member of the newly instituted Academy of Sciences there. A year later he became General Secretary of the Plastic Arts, and later still, on the establishment of the university of Munich, one of its professors. After Jacobi's death, he was made President of the Academy at Munich, but removed in 1841 to Berlin, where he gave several course of lectures, particularly on the 'Philosophy of Mythology,' and on that of 'Revelation.' For many years Schelling published nothing of importance, and only after his death, which took place at Ragaz on the 20th of August 1854, did the publication (completed in 1861) of his later works commence. Ten volumes comprise his earlier

writings (some of them unpublished in his lifetime), and four others his concluding lectures. The philosophy of Schelling is no finished and completed system to which his various works are but as component parts like the philosophy of Plato, it is essentially a history of development, a series of progressive stages, through which the philosopher himself passed. Instead of systematically completing the various sciences in agreement with his general principle, Schelling seemed always beginning again with the beginning, always labouring at new positions, new foundations, mostly, like Plato, in connexion with earlier philosophemes (Fichte, Spinoza, Neo-Platonism Leibnitz, Jacob Bohm, Gnosticism), which he endeavoured to assimilate one after the other, into his own system. An exposition of his philosophy, therefore, has to guide itself accordingly, and to take up its several periods singly, pursuant to the succession of the various groups of his writings.

1 *First Period Schelling's Derivation from Fichte.*

Schelling's starting point was Fichte, to whom, in his earliest writings, he openly adhered. His work *On the Possibility of a Form of Philosophy* is intended to demonstrate the necessity of an ultimate principle, as first proclaimed by Fichte. His other work, *On the Ego*, again, shows how the ultimate ground of our knowledge lies only in the ego, and how every true philosophy consequently must be idealism. If our cognition is to have any reality, there must be a point possible in which ideality and reality, thought and being, shall coincide and be identical; and if cognition, in consequence of the existence of a higher principle that conditioned it, were not itself highest, it could not possibly be absolute. Fichte regarded this work as a commentary on his *Wissenschaftslehre*; it contains hints, nevertheless, of Schelling's own later position, especially in the accent laid on the unity of knowledge, on the necessity of the various sciences becoming in the end one. The *Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism*, 1795, are a polemic against those followers of Kant, who lapse from the critico-idealistic position of the man-

ter back into the ancient dogmatism again. In a series of articles in the journal of Niethammer and Fichte, Schelling gave, 1797-98, a general view of the latest philosophical literature—also from Fichte's position. But still he begins here to direct his attention to a philosophical deduction of nature, if as yet, Fichte-like, only from the nature of the ego. The same views were further developed in his *Ideas towards a Philosophy of Nature*, 1797, and in his work *On the World Soul*, 1798. The leading thoughts of the last three works are as follows. The origin of the notion of matter lies in the nature and action of the mind. Mind, namely, is the unity of a limiting and an unlimited force. Limitlessness would render consciousness as impossible as an absolute limitedness. Feeling, perception, cognition is conceivable only if the force that tends into limitlessness become limited by an opposing force, and this latter in turn be relieved of its limits. Mind is but the antagonism of these two forces, or the perpetual process of their relative unity. Nature is similarly situated. Matter as such is not the *prius*, but the forces of which it is the unity. It is to be conceived only as continual product of attraction and repulsion, the primitive forces, and not as inert mass. But force is as it were what is immaterial in matter. It is that which may be compared to the mind. Matter and mind, then, exhibiting the same conflict of opposed forces, must themselves be capable of union in a higher identity. But the mental organ for the apprehension of nature is perception, which possesses itself of space—space limited and filled by the forces of attraction and repulsion—as object of outer sense. Thus the inference was necessary for Schelling, that there is *the same absolute* in nature as in mind, and that their harmony is no mere reflexion of thought. 'Or if you maintain that it is we who only *transfer* this idea to nature, then never upon your soul has any dream dawned of what for us nature is and should be. For we will not allow nature only to agree contingently (as it were through interposition of a third something), with the laws of intellect, but necessarily and ori-

ginally, and maintain her, not only to express, but to realize these laws, and to be nature and to be called nature, only in so far as she accomplishes this.' 'Nature shall be the visible soul, soul the invisible nature. And here, then, in the absolute identity of soul *within* us and of nature *without* us, must lie resolution of the problem as to the possibility of an external nature.' This thought that nature, matter, is the actuose unity of attraction and repulsion, in the same manner as mind is the unity of tendencies limiting and unlimited, that the repulsive force of matter corresponds to the positive unlimited element of mind, and the attractive to the negative or limiting one—this idealistic deduction of matter from the nature of the ego prevails throughout the writings of this period. Nature appears thus as the counterpart of the mind, and produced by the mind, only that the mind may, through its agency, attain to a pure perception of itself, to self-consciousness. Hence the series of grades in nature, in which all the stations of intellect on its way to self-consciousness are externally stereotyped. In the organized world especially, it is that intellect contemplates its own self-production. For this reason there is something symbolical in everything organic; every plant is a corporealized throb of the soul. The main peculiarities of organic growth, self-formation from within outwards, adaptation of means to ends, variety of interpenetration of form and matter, are all so many leading features of the mind. As in the mind there is an infinite effort towards self-organization, so also on the part of the external world must a similar tendency display itself. The entire system of the universe, therefore, is a species of organization, formed from a centre outwards, and rising ever from lower to higher stages. In accordance with this point of view, then, the great endeavour of the philosophy of nature must be to construe into unity the life of nature which has been sundered and dislocated by natural philosophy into an innumerable variety of forces. 'It is needless pains, taken by many people, to prove how wholly different in their actions fire and electricity are. Everybody knows that who has ever seen or heard anything of either. But in our inmost soul we strive to

unity of system in knowledge; we are impatient of the importunity that obtrudes a special principle for every special phenomenon; and we believe ourselves only there to catch a sight of nature, where, in the greatest complexity of phenomena, we discover at the same time the greatest simplicity of law, and in the most lavish prodigality of effects the strictest economy of means. Therefore attention is due to every thought, even though still crude and incomplete, that tends to the simplification of principles : if for nothing else, it at least serves for impulsion to inquiry, and to exploration of the hidden tracks of nature.' The scientific investigation of nature showed a particular bias during this period, to the adoption of a duality of forces as dominant there. In mechanics, Kant had given a theory of the antithesis of attraction and repulsion; in chemistry, the phenomena of electricity, abstractly conceived as positive and negative, were assimilated to magnetism; in physiology, there was the antagonism of irritability and sensibility, etc. etc. As against these dualities, now, Schelling pressed forward to the unity of all opposites, of all dualities, not to the abstract unity, but to the concrete identity, the harmonious concert and co-operation of the whole heterogeneous variety. The world is the actuose unity of a positive and a negative principle, 'and these two opposing forces, in conflict or in coalition, lead to the idea of a world-organizing, world systematizing principle, the soul of the universe.'

In the work on the *World-Soul*, Schelling made great progress towards an autonomic conception of nature. In such soul nature possesses a special, immanent, intelligible principle. The objectivity, the independent life of nature is recognised thereby in a manner that is impossible to the consistent idealism of Fichte. In this direction Schelling continued to advance, and distinguished presently with perfect consciousness transcendental philosophy and nature-philosophy as the two sides of philosophy in general. The addition to idealism of a complementary philosophy of nature was a decided advance on the part of Schelling beyond the position of the *Wissenschaftslehre*. With it, then,—though Schelling still continued to

employ the method, and to believe himself true to the spirit, of Fichte,—we pass into a second stadium of his philosophizing.

2 Second Period : Distinction of Philosophy into Philosophies of Nature and of Mind (Spirit)

This position is principally represented in the following works : *First Sketch of a System of Nature-Philosophy*, 1799; Introduction to this work, 1799 : articles in the *Journal of Speculative Physics*, 2 vols., 1800-1801; *System of Transcendental Idealism*, 1800. The two parts of philosophy Schelling distinguishes thus. All knowledge rests on the agreement of a subject with an object. Nature is the sum of objectivity, as the ego, or intelligence, is the sum of what is subjective. There are two ways of joining the two sides. Either assuming nature to be the *prius*, we ask, how does intelligence come to be added to it (that is, we resolve nature into pure determinations of thought—philosophy of nature); or assuming the subject to be the *prius*, we ask, how are the objects produced from the subject—transcendental philosophy. All philosophy must endeavour to construct either intelligence out of nature, or nature out of intelligence. As transcendental philosophy subordinates the real to the ideal, so the philosophy of nature endeavours to deduce the ideal from the real. Both, however, are but the poles of one and the same knowledge, and they mutually seek each other : hence the one leads necessarily only to the other.

(a) *Philosophy of Nature*.—To philosophize on nature is as much as to create nature, to raise it out of the dead mechanism in which it appears sunk, to animate it as it were with freedom, and render possible for it its own spontaneous evolution. And what then is matter but the extinguished spirit ? Nature, accordingly, being but the visible organism of our minds, will be able to produce nothing but what follows reason and law. But it is to destroy all idea of nature from the first, to assume the design exhibited by it to result from without, in consequence of the understanding of some other being acting on it. A perfect demonstration of the intelligible world as present in

the laws and forms of the sensible world and again a perfect comprehension of these laws and forms by means of the intelligible world, a demonstration, consequently, of the identity of the worlds of nature and of thought—this it is the business of the philosophy of nature to accomplish. Its beginning, indeed, is immediate experience; primarily we know nothing but from experience; so soon, however, as I perceive the inner necessity of a proposition of experience, this proposition is already *a priori*. Empiricism enlarged into unconditionedness is the philosophy of nature. The leading ideas of this philosophy Schelling enunciates thus :— Nature is an oscillation between productivity and product, continually passing into definite forms and products, but equally also productively passing beyond these. This oscillation points to a duplicity of the principles by which nature is maintained in constant activity and preserved from exhausting itself, and coming to term in precise products. Universal duality, then, must be the principle of all interpretation of nature. The first principle of a philosophical theory of nature is, to look for polarity and dualism everywhere. On the other hand, again, all consideration of nature must end in recognition of the absolute unity of the whole, a unity, however, which is to be discerned in nature only on one of its sides. Nature is, as it were, the instrument by which absolute unity eternally makes real all that has been pre-formed in the absolute mind. The absolute, then, is completely to be perceived in nature, although the world of externality produces only in series, only successively and in infinite gradation, what is at once and eternally in the world of truth. Schelling treats the philosophy of nature in three sections : (1) Proof is to be given that, in its original products, nature is *organic*; (2) the conditions of an *inorganic* nature are to be deduced; and (3) the *reciprocity* of organic and inorganic nature is to be demonstrated. (1) *Organic nature* is deduced thus : In an absolute sense nature is nothing but infinite activity, infinite productivity. Were this to realize itself unchecked, there were produced at once with infinite velocity an absolute product, whereby empirical nature were unexpressed. But if the latter

is to be expressed, if there are to be finite products, then it will be necessary to assume that the productive activity of nature is checked by an opposed retarding activity, also existent in nature. A series of finite products is the consequent result. But the absolute productivity of nature aiming at an absolute product, these several products are only apparent products, each is immediately transcended again by nature in order, through an infinite series of finite products, to satisfy the absoluteness of the inner productivity. In this eternal production of the finite, then, nature appears as a living antagonism of two opposed forces, one promoting and the other retarding. The latter acts also in infinite multiplicity; the original productive force has to contend, not merely with a simple checking action, but with an infinity of reactions, which may be named the primitive qualities. Thus then every organic being is a permanent expression of the conflict of the mutually disturbing and limiting actions of nature. And this, namely the primal limitedness and obstructedness of the formative actions of nature, explains why each organization, instead of attaining to an absolute product, continues only to reproduce itself *ad infinitum*. Here, too, lies the importance of the relation of sex in the organic world. It fixes the products of the latter, it compels them ever to return to their own grade, and reproduce it only. In such reproduction, nature considers not individuals but the genus. The individual is repugnant to nature, whose desire is the absolute, and whose endeavour is ever to express it. The individual products, therefore, which exhibit the activity of nature as stationary, may be regarded only as unsuccessful attempts to express the absolute. The genus is the end of nature, then, the individual but the means. So soon as the former is secure, nature abandons the latter, and works for its destruction. The dynamical gradation of organic nature is divided and classified by Schelling according to the three fundamental functions of organized existences :— (a) power of reproduction; (b) irritability; (c) sensibility. Those organisms stand highest in which sensibility is highest; those lower in which irritability predominates; lastly, repro-

duction appears in its greatest perfection where sensibility and irritability are almost lost. Nevertheless, these forces are woven into each other throughout the whole of nature, and consequently it is only a single organization which ascends there from plants to men. (2) *Inorganic nature* is opposed to organic. The nature of the inorganic world is conditioned by that of the organic. If the constituents of the latter are productive, those of the former are unproductive. If in the one, it is only the genus that is fixed, in the other it is the individual, to which there belongs no reproduction of the genus. Inorganic nature, as opposed to organic, is necessarily a multiplicity of materials which are not related together otherwise than as being at once apart from and beside each other. In short, inorganic nature is mere mass—mass held together by a cause that is without,—gravity. Like organic nature, it has its grades nevertheless. What in organic nature is process of reproduction, is in inorganic nature process of chemistry (as, for example, combustion); what in the one is irritability is here electricity; what in the one is sensibility, the highest organic grade, is in the other magnetism, or the highest inorganic grade. And thus we have already (3) *the reciprocity of the organic and the inorganic worlds*. The result to which every true philosophy of nature must come is, that the difference between organic and inorganic nature exists in nature only as an object, while nature again as originally productive soars over both. If the functions of organization are only possible under presupposition of an inorganic world without, the two worlds must have a common origin. We can only explain this by assuming the existence of inorganic nature to imply a higher dynamic order of things to which it is subjected. There must be a third something that connects again organic with inorganic nature, a medium that supports the continuity of both. The identity of an ultimate cause must be assumed, by which, as by a common soul (world-soul), universal nature, organic and inorganic, is animated; a single principle which, fluctuating between organic and inorganic nature, and preserving the continuity of both, constitutes the first cause of all alteration in

the one, and the ultimate ground of all activity in the other. We have here the idea of a universal organism. That it is a single organization which unites the organic and inorganic worlds we saw above in the parallelism of the gradations of both worlds. What in inorganic nature is the cause of magnetism, causes in organic nature sensibility; and this latter is but a higher potency of the former. Duplicity from identity, as it appears in the organic world in the form of sensibility, so in the inorganic world it appears in the form of magnetism. The organic world, then, is in this manner but a higher stage of the inorganic; it is one and the same dualism which, from magnetic polarity up through the phenomena of electricity, and the differences of chemistry, presents itself also in the organic world.

(b) *Transcendental Philosophy.* Transcendental philosophy is nature philosophy made inward. The entire series, which we have described as it presents itself in the object, repeats itself as a successive development in the perceiving subject. The peculiarity of transcendental idealism, we are told in the preface, is, that it necessitates, so soon as it is accepted, a reproduction, as it were, of all knowledge from the beginning. What has long passed for established truth must submit to proof anew, and issue from it, in the event of success, at least in a quite other shape and form. The various parts of philosophy, and philosophy itself, must be exhibited in a single continuity as the advancing history of consciousness to which the deposits of experience serve for memorial and document.

Exposition of this consists in a gradation of intellectual forms, by means of which the ego rises to consciousness in its highest potency. Exact statement of the parallelism between nature and intelligence is possible neither to transcendental philosophy nor to the philosophy of nature apart, but to both united: the one is to be regarded as the necessary counterpart of the other. The principle of the sub-divisions of transcendental philosophy results from its problem, to reproduce anew all knowledge, and to test anew all prejudices and established opinions. The prejudices of ordinary opinion are, in general,

two :—(1.) That there exists without us, and independent of us, a world of things which is perceived as it is. To elucidate this prejudice is the problem of the first part of the transcendental philosophy (theoretical philosophy). (2.) That we can at will affect the objective world in accordance with ideas originating freely in us. The solution of this problem is practical philosophy. But these two problems involve us (3.) in a contradiction. How is mastery of the world of sense possible to thought, if intelligence, in its very origin, is but the slave of the objects? And, conversely, How is agreement possible between intelligence and things, if the latter are to be determined according to the former? The solution of this problem, the highest in transcendental philosophy, is the answer to the question, How are we at once to think intelligence as in subjection to objects, and objects as in subjection to intelligence? This it is impossible to think, unless the faculty which produced the objective world be originally identical with that which expresses itself in will; unless therefore, the same faculty which in will is consciously productive, be in the production of the world, unconsciously productive. To prove this identity of the conscious and unconscious energies is the problem of the third part of the transcendental philosophy, or of the science of natural design and art. The three parts named completely correspond, consequently, to the three *Kritiken* of Kant—(1.) *Theoretical philosophy*, beginning with the highest principle of knowledge, consciousness, develops thence the history of the latter in its principal epochs and stations, namely, sensation, perception, productive perception (as producing matter), external and internal perception (with deduction of space, time, and the Kantian categories), abstraction (distinction of intelligence from its own products), absolute abstraction or absolute will. The absolute act of will introduces us into (2.) *Practical philosophy*. Here the ego is no longer merely perceptive or unconscious, but it is consciously productive, or it realizes. As an entire nature originated in the primitive act of self-cons-

ciousness, a second nature will now be found to spring out of the second, or that of the free determination of self, and this second nature it is the object of practical philosophy to deduce. Schelling follows in the sequel almost entirely the doctrine of Fichte, but concludes with such admirable remarks on the philosophy of history as demonstrate an advance on Fichte. The moral order of the universe is not enough to insure the free action of intelligence its return. For this order is itself the product of the various subjects acting, and exists not where these act contrary to the moral law. It can neither be anything merely subjective, like the moral order of the universe, nor yet any mere submission to law on the part of objective nature, that insures free action its return, and brings it about that, from the completely lawless play of the freedom of the individuals, there issues at last, for the entire family of free beings, an objective, rational, and harmonious result. A principle superior at once to subject and object must be the invisible root of this harmony of both which action demands: this principle is the absolute which is neither subject nor object, but the common root and the uniting identity of both. The free action of the genus of rational beings, realizing itself in that element of subjective and objective harmony which is the eternal production of the absolute, is history. History, consequently, is nothing but the realization of that perpetually progressive harmony of subject and object, the gradual manifestation and revelation of the absolute. In this revelation there are three periods. The first is that in which power reveals itself only as destiny, blindly holds down freedom, and destroys, coldly and unconsciously, all that is greatest and noblest. This is the tragic historical period, a period of brilliancy, but of the disappearance as well of the marvels of the old world and of its dynasties, of the noblest humanity that ever flourished. The second historical period is that in which the former blind power manifests itself now as nature, and the obscure law of necessity appears transformed into an open natural law, which compels the unbridled caprice of individual will to obey a plan of universal culture conducting in the end to a union of the

peoples, to a universal state.

This period begins with the advance of the mighty Roman republic. The third period will be that in which what was fate and nature in the former periods will manifest itself as providence, while the dominion of fate and nature will be seen to have been but the imperfect beginning of the gradual revelation of providence. When this period will begin it is impossible for us to say. But when it is, God is. (3) *Philosophy of Art*—The problem of transcendental philosophy is the concord of object and subject. This concord was realized in history (with which practical philosophy closed) either not at all, or only as infinite progress. But now the ego must succeed in actually perceiving this concord or identity, which constitutes its deepest self. If now, then, all conscious action is designful, coalescence on its part with unconscious action is only possible in what, being designful in itself, has been without designfulness produced. Such a product, is nature; we have here the principle of all *Teleology* in which alone it is possible to find a solution of the given problem. What is distinctive of nature is that, though but blind mechanism, it is still designful, that it exhibits an identity of conscious subjective and of conscious objective action : in it the ego beholds its own innermost self, which indeed only consists in this identity. But in nature the ego regards that identity as only objective and external to itself : it must be enabled to perceive it also as such that its principle lies in the ego itself. Such perception is artistic perception. As the product of nature is an unconscious product that is like to a conscious one, so the product of art is a conscious product that is like to an unconscious one. To teleology, then, we must add *aesthetics*. The contradiction of the conscious and the unconscious, which without cessation perpetuates itself in history, and which is unconsciously resolved in nature, finds conscious resolution in the work of art. Here at last intelligence reaches a perfect perception of its own self. The feeling that accompanies this perception is a feeling of infinite satisfaction : all contradictions are removed, all mysteries revealed. The unknown something that brings the objective and the conscious

action into unexpected harmony, is nothing else than that absolute, that immutable identity which upholds existence. The veil, with which it obscures itself for others, it lays aside for the artist, and impels him involuntarily to the production of his works. Thus art is the one and eternal revelation; there is no other; it is the miracle that must convince us of the absolute reality of that supreme principle which never becomes objective itself, but is the cause nevertheless of all that is objective. And so it is that art stands higher than philosophy, for only in art does the intellectual perception attain objectivity. Art is what is highest for the philosopher, for it opens as it were the holy of holies to him, where in eternal and primeval union there burns as in a flame what in nature and history is separated, and what in life and action as well as in thought must be eternally divided. From this we are enabled to understand too, that philosophy, as philosophy, can never acquire a universal authority. The single recipient of absolute objectivity is art, and with art consciously productive nature perfects and completes itself.

The 'transcendental idealism' is Schelling's last work written in the method of Fichte. Its principle is a decided advance on the position of Fichte. What to Fichte was an inconceivable limit of the ego, becomes for Schelling a necessary duplicity dependent on the simple nature of the ego. If Fichte contemplated the union of subject and object as only infinite asymptotical progress, Schelling contemplates its actual present realization in the work of art. God, whom Fichte conceived only as object of a moral belief, has become for Schelling a direct object of æsthetic intuition. This his difference from Fichte could not long escape Schelling. It was impossible for him to remain unconscious of the fact that he stood no longer on the level of subjective, but had passed to that of objective idealism. Having then advanced beyond Fichte in his antithesis of transcendental philosophy and the philosophy of nature, it was only consequent that he should proceed a step further and place himself on the indifference-point of both, that he should, now adopt for principle the identity of ideality and reality, of thought

and existence. This was the principle of Spinoza before him, and to this philosopher of identity, consequently, he felt himself powerfully attracted. Instead now of the method of Fichte, he adopted Spinoza's mathematical one, to which he ascribed the greatest evidence of demonstration.

3 *Third Period : The Period of Spinozism or of the Indifference of the Ideal and Real.*

The principal writings of this period are : *An Exposition of my System of Philosophy* (Journal of Speculative Physics, ii. 2); the second and enlarged edition of the *Ideas towards a Philosophy of Nature*, 1803; the dialogue *Bruno, or on the Divine and Natural Principle of Things*, 1802; *Lectures on the Method of Academical Study*, 1803; *New Journal of Speculative Physics*, 1802-3, three parts. Schelling's new position is perfectly characterized in the definition of reason, which he has placed at the beginning of the treatise first named : I call reason absolute reason, or reason so far as it is thought as total *indifference* of *subjective* and *objective*. The ability to think reason is to be presumed in every one; to think it as absolute, or to reach the position required, the thinking subject must be abstracted from. For him who accomplishes this abstraction reason immediately ceases to be something subjective as it is generally conceived to be. Nay, it cannot be any longer thought even as something objective, for something objective, or something thought is only possible in relation to a thinker. The abstraction, then, converts it into that true *in-itself* (virtuality, or absolute), which precisely coincides with the indifference-point of subjective and objective. The position of philosophy is the position of reason; the cognition of philosophy is a cognition of things as they are in themselves, that is to say, as they are in reason. It is the nature of philosophy wholly to eliminate all succession in time and separation in space, all difference generally, imported into thought by imagination, and to see in things only that by which they express absolute reason, not, however, so far as they are objects for such reflection as merely follows the laws of mechanism and

in time. All is in reason, and besides reason there is nothing. Reason is the absolute. Any objections to this allegation can derive only from our being accustomed to see things not as they are in reason, but as they appear. Everything, that is, is essentially identical, and one with reason. It is not reason that makes an externality to itself, but only the false use of reason, which is conjoined with the inability to forget the subjective element within ourselves. Reason is absolutely *one* and self-identical. The supreme law for the being of reason, and, as there is nothing but reason, for all being, is the law of identity. Between subject and object, then, one and the same absolute identity expressing itself in both, there is possible, not a qualitative, but only a quantitative difference (a distinction of more or less), so that nothing is either simply object or simply subject, but in all things subject and object are united, although in various proportions with preponderance now of the one and now of the other. But the absolute being pure identity of subject and object, quantitative difference must fall outside of this identity, that is, into the finite. As the fundamental form of the infinite is $A=A$, so that of the finite is $A=B$ (combinations, that is, of subject and object in various proportions). But *in itself* nothing is finite, for identity is the single *in-itself*. So far as there is difference in individual things, identity exists in the form of indifference. Were we able to take in at a glance all that is, we should perceive in all a perfect quantitative equipoise of subjectivity and objectivity, or pure identity. In individual things, no doubt, there is a preponderance now on the one side and now on the other, but on the whole this is compensated. The absolute identity is absolute totality, the universe itself. *In itself* there is no individual existence or individual thing. Without totality there is nothing *in itself*; and if anything is perceived outside of totality, this is possible only as result of an arbitrary separation of the individual from the whole, the product of reflection and the source of all errors. Essentially, there is the same absolute identity in every part of the universe. The universe consequently is to be conceived as a line, the centre of which is $A=A$, the one end $+A=B$ (that is

a preponderance of subjectivity), and the other end $A = +B$ (or a preponderance of objectivity) so, nevertheless, that even in the extremes there is still relative identity. The one side is reality or nature, the other ideality. The real side develops three potences (a potency is a definite quantitative difference of subjectivity and objectivity). (1) The first potency is matter and gravity—the greatest overweight of the object. (2) The second potency is light (A^2)—an inward (as gravity was an outward) perception of nature. Light is a higher movement of subjectivity. It is the absolute identity itself. (3) The third potency is the common product of light and gravity, organization (A^3). Organization is as original as matter. Inorganic nature as such does not exist: it is actually organized, and for the organization which proceeds from it as from the original seed. Each body's organization is this body's interior become outward; each itself becomes plant and animal. Organic does not form itself out of inorganic, but is from the first at least potential in it. What lies now before us apparently as inorganic matter is the residuum of the organic metamorphosis, what was unable to become organic. The brain of man is the highest result of the entire organic metamorphosis of the earth. From the preceding, Schelling continues, it will have been seen as well that we maintain the internal identity of all things, and the potential presence of all in all, as that we regard so-called dead matter as only a plant-world and an animal-world asleep—a world, however, that animated by the being of absolute identity may still possibly awake at some future time. Schelling breaks off here, leaving the correspondent potences of the ideal sphere undeveloped. Elsewhere, however, we have these latter stated thus: (1) Knowledge, the potency of reflection; (2) Action, the potency of subsumption; (3) Reason, the unity of reflection and subsumption. These three potences represent: (1) As the true, the assimilation of matter into form; (2) As the good, the assimilation of form into matter; (3) As the beautiful, or the work of art, the absolute assimilation and unification of form and matter.

In order to attain cognition of the absolute identity, Schell-

ing even attempts to construct a new method. Neither the analytic nor the synthetic method appeared to him applicable for this purpose, both concerning finite cognition. Even the mathematical method he left off by degrees. The logical forms of common acceptation, nay, even the usual metaphysical categories, appeared to him now, too, as insufficient. As initial point of true cognition, Schelling indicated intellectual perception. Perception generally is an identifying of thought and being. When I perceive an object, the being of this object and my thought of it are for me absolutely the same thing. But in ordinary perception unity is assumed between thought and some particular sensuous existence. In the perception of reason, intellectual perception, on the contrary, it is the absolute subject object, that is perceived, or identity is assumed between thought and being in general, all being. Intellectual perception is absolute cognition, and absolute cognition must be thought as such that in it thinking and being are no longer opposed. Intellectually to perceive directly within yourself the same indifference of ideality and reality which you perceive, as it were, projected out of you in time and space, this is the beginning and the first step in philosophy. This veritably absolute cognition is wholly and solely in the absolute itself. That it cannot be taught is evident. We do not see, either, why philosophy should be under any obligation to concern itself with this inability. It is advisable, rather, on all sides, to isolate from common consciousness the approach to philosophy, and to leave open neither footpath nor highroad from the one to the other. Absolute cognition, like the truth it contains, has no true contrariety without itself, and admits not of being demonstrated to any intelligence; neither does it admit of being contradicted by any. It was the endeavour of Schelling, then, to reduce intellectual perception to a method, and this method he named construction. Of this method, the possibility and necessity depended on this, that the absolute is in all, and all is the absolute. The construction itself was nothing else than a demonstration of how, in every particular relation or object, the whole is absolutely expressed. Philosophically

to construe an object, then, is to point out that in it the entire inner structure of the absolute repeats itself.

In accordance with the position of identity or indifference, Schelling attempted an encyclopædic construction of all the philosophical disciplines in his *Lectures on the Method of Academical Study* (delivered 1802 appeared 1803). Under the form of a critical review of the university curriculum, they afford a summary and connected but popular statement of his philosophy. The part most worthy of remark in them is the attempt at an historical construction of Christianity. The incarnation of God is an eternal incarnation. The eternal Son of God born of the being of the father of all things, is the finite itself as it is in the eternal perception of God. Christ is only the historical, sensuously-seen pinnacle of the incarnation; as an individual he is quite intelligible from the circumstances of the period. God being eternally independent of all time, it is inconceivable that he should have assumed human nature in any specific moment of time. Christianity, as it is in time, exoteric Christianity, corresponds not to its idea, and has only to expect its completion. A main obstacle to this completion was and is the so-called Bible, which besides, as regards true religious substance, is inferior to some other religious writings. (!) A new birth of esoteric Christianity, or a new and higher religion, in which philosophy, religion, and poetry shall be fused into unity, this must be the product of the future. The last statement contains already a hint of the 'revelation philosophy', and of the Johannine era announced in it. Similar other allusions occur also in the same work. Thus Schelling places in the beginning of history a sort of golden age. It is inconceivable, he says, that man as he now appears, should have been of himself able to raise himself from instinct to consciousness, from animality to rationality. The present race of men must have been preceded, then, by another, immortalized in the ancient legend under the figure of gods and heroes. An origin for religion and civilisation is intelligible only in the lessons of

superior natures. I hold civilisation to have been the primal condition of mankind, and the institution of states, of sciences, of religion, and of arts, to have been contemporaneous, or rather one and the same: these things, indeed, were not then veritably sundered, but in perfect interpenetration, as they will be again in the last days. Schelling is only consistent, then, when he regards the symbols of mythology, which we find to be historically first, as revelations of supreme cognition—and here, again, we have a step to the subsequent ‘philosophy of mythology.’

The mystical element, which we find expressed in these historical views, asserts itself henceforward more and more in Schelling. This mystical tendency was partly the result of his unsuccessful attempt to find an appropriate form, an absolute method, for the expression of his philosophical ideas. All nobler mysticism depends on the impossibility of adequately expressing infinite matter in a logical form. And so it was that Schelling, after he had restlessly flung himself into every method, soon sickened of that of construction also, and henceforth completely abandoned himself to the boundless course of his own phantasy. Partly, again, his philosophical views had gradually undergone a transformation. From the speculative science of nature he turned more and more to the philosophy of mind, and his definition of the absolute changed accordingly. If the absolute had hitherto been to him the indifference of ideality and reality, preference was now given to the former in reference to the latter, and ideality became the fundamental attribute of the absolute. Ideality is the *prius*, ideality, secondly, determines itself within itself to reality, which as such consequently is only third. The former harmony of spirit and nature is broken up, and matter appears as the negative of spirit. In thus distinguishing from the absolute the universe as its antitype, Schelling has decidedly abandoned the position of Spinozism and passed to another.

4. *Fourth Period : The Mystic or Neo-Platonic Form of the Philosophy of Schelling.*

The writings of this period are :—*Philosophy and Religion*,

1804; *Exposition of the True Relation of Nature-Philosophy to the amended Fichtian Views*, 1806; *Annals of Medicine* (co-edited with Marcus), 1805-1808. From the position of indifference, as has been said, the absolute and the universe were identical, nature and history were immediate manifestations of the absolute. But now Schelling accentuates the difference between them, and in order most strikingly to express the separatedness of the world, he quite neo-Platonically represents it, in the first work named, as originating in a rupture, in a downfall from the absolute. From the absolute to the actual there is no continuous transition; the origin of the material world is only conceivable as a complete break off from the absolute by direct separation. The absolute is the only reality; finite things are not real. The existence of the latter, then, cannot depend on a communication of reality made to them by the absolute, but on their very distance, on their very downfall from the absolute. The reconciliation of this downfall, God's completed realization, is the goal of history. To this idea, there are then added some other conceptions of a neo-Platonic complexion. Thus we have the myth of Psyche falling from intellectuality to sense, and this fall even Platonically described as the punishment of selfness. Then we have the kindred myth of a palingenesis and migration of souls, which souls, according as they have more or less laid aside self here below, and purified themselves into identity with the infinite, either begin a higher life on better stars, or, saturated with matter, are driven down into still lower regions. Particularly neo-Platonic are the high estimation and mystico-symbolical interpretation of the Greek mysteries (begun even in the *Bruno*), as well as the opinion that religion, if it would preserve uninjured its pure ideality, can never exist otherwise than esoterically or in the form of mysteries. The same thought of a loftier unification of religion and philosophy pervades the whole of the writings of this period. All true experience, says Schelling, is religious. The existence of God is an empirical truth, nay, the ground of all experience. Religion, indeed, is not philosophy; but a philosophy which should not unite in holy harmony religion with science, were

certainly none. Something higher than science I certainly do know. And if to science there are only two ways open, that of analysis or abstraction and that of synthetic deduction, then all science of the absolute is denied. Speculation is the whole—vision, contemplation of everything, that is, in God. Science itself is valuable only so far as it is speculative, so far as it is contemplation of God as he is. A time will come, however, when the sciences will more and more disappear, and immediate cognition assert itself. Only in the highest science does the mortal eye close, and then it is no longer man that sees, but eternal sight itself that has come to see in him.

With such theosophical views, Schelling was naturally directed to the older mystics, whose writings he now began to study. In his polemic against Fichte, Schelling replies to the reproach of mysticism as follows :— Among the learned of one or two centuries past, there was a tacit understanding not to go beyond a certain point, where the genuine spirit of science was left to the unlearned. These, because they were unlearned, and had incurred the envy of the learned, were styled visionaries. But many a professed philosopher might be glad to exchange his entire rhetoric for the fulness of heart and soul that is present in the writings of these very visionaries. I, then, would not be ashamed of the name of such a visionary. Nay, I will endeavour to give a foundation to the reproach : hitherto I have not properly studied the writings of these men, negligence has been the cause. Schelling failed not to make good these words. And it was especially to the kindred Jacob Bohm that he henceforward more and more directed himself. Study of Bohm, indeed, is already apparent in the writings before us. One of Schelling's most celebrated works (and which appeared soon afterwards), that on free-will (*Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Free-will*, 1809), is altogether built on Bohm. With it begins the last period of Schelling's philosophizing.

5 *Fifth Period : Attempt at a Theogony and Cosmogony in agreement with Jacob Bohm*

With Bohm, Schelling had much in common. To both

speculative cognition was a sort of immediate perception. Both employed a mixture of abstract and sensuous forms, a medley of logical precision and phantastic colouring. Both were alike finally, in a speculative relation. A leading thought with Bohm was the self-diremption of the absolute. Taking the divine substance as at first the formless unqualified infinite and incomprehensible, that which was foundationless, Bohm conceived it further, in the feeling of its own abstract infinite being, to shrink into finitude, into the ground or centre of nature, where in their dark torture-chamber, the qualities separate from each other, where at last from the hard contrition of these qualities the lightening springs, which then, as spirit, or principle of light, dominates and illuminates the struggling powers of nature, until God, raised by the basis from his unbasedness, or by the ground from his ungroundedness, into the light of the spirit, lives and moves in an eternal realm of bliss. This theogony of Bohm's is strikingly in harmony with the present views of Schelling. As Bohm conceived the absolute to be the primal formless baselessness, or groundlessness, Schelling, as we have seen already, figured it as indifference. As Bohm too proceeded to distinguish this all-unbasedness from the basis or nature, and from God as the light of the spirit, so Schelling apprehends the absolute now as what, externalizing itself, returns from this self-externalization into a higher unity with its own self again. We have thus already indicated the three moments in the history of God which constitutes the interest of the work on free-will already named :—(1) God as indifference, or as primal baselessness, foundationlessness, groundlessness, the unfounded void; (2) God as diremption into existence and ground (basis), ideal and real; (3) Conciliation of this diremption and transformation of the original indifference into identity. The first moment in the divine life is that of pure indifference or distinctionlessness. This that precedes all existence may be named the primal ground or unground (groundlessness, foundationlessness). The unground is no product of the antitheses, nor are these implicit in it, but it is a special being devoid of all antithesis, and therefore such that it possesses no predicate but

predicatelessness. Real and ideal, darkness and light, can never as antitheses be predicated of the unground : only as non-antitheses, in a neither the one nor the other, is it possible to enunciate them of it. From this indifference now duality breaks forth : the unground parts into two equally eternal beginnings, in order that ground and existence may become one in love, or in order that the lifeless and indefinite indifference may rise into the living and definite identity. As there is nothing before or besides God, God must have the ground of his existence within himself.

But this ground is not merely logical as a notion, but real, as a something actual and to be distinguished from existence in God : this ground is nature in God, distinguishable from God, but inseparable from God. In it, then, is neither understanding nor will, but only the craving for them; it is the longing to give birth to itself. But the ground longingly moving thus, like a heaving sea, in obedience to some dark and indefinite law, there arises in God himself, correspondent to this first stirring of the divine existentiality in the ground, an inner reflexive perception in which—no object being possible for it but God himself—God beholds himself in his own image. This perception is God born in God himself, the eternal Word in God (Gospel of John, i), which rises on the night of the ground like light, and bestows understanding on its dark longing. This understanding united with the ground becomes free creative will. Its work is the setting in order of nature, the previously lawless ground; and from this transformation of the real by the ideal there comes the creation of the world. In the evolution of the world there are two stadia :—(1) The birth of light, or the gradual development of nature up to man; (2) The birth of spirit, or man's development in history. (1) The development of nature in grades depends on a conflict of the ground with the understanding. Originally the ground endeavoured to shut itself into its own self, and independently to produce all from its own self alone; but its products without understanding were without stability and fell again to the ground, a creation which we still behold in the extinct plants

and animals of the prehistoric world. But even in the sequel the ground yields only gradually to the understanding, and every such step towards light is marked by a new class of beings. In every natural existence there are, therefore, two principles to be distinguished: first, the dark principle, through which natural existences are separated from God, and possess a particular will; secondly, the divine principle of understanding, or of the universal will. In irrational natural existences, these two principles, however, are not yet moulded together into unity, but the particular will is mere rage and greed in them, whilst the universal will, quite apart from the individual will, is operative as mere external natural power, as controlling instinct. Only (2) in man are the two principles united as they are united in the absolute. But in God they are inseparable, while in man they are not only separable, but must separate, in order that there may be a difference of man from God, and that God, as opposed to man, may be revealed as that which he is, as unity of both principles, as spirit that subdues the difference, as love. Just this separableness of the universal and particular wills is the possibility of good and evil. The good is the subordination of the particular to the universal will, and the inversion of this the true relation is evil. In this possibility of good and evil, man's free-will consists. Empirical man, however, is not free; his whole empirical condition is determined by an intelligible act antecedent to time. As man acts now, he must act; but nevertheless he is free in act, because from eternity he has freely made himself what he now necessarily is. From the very beginning of creation, the will of the selfsubstantiating ground has brought along with it the self will of the creature for the production of the antithesis, in the subjugation of which God may realize himself as the reconciling unity. In this universal excitation of evil, man has involved himself in self-will and selfishness; hence in all men evil as nature, and yet in each as his own free act.

The history of man depends, on the great scale, on this conflict of self-will and universal will, as the history of nature on the conflict of the ground and the understanding. The various

stages which evil as historical power describes in battle with love, constitute the periods of universal history. Christianity is the middle-point of history.

In Christ the principle of love became personally opposed to evil in the person of man. Christ was the mediator in order to restore to its highest position the connexion of creation with God; for only the personal can be the saviour of the personal. The end of the world is the reconciliation of self-will and love, the dominion of universal will, so that God is all in all. The indifference of the beginning is then raised into the absolute identity.

In his reply to Jacobi (1812), Schelling gave a further justification of this his idea of God. He endeavours to repel Jacobi's accusation of naturalism, by demonstrating that the true idea of God is a union of naturalism and theism.

Naturalism would think God as ground (immanent); theism as cause of the world (transcendent): the truth is the union of both characters. God is at once cause and ground. It nowise contradicts the notion of God that he should be conceived, so far as he reveals himself, to proceed out of himself from imperfection to perfection, to develop himself: imperfection is perfection itself, but as in process of becoming. The stages of the process are necessary, in order to exhibit on all sides the fulness of perfection. Unless there be a dark ground, a nature, a negative principle in God, there can be no talk of a consciousness of God. As long as the God of modern theism remains a simply single being, that is to be supposed purely essential, but is in fact only essenceless; as long as there is not recognised in God an actual duality, and a limitative and negative power that is opposed to the expansive and affirmative one, so long will the denial of a personal God be but scientific candour. It is universally and absolutely impossible to think a being possessed of consciousness who has not been brought into limitation by a negative power within himself—as universally and absolutely impossible as to think a circle without a centre.

Schelling's letter to Eschenmayer, in the *Universal Journal by Germans for Germans*, may be regarded as an elucidation of

the views contained in the work on free-will, and in the reply to Jacobi. In this letter he presses himself more plainly than he had previously done as to what is to be understood by *ground*, and as to his justification for speaking of a ground in God.

After this communication, there occurred a pause in the literary activity of Schelling. It was publicly rumoured, indeed, that the printing of an unusually great work, entitled *The Ages of the World*, had begun; but also again that Schelling had recalled and destroyed the proofs. The title had seemed to give promise of a philosophy of history; and the description of the short essay *On the Gods of Samothrace* (1815), as supplementary to the work itself, made it seem likely, at the same time, that in it great stress would be laid on the development of the religious consciousness.

Now, indeed, that in Schelling's collected works we have the printed treatise itself, we see that the Past, that is to say, what is to be thought as previous to nature, constitutes the theme of the first book (existent in the eighth volume of the collected works, in the form which Schelling may have given to it about the year 1815); that it is nature itself that, under the title of the 'Present' is to be considered the subject of the second book; and that, lastly, surmises of the Future were the material of the third book. For the rest, it is evident that at least the main features of the later doctrine of potences had even then taken fixed shape in the mind of Schelling.

A quite extraordinary sensation was produced—Stahl and Sengler having called public attention to the new turn in the views of Schelling—by the preface which he prefixed in the year 1834 to H. Becker's translation of a work of Cousin's. This not only because he spoke in it so bitterly of Hegel, who, he said, had quite misunderstood the sense of the *Identitätssystem* but because he now openly declared that, while his entire earlier system formed but one half, and that the negative one, of philosophy, there required to be added, as complement to it, the second or positive half, in which the method should not

be any longer one of pure *a priori* construction, but should adopt in part the process so exclusively applied by empiricism.

In a similar manner, but with somewhat less bitterness to Hegel, he expressed himself in the address with which he opened his lectures at Berlin in 1841. And as a conviction soon obtained that Schelling would hardly bring himself to lay his Berlin discourses before a wider circle, attempts were made—after publication of the extracts of Frauenstadt and others, but especially of the report of Dr. Paulus, which latter Schelling's own action for piracy seemed to authenticate—partly to expound and partly critically to judge the new doctrine.

That these were only partially correct appeared, when, after Schelling's death, his sons made public, as well the introduction to the *Philosophy of Mythology* as the *Philosophy of Revelation*. These works enable us to form a pretty complete conception of the latest shape which philosophy assumed with Schelling. Quite, namely, as in the work on free-will, and the other works immediately subsequent, that, which in his third period had been named the absolute indifference, is designated as the *prius* of nature and mind, nay as the *prius* of God, so far as it is that in God which is not (yet) God. Then it is shown how from this pre-notion of God, substituted by pantheism for the usual notion, the true notion of God is reached, the notion, that is, of true monotheism, which supplants pantheism by rendering pantheism latent within it.

In this progression of the notion of God, there are distinguished now three moments, or, as Schelling, in his earlier manner, prefers to name them, potences: first, the ability-to-be (*das Sein konnende*), which, as it not yet *is*, is characterized by the sign *minus*, and usually named—A. It is ground or even nature in God, the dark that awaits illumination, what was called in the work on free-will the hunger for existence, nameable also the subject of being or potential being (*Ansichsein*).

To this mere ability to be there stands opposed as its pure contrary (consequently, + A), pure being which is without all potentiality (*Können*); which, as the former was mere subject, is not even subject, but only predicate and object; which, too,

as the former was a self and within itself, is rather what is without itself or external to itself, and not what denies (or withdraws) itself. Both constitute the presupposition to—what is excluded by them—the third, $\pm A$, in which the in-itself and the without-itself (potentiality and actuality), or subjectivity and objectivity, unite, so that it may be named what is by itself, (what is at home with itself), what is master of itself.

This third now, which, as—A has the *first*, has itself the *highest* claim to the predicate of being, is most appropriately designated spirit.¹ God, as unity of these three, is still far from being triune, but is as yet only the all-one, in which notion there lies but the root of the Trinity. The progress to the Trinity, at the same time also to the universe that is distinguished from God, proceeds in this way that—A, which was non-being, is made explicit as such. To this, however,—because only what is as non-being is capable of being made explicit,—it is necessary to presuppose that—A was previously explicit as being, but was overmastered by the opposing + A. The appearance of this contradiction (*Spannung*), which follows not from the nature, but from the will of God, has—as in it properly the relation of the two potences has reversed itself (—A having become being, and + A potentiality, or ability to be, or power)—for its product the conversion of the original relation, and so of the *unum versum* (universe); but just so it serves also to this, that, above both as now transformed, $\pm A$ is God as self-possessing actual spirit : theogonic and cosmogonic processes here fall together.

The latter manifests a series of stages in which the various relations of the two potences are demonstrated by the philosophy of nature. In the human consciousness, which is the last term of the series, the contention of the potences reaches its end. The powers from whose conflict the world arose, repose

1. That the non-being — A should now be alluded to as specially being is sufficiently perplexing; but, in addition, the sentence itself is, either in pointing or otherwise, ungrammatical. As the smallest emendation possible, a comma has been added.—The reader will observe that the text is now corrected from Schelling's work.

in the inner of the human spirit, which for this very reason is really the microcosm. Through the Promethean deed of the apprehension of self as ego, the hitherto only ideal world becomes, in externality to God, a real one, the vocation of which is to subordinate itself to what it left; whereby naturally this latter, previously transmundane, becomes now supramundane. The path to this consummation describes the various progressive relations of the ego, which, referring itself theoretically to the natural, and practically to the moral law, and, freed by the latter, elevates itself into an artistic and contemplative enjoyment, in which that becomes object for it that is characterized by Aristotle as the thinking of thinking, and by later philosophy as the subject-object,—the final cause of the world, or God as first principle of the world.

The course here is designated by Schelling as the progress towards God. Beginning with the first conditions of all-being, passing to the action of the potences in production of a divided and in itself graduated being, proceeding to the self-assertion of the ego that thereby isolates itself from God, the result of the doctrine is that the ego declares itself as not the first principle, and subordinates itself to the isolated God, whom, in the end, it acknowledges as this principle.

In the end : hitherto, then, we have philosophized towards God, and therefore without God; it has been shown that none of the stages hitherto considered, neither knowledge of nature, nor life in the state, nor contemplative absorption, yields an ultimate satisfaction; philosophy, therefore, can be named, because of this negative result, only negative philosophy. As hitherto wholly conditioned by thought too, it may be fitly named rational philosophy. But thought being without power to create reality, to bestow existence, the end of rational philosophy is only God as idea.

But the power that fails thought is possessed by will. Will postulates an active God, lord of all being, who will practically resist the schism that has actually appeared. This longing for an actual God is religion, and philosophy, in receiving religion for its object, assumes quite a new character : it is become positive.

tive philosophy. It has no longer its previous rational character, when it considered only how the problem was possibly to be thought; but as religion roots in the action of free-will its aim now is to explain religion as it actually occurs, and to show how all relates itself when God, conceived as only found at the end of the negative philosophy, is made principle with derivation of all from him, whereas previously the course had been to him.

The philosophy of religion, which is not to be confounded with a so called religion of reason, has for object partly the incomplete, partly the completed religion. It is first, then, Philosophy of Mythology, and then Philosophy of Revelation. In the former Schelling attempts to show, how it is to be explained that men, not otherwise insane, should have submitted themselves to ideas which represented the sacrifice of a son, for example, as duty; and, again, how it is possible that such ideas should appear, even from a Christian point of view, preferable to complete irreligiousness.

Schelling intimates that the forces dominating these men and people, and regarded by them as God, must, from the point of view of the highest religion, be recognised as at least moments in God. The primitive form of religion, namely, which may, because no polytheism is yet present, and humanity is pervaded by God, be called Monotheism (but an abstract one) is followed by the crisis which is one with the progression of the nations, and in which there repeats itself in the consciousness of man, the same process of the potences which (in externality and priority to consciousness), gave rise to the natural stages.

Hence the parallelism between these later and the mythological stages, which has led many to see in mythology only a disguised physical philosophy. Philosophy shows now that the mythological process consists in the individual potences taking possession of consciousness, instead of the all-one as previously in primitive monotheism, and the *first step* is that where consciousness knows itself as under dominion of the revolutions of the heavens, a form which may be named astral religion or Sabæism.

Mythology, reaching, as Greek, its flourishing point, we find there again all the notions of the earlier stages. Thus Uranus is the god of the consciousness, which appears first in the process. The second stage, on which the first potency ($-A$) is reduced to passivity by the second ($+A$), is represented in Greek mythology by the emasculation of Uranus. In this reference it is characteristic that the Greek Herodotus, where he mentions this moment of the mythological process (a moment stereotyped among the Babylonians and Arabians) introduces Urania and her son Dionysus.

On this second stage stand now very various religions, as well those which wholly merge themselves in the mythological process (Phœnician, Egyptian, Indian, etc.), as also those (like Buddhism and the dualism of the Persians), which would fix the process on certain points. The Greek displays the *highest stage* of mythology : nay, in the mysteries, in which it begins to make its peculiar nature clear to itself, it properly transcends itself, and so it is that the consideration of the mysteries is the best introduction to the philosophy of revelation.

The special problem of the latter is to explain from its premises the person of Christ which is the matter proper of all Christianity. The action of Christ before his becoming man, his incarnation, and, lastly, the mediation so accomplished, are considered; the point of view being always held fast, however, that the mythological process is the presupposition and in the end the presage of what in Christ becomes actual. The completion of his work prepares the way for the third potency, spirit, through the action of which the Church, as explication of Christ, exists. The three periods of the Church are prefigured by the principal apostles, Peter, Paul and John. The two first periods, Catholicism and Protestantism, have already elapsed : the third, the Christianity of John, is now approaching.

There is indisputably something grandiose in this attempt to comprehend the whole process of the world, and of its inner and outer history, as the self-mediation of God with himself, and to unite pantheism and theism in the higher notion of God as at once free and in subjection to development ('mono-

theism'). How closely this last phase of the philosophy of Schelling approaches the Hegelian which in its way also adopts for principle the notion of a process of the absolute through mediation of negation, will appear at once from the statement of Hegel, to which we proceed.

XXIII TRANSITION TO HEGEL

The radical defect of the philosophy of Schelling, as seen in its development with relation to Fichte, is the abstractly objective manner in which it conceived the absolute. This was pure indifference, identity; there was (1) no possibility of transition from it to the definite, the real; and hence Schelling afterwards fell into a complete dualism between the absolute and the world of reality. In it (2) mind had been obliged to yield its supremacy to nature; or the one was equated with the other, and the pure objective indifference of ideality and reality was placed above both, that is, then, above the former. From reflection on this one-sidedness, the Hegelian philosophy arose.

Hegel, in opposition to Fichte and agreement with the position of Schelling, held that it is not anything individual, not the ego, that is the *prius* of all reality, but, on the contrary, something universal, a universal which comprehends within it every individual. But then he conceived this universal not as indifference, but rather as development, as a universal in which the principle of difference is immanent, and which uncloses itself into the entire wealth of the actuality exhibited by the worlds of mind and of matter. Nor is the absolute to Hegel merely something objective, as it were the negative extinction of being and of thinking, of reality and ideality, in a neutral third: the universal, that underlies all, is rather only one of the terms of this disjunction, the ideal one.

The idea is the absolute, and all actuality is only a realization of the idea. Above there is nothing higher than the idea, and without there is nothing further: it is the idea that actualizes itself in every individual of the total whole. The universe is no indifference of ideality and reality; rather it is that reality

into the infinite forms of which the idea (in order not to be a mere unreal *abstraction*), unfolds itself, without, however, losing itself in them, but, on the contrary, with return from them back into its own self in the form of a rational soul, and so as conscious, self-thinking idea, to exist in its true form, in a form adequate to its own inner and essential being.

Thus Hegel restores to thought its own right. Thought is not one existential form of the absolute beside others; it is the absolute itself in its concrete unity of self; it is the idea come back to itself—the idea that knows itself to be the truth of nature and the power in it. The Hegelian philosophy constitutes thus, then, the diametrical opposite to the philosophy of Schelling that preceded it. If the latter became ever more and more realistic, more and more Spinozistic, more and more mystic, more and more dualistic, the former, on the contrary, was again idealistic, rationalistic, a pure monism of thought, a pure reconciliation of the actual and the intellectual. If Schelling substituted objective for subjective idealism, Hegel supersedes both by an absolute idealism, that is again to subordinate the natural to the intellectual element, but equally at the same time to embrace both as inwardly one and identical.

As regards form, the Hegelian philosophy is in its *method* equally essentially distinguished from its predecessor. The absolute is to Hegel not being (a definite, fixed something), but process, explication of differences and antitheses, which, however, are not independent, or self-subsistently opposed to the absolute, but constitute, individually and collectively, only moments within the self-evolution of the absolute.

This necessitates a demonstration, then, that the absolute is possessed within itself of a principle of progress from difference to difference, which differences still form only moments within it. It is not we who are to bring differences into the absolute, but it is the absolute itself which must produce them; whilst they, for their parts, must again resolve themselves into the whole, or demonstrate themselves as mere moments.

This it is the object of the Hegelian method to make good. Its position is : every notion has in itself its own opposite, its

own negation; is one-sided, and pushes on into a second, which second, the opposite of the first, is as *per se* equally one-sided with the first. In this way it is seen that both are only moments of a third notion, which, the higher unity of its two predecessors, contains in itself both, but in a higher form that combines them into unity. This new notion, again, once assumed as established, similarly demonstrates itself as but a one-sided moment, that also pushes forward to negation, and through negation to a higher unity, and so on.

This self-negation of the notion is to Hegel the genesis of all differences and antitheses, which, for their parts, are never anything fixed or self-subsistent, as the reflecting understanding supposes, but only fluent moments of the immanent movement of the notion. And so it is also with the absolute itself. The universal, which is the ground of everything particular, is such only in this way, that it (the universal), as such, is only something one-sided, and is of itself impelled into negation of its abstract universality by means of concreter particularity (definiteness). The absolute is not a simple one something, but a system of notions which owe their origin just to this self-negation of the original universal.

This system of notions is then collectively in itself again an *abstractum*, that is impelled forward into negation of its merely notional (ideal) being, into reality, into the real self subsistence of the differences (nature). But here again, in nature, there is the same one-sidedness of being but moment and not itself the whole, and thus, therefore, the self-subsistence of the real element also resolves itself, and this element is resumed into the universality of the notion in the form of self-consciousness, of thinking spirit, which comprehends and unites within itself both notional (logical) and real (natural) being, in a higher ideal unity of the universal and the particular.

This immanent spontaneous evolution of the notion is the method of Hegel. It will not, like the method of Fichte, merely subjectively propose a thesis, antithesis, and synthesis,

but it will follow and watch the course of the thing itself. It will not produce being (existence), but what in itself already is, that it will reproduce for thought and consciousness. It will understand all in its own immanent connexion, which connexion is but a consequence of the inner necessity, by virtue of which there is manifested everywhere this production of difference from identity, and of identity from difference, this living pulse of the coming and the going of the antitheses.

The clearest expression of his difference from Schelling is given by Hegel in his *Phenomenology of the Mind* (spirit), the first work in which he appeared (1807) as philosophizing on his own account, his place previously having been that of an adherent of Schelling. In sum he brings it together into the following three *mots*: In Schelling's philosophy the absolute appears as if it had been shot out of a pistol; it is but the night in which all cows are black; its expansion into a system again is no more than the proceeding of a painter who has on his palette two colours only, red and green, the one to be used on demand of historical pieces, the other on that of landscapes.

The first hit here refers to the manner in which the idea of the absolute is attained, instantaneously, that is, by means of intellectual perception,—a spring which in the *phenomenology* became under the hands of Hegel a graduated and methodic progress. The second hit concerns the mode of conceiving and expressing the absolute thus attained, wholly as absence of all finite differences, namely, but not at the same time as within itself the immanent production of a system of differences. Another expression of Hegel for this is, that all turns on thinking and enunciating the absolute (the true), not as substance (negation of all determinateness), but as subject (excitation and production of finite differences). The third hit is meant for the way in which Schelling carried out his principle in practical reference to the concrete matter of natural and spiritual fact, by applying to objects, namely, already-made schema (to wit, the antithesis real and ideal), instead of allowing the thing itself spontaneously to unfold and particularize itself.

The school, particularly of Schelling, was conspicuous for

its-activity in this schematizing formalism, and to it specially applies what Hegel further remarks in the preface to the Phenomenology: 'When this formalism intimates, let us say, that mind is electricity, or an animal azote, it is natural that the uninitiated should gape with wonder, and admire in the intimation the profundity of genius. But the trick of such sagacity is as soon learned, as it is easy to practise : and its repetition becomes as insupportable as the repetition of a detected juggling trick. This method of labelling everything in heaven and in earth, in nature and in man, with the couple of terms of the general schema, converts the universe into a huckster's shop, with its tiers and its rows of closed ticketed boxes'.

The special object of the phenomenology was, by a development of consciousness in its essential principle, to establish what was to Hegel the absolute cognition,—to demonstrate this cognition, indeed, to be but the highest step and stage of consciousness. Hegel gives in this work a history of consciousness as it appears in time (hence the title), an evolution of the epochs of the growth of consciousness on its way to philosophical knowledge. The inner development of consciousness is realized by the particular state, in which it may at any time exist, becoming always objective (known) to it, and by this knowledge of its own being raising it always into a higher and higher state.

The Phenomenology attempts to show how and by what necessity consciousness ascends from stage to stage, from in-itself to for-itself (from implicitness to explicitness), from being to knowing. The beginning is taken with the lowest stage, with immediate (intuitive, natural) consciousness. Hegel has entitled this chapter, 'Sensible certainty, or opinion and the *this*.' On this stage, to the question of What is the *this* or the *here* ? and, What is the *now* ? the answer of the ego is—*Here* is a tree; *now*, it is night. Let us but turn round, however, and the *here* is not a tree, but a house, while if we lay aside the second answer, in order to look at it later, the *now* is found to be no longer night, but noon. The *this*, then, becomes a not-*this*,

that is, a universal, a general notion. And necessarily so, for when I say 'this bit of paper', I say something universal and not particular, as each and every bit of paper is a 'this bit of paper.'

In this inner dialectic lies the transition of direct sensible certainty into perception. And so each stage in the consciousness of the philosophizing subject involving itself in contradictions, and through this immanent dialectic rising ever into a higher one, the evolution continues, till, with the complete elimination of contradiction, all strangeness between subject and object disappears, and the soul comes to perfect self-cognition, and perfect self-certainty.

Briefly to name the several stages, consciousness first appears as sensuous certainty; then as perception, the object of which is a thing with its qualities; further, again, as understanding, apprehension of objects as principles reflected into themselves, or as discrimination between force and manifestation of force, noumenon and phenomenon, outer and inner. Next, consciousness,—which in the object and its qualities has now recognised its own self, its own pure essential nature, for which consequently the other as other is eliminated—becomes the self-identical ego, the truth and certainty of itself, self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness then, as universal self-consciousness or reason describes another series of successive stages, until it appears as spirit, reason that, filled and identified with the rationality of existence and the outer world, dominates the natural and spiritual universe as *its* kingdom, in which it knows itself at home. Spirit rises through the stadia of instinctive observance, information and enlightenment, morality and general moral views, to religion; and religion itself, lastly, terminates, in its consummation as revealed religion, in the absolute cognition.

On this last stage being and thinking are no longer apart, being is no longer the object of thinking, but the object of thinking is now thinking itself. Science is nothing but intelligence truly cognising its own self. In the closing words of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel thus glances back on the road that has

been travelled : 'The goal, absolute cognition, or spirit (intelligence) that knows itself as spirit, has for its path the inward assimilation and conservation of spirits (the subordinate stages), as they are in themselves, and achieve the organization of their empire. Their conservation, on the side of their free actual manifestation in the form of contingency, is history, while on the side of their logically understood organization, it is the science of cognition as it phenomenally presents itself in time. Both together, history logically understood, form the record and the Calvary of the absolute spirit, the reality, truth, and certainty of its throne, without which it were the sole and lifeless eremite; only—

"From the goblet of this spirit-empire,
Foams for it its infinitude."

For the rest, the march of the Phenomenology is not yet a strictly scientific one; it is the first genial application of the 'absolute method', interesting and suggestive in its critique of the forms of 'phenomenal cognition', but, in the disposal and arrangement of the opulent dialectical and historical material on which it operates, it is arbitrary.

XXIV. HEGEL

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL was born at Stuttgart on the 27th of August 1770. In his eighteenth year he entered the university of Tübingen, with a view ultimately to the study of theology. As student he attracted no particular attention : it was the youthful Schelling who here at that time outshone all his contemporaries. After having been a domestic tutor successively in Switzerland and at Frankfort-on-the-Maine, he qualified himself for the academical career at Jena in 1801. He ranked at first as an adherent and supporter of the philosophy of Schelling. And in this sense we find written his tractate of the same year, on the 'Difference between the Philosophical Systems of Fichte and Schelling'. Soon after-

wards, indeed, he openly joined Schelling in the editing of the *Critical Journal of Philosophy* (1802-3) to which he contributed a variety of important articles. He had but small success at first as an academi teacher, and though appointed to a professorship in 1805, the political catastrophe that presently burst over Germany soon deprived him of it again. On the day of the battle of Jena, amid the thunder of the artillery, he wrote the last words of the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, his first great, original book, the crown of his Jena career.

Some time afterwards he was wont to speak of this work (which appeared in 1807) as his voyage of discovery. From Jena, Hegel went to Bamberg; and there—being in want of all other means of subsistence—he edited for two years the local political journal. In the autumn of 1808 he became rector of the academy at Nurnberg. It was in this capacity that—slowly maturing all his works, and only properly beginning his literary career when Schelling had already ended his—he composed (1812-16) his *Logic*. In the year last named, he received a call to a chair of philosophy at Heidelberg, where, in 1817, he published his *Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences*, in which he expounded for the first time the whole of his system.

The fulness of his fame and activity, however, properly dates only from his call to Berlin in 1818. Here there rose up around him a numerous, widely-extended, and, in a scientific point of view, exceedingly active school; here, too, he acquired from his connexion with the Prussian bureaucracy, as well political influence for himself as the credit for his system of a state-philosophy; not always to the advantage of the inner freedom of his philosophy, or of its moral worth. Still, in his *Moral and Political Philosophy*, published in 1821, Hegel rejects not the fundamental principles of the modern political system; he demands popular representation, liberty of the press, open lawcourts, trial by jury, and administrative independency of corporations.

In Berlin, Hegel prelected on almost all the branches of philosophy. His various courses of lectures were published after his death, by his friends and disciples. His delivery as a

lecturer was hesitating, embarrassed, and without ornament, but not without a peculiar charm as the immediate expression of deep and labouring thought. The relaxation of social intercourse he sought rather among plain and unofficial people than in the company of the great; he had no liking to shine in *salons*. In the year 1830, he was made rector of the university, and fulfilled the duties of the office in a more practical manner than previously Fichte. Hegel died of cholera on the 14th November 1831, the anniversary of the death of Leibnitz. He lies in the same graveyard as Solger and Fichte, close beside the latter and not far from the former.

The publication of his collected writings and lectures was commenced in 1832 :—Vol. 1. The Smaller Treatises; 2. The Phenomenology; 3-5. Logic; 6-7. The Encyclopædia; 8. The Moral and Political Philosophy; 9. The Philosophy of History; 10. The Lectures on Æsthetics; 11-12. The Philosophy of Religion; 13-15 The History of Philosophy; 16-18 The Miscellaneous Works. Rosenkranz has written his Life.

The internal classification of the Hegelian system is, in consequence of the course taken by thought in it, a tripartite one :—(1) The development of those pure universal notions, or thought-determinations which, as it were a timeless *prius*, underlie and form the foundation of all natural and spiritual life, the logical evolution of the absolute—the *Science of Logic*; (2) The development of the real world, nature in its particularizedness and externalizedness—the *Philosophy of Nature*; (3) The development of the ideal world, or of the concrete spirit that is actualized in Rights, Morals, Politics, Art Religion, Science—the *Philosophy of the Spirit*. These three parts of the system represent at the same time the three moments of the absolute method, Position, Negation, and Unity of both. The Absolute is, firstly, pure immaterial thought; secondly, it is heterization of pure thought, disruption of thought into the infinite atomism of time and space—nature; thirdly, it returns out of this its self-externalization and self-alienation back into its own self, it resolves the heterization of nature, and only in this way becomes at last actual, self-cognisant thought, Spirit.

I. The Science of Logic

The logic of Hegel is the scientific exposition and development of the pure notions of reason,—of those notions or categories which underlie all thought and all being, and which are as well the fundamental factors of subjective cognition, as the indwelling soul of objective reality,—of those ideas in which the spiritual and the natural have their point of coincidence. The realm of logic, says Hegel, is truth as it is in its own self, and without veil. It is, as he also figuratively says, the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of the world or of a single finite being. It is thus, no doubt, a realm of shadows; but these shadows are—in freedom from all material crassitude—the simple ultimate principles, into the diamond net of which the entire universe is built.

For a beginning of the collection and discussion of these pure notions, we have to thank several philosophers, as Aristotle in his *Categories*, Wolff in his *Ontology*, Kant in his *Transcendental Analytic*. But by these they were neither completely enumerated, nor critically tested, nor yet derived from a principle, but only empirically taken up and lexicologically treated. In contrast to this procedure, Hegel sought (1.) completely to collect these notions; (2) critically to test them (that is, to exclude all but pure, unsensuous thought); and (3)—what is the most characteristic peculiarity of the Hegelian logic—dialectically to deduce them the one from the other, and develop them into an internally articulated system of pure reason. Fichte, before Hegel, had accentuated the necessity of a deduction on the part of reason,—purely out of its own self, and perfectly free from any pre-supposition,—of the entire system of knowledge. This thought Hegel seizes, but in an objective fashion. His beginning is not with certain highest axioms in which all further development is already implicitly contained, and serves consequently simply for their more particular characterization; but, taking stand on what requires no further support of proof, on the simplest notion of reason, that of pure being, he deduces thence, in a pro-

gress from abstracter to concreter notions, the complete system of pure, rational knowledge. The spring of this evolution is the dialectical method that advances from notion to notion through negation.

All position, says Hegel, is negation; every notion has *in it* the opposite of itself, in which it passes forward to its own negation. But, again, all negation is position, affirmation. When a notion is negated, the result is not forthwith a mere nothing, a pure negative, but on the contrary a concrete positive; there results, in fact, a new notion, and one, too, that is enriched by the negation of the preceding one. The negation of the unit, for example, is the notion of plurality. In this manner, negation is made by Hegel the vehicle of the dialectic progress. Each notion is no sooner affirmed than it is again negated, and of this negation the product is a higher and a richer notion. This method, at once analytic and synthetic, Hegel uses throughout the entire system of knowledge.

We proceed to a brief summary of the Hegelian logic. It separates into three parts,—the *doctrine of Being*, the *doctrine of Essence* (essential nature), and the *doctrine of the Notion*.

1. *The Doctrine of Being*

(a) *Quality*—The beginning of scientific cognition is the direct, immediate, indeterminate notion of *Being*. In its entire want of *logical comprehension*, complete vacancy, it stands before thought with precisely the same meaning as simple negation, *Nothing*. These two notions, consequently, are not more absolutely opposed than absolutely identical; each of them disappears immediately into the other. This oscillation, or disappearance of the one into the other, is pure *Becoming*, which more specially is *Origination*, as transition from Nothing to Being, while, as transition from Being to Nothing, it is *Decease*.

The precipitation of this process of coming to be and ceasing to be into a simple unity at rest, is recognisable *State*

(*Daseyn*, *Thereness*, *So-ness*). State is Being, with an element of definiteness, or it is *Quality*, and more specially still *Reality*, Limited State. Limited State excludes other (or others) from itself. This reference to self which is conditioned by negative relation to other (or others), is named *Being-for-self* (independent, self-contained individuality). This *Being-for-self*, that refers itself only to its own self, and is repellent to aught else, is *One* (the unit). But through this repulsion, the *One* directly affirms (implies) *Many* ones. But the many ones are not different the one from the other. The one is what the other is. The *Many* are, therefore, *One*. But the *One* is equally the *Many*. For its exclusion is affirmation of its opposite, or it thereby virtually affirms itself as plurality. *Quality*, through this dialectic of *Attraction* and *Repulsion*, passes into *Quantity*; for indifference to the qualitative speciality, indifference to difference, is *Quantity*.

(b) *Quantity*—*Quantity* concerns magnitude, and as such is indifferent to *Quality*. So far as the *Magnitude* contains many distinguishable units in it, it is *Discrete*, or exhibits the moment of *Discretion*; so far, again, as the many units are homogeneous, the *Magnitude*, as without distinction, is *Continuous*, or it exhibits the moment of *Continuity*. Each of these two characters is at the same time identical with the other; discretion cannot be thought without continuity, continuity not without discretion. Actuality of quantity, or limited quantity, is the *Quantum*. In the quantum the moments of unity and plurality are also contained; it is an amount of units,—that is, *Number*. Opposed to quantum or extensive magnitude stands intensive magnitude or *Degree*. In the notion of degree, which implies always a certain singleness of power, virtue, or determinateness, *Quantity* returns to *Quality*. The union of *Quantity* and *Quality* is *Measure*.

(c) *Measure* (proportion) is a qualitative quantum, a quantum on which the quality depends. An example of this quantitative force, on which the actual so-ness of the particular object wholly rests, is temperature, which, in relation to water, decides whether this latter shall remain water or become either

ice or steam. Here the *quantum* of the heat actually constitutes the *quality* of the water. Quality and quantity, consequently, are perpetually interchanging characters, and *in* a being, a *third* something, which is itself different from its own directly-apparent *what* and *how much*. This negation of the directness and immediacy, this quality (or something) which is independent of the directly-present existential form, is *Essence*. Essence is Being-within-self, a being in internality to self, and so self-diremption of being, being that is reflected into itself. Hence the duplicity of all the distinctive characters of essence.

2. *The Doctrine of Essence*

(a) *Essence as such*.—Essence, as reflected being, is reference to self only in that it is reference to other. This being is called reflected in analogy with the reflexion of light, which impinging in its rectilinear course on the surface of a mirror, is thrown back from it. In the same way, then, as reflected light is something mediated or affirmed (posited) by its reference to other (that is, to something else), reflected being is such an entity as is shown to be mediated by, or founded on, another. When philosophy proposes for its problem, consequently, cognition of the essence of things, the immediate (directly presentant) being of these things is thereby assumed to be mere hind or veil behind which the essence is concealed. In the very speaking of the essence of an object, therefore, we necessarily reduce its immediate being (that is in contrast to the essence, but without which it were impossible to think the essence), to something merely negative, to *appearance* (*Schein*). Being shines, shows, or appears by (*an*) essence. Essence, consequently, is being (the outward being) shining, showing, or appearing away into its own self. Essence, as against the Appearance, yields the notion of the *Essential*; what only shines or appears by (*an*) essence is the *Inessential*. But inasmuch as the Essential only is as in relation to the Inessential, the Inessential is itself Essential; the Essential is quite as much in want of the Inessential, as the Inessential of the Essential. The consequence is, then, that

each appears by (*an*) the other; or there takes place between them that mutual relation which we name *reflexion*.

In this whole sphere, then, we have to do with determinations of reflexion, with characters such that either indicates the other, and is incogitable without the other (for example, positive and negative, antecedent and consequent, thing and quality, matter and form, force and operation of force). We have thus again in the evolution of Essence the same characters as in the evolution of Being, but now they are in a reflected form, and no longer direct or immediate. For Being and Nothing, we have now Positive and Negative, for State (*Dasein*) Existence (*Existenz*). etc

Essence is reflected Being, reference to self, which is through a medium of reference to other, another which *appears* by (*an*) it. This reflected reference to self we term *Identity* (which, in the so called first law of thought, the axiom of identity $A = A$, is only incompetently and abstractly expressed). As reference to self, which is equally distinction of it from itself, Identity essentially contains and implies the character of *Difference*. Direct, external difference is *Diversity*. Difference as such, the essential difference, is *Contrariety* (*Positive* and *Negative*). The self-contrariety of essence is *Contradiction*. The contrariety of identity and difference is reconciled in the notion of *Ground*. In distinguishing itself from itself, namely, essence is firstly the essence that is identical with itself, Ground, and, secondly, the essence that is distinguished or ejected from itself, the *Consequent*. In the category of ground and consequent, then, the same thing, the essence, is twice put: the ground and what it grounds are the same matter, and so it is a hard problem to define the ground otherwise than by the consequent, and conversely. Their separation, then, is merely an arbitrary abstraction, but just for this reason also (the identity of both), any application of this category is properly a formalism. A reflection that demands grounds, would simply see the same thing twice, now in its immediate, direct appearance, and again in its posititiousness, affirmedness, through the ground.

(b) *Essence and Manifestation*.—The Manifestation is no

longer essence-less appearance, but appearance that is filled-up, full-filled, implemented by essence. There is no appearance without an essence, and no essence that passes not into manifestation. It is one and the same matter that is taken now as essence and now as manifestation. In reference to essence in manifestation, the positive moment that was previously termed ground is now called *Matter*, the negative one *Form*. Every essence is unity of matter and form, that is, it *exists*. *Existence*, namely, in contradistinction to immediate (unreflected) Being, is the term which we give to that being which is produced by the ground,—that is, to grounded, or founded, being (being that is reflected to an antecedent source). Essence as *existent* is called *Thing*. In the relation of the Thing to its *Properties*, the relation of form and matter is repeated. The Properties exhibit the thing on its formal side : in matter it is Thing. The relation between the Thing and its Properties is usually designated by the verb *Have* (the thing *has* properties), in contradistinction to immediate oneness of being. Essence as negative reference to itself and repelling itself from itself into Reflexion-into-other is *Force* and *Exertion* (its operation). This category has it in common with the other categories of essence, that in it one and the same matter is twice put. The Force can be explained only by the Exertion, the exertion only by the force, and hence any explanation that resorts to this category is but a movement in tautologies. To consider force as incognisable is but a self-deception of the understanding in regard to its own act. The category of force and exertion finds higher expression in the category of *Inner* and *Outer*. The latter stands higher, for Force to exert itself requires a *solicitation*, whereas the Inner is Essence of itself (spontaneously) manifesting itself. These two co-efficients, Inner and Outer, are also identical; neither is without the other. What a man, for example, is inwardly in his character, that is he also outwardly in his action. The truth of this relation, consequently, is rather the identity of Inner and Outer, of Essence and Manifestation, that is :

(c) *Actuality*.—Besides (unreflected) Being and Existence

we have Actuality, then, as a third stage of being. In Actuality, the Manifestation of Essence is adequate and complete. Veritable Actuality, therefore (as distinguished from *Possibility* and *Contingency*), is necessary being, rational *Necessity*. The notorious *propos* of Hegel,—All that is actual is rational, and all that is rational is actual,—is seen, with such a meaning as is given here to ‘Actuality,’ to be simple tautology. What is necessary, regarded as its own ground (a ground or origin, then, that is identical with itself), is *Substance*. The side of manifestation, what is inessential in the case of Substance, contingent in the case of the Necessary, is constituted by the *Accidents*. The Accidents are no longer to Substance, as Manifestation to Essence or Outer to Inner, and adequate representation; they are only transitory affection of Substance, contingent and mutable phenomenal forms, like waves of the sea in relation to the water of the sea. They are not produced by substance, but rather disappear in it as their ground. The relation of Substantiality passes into the relation of *Causality*. In this relation one and the same matter is twice put, once as *Cause* and again as *Effect*. The cause of heat is heat, and its effect is again heat. Effect is a higher notion than the accident of substantiality, for it is actually contraposed to the cause, and the cause itself, passes over into the effect. So far, however, as in the relation of causality, either side presupposes the other, the truth is rather a relation such that in it either side is cause and effect at once—*Reciprocity*. Reciprocity is a higher relation than causality, inasmuch as there is no such thing as a true causality: there is no effect without counter-effect, no action without counter-action (reaction).

With the category of Reciprocity we quit the sphere of Essence. All the categories of essence have displayed a duplicity; but in reciprocity the duplicity of cause and effect has collapsed to unity. Now, then, instead of duplicity we have again unity, identity with self. Or we have again a Being (or a sort of being) that exhibits diremption into several self-subsistent factors, which factors, however, are immediately, identical with the being itself. This Unity of the Immediacy (the self-

subsistency) of Being with the self-diremption of Essence is the *Notion*.

3. *The Doctrine of the Notion*

Notion is that in the other that is identical with itself; it is substantial totality, the moments of which (*Singular, Particular*), are themselves the whole (the *Universal*),—a totality which no less gives free scope to the difference than it resumes it again into unity within itself. The Notion is (a) Subjective notion, the unity of the many in its own self, expressed as in the moment of Form, and in abstraction from the Matter. It is (b) Objectivity, notion in the shape of Immediacy, as external unity of self dependent existences. It is (c) Idea, the notion that is no less objective itself than it reduces the objectivity of sense into unity with itself,—that is no less immanent in the object, than independently existent as punctual unity of all reality.

(a) *The subjective notion* contains the moments of *Universality* (identity with itself in the difference), *Particularity* (the differencedness that remains in identity with the universal) and *Singularity* (the independent individuality that unites within itself the universal and the particular, the genus and the species). The universal independently expressed is the notion as such. This one-sidedness is remedied by statement of the universal as inherent in a singular, or as predicate of a subject; that is, by the *Judgment*. The judgment enunciates the identity of the singular with the universal, and by consequence, the sundering of the universal into independent individuals that are identical with it,—the self-diremption of the notion. In the judgment the notion expresses itself in that aspect of itself, by virtue of which it is not something abstract (like substance, cause, force), but concrete and definite, immanent in individual existences, and continuing itself far and wide into a world of such. The one-sidedness of the judgment—the expression of the singular as immediately identical with the universal, and the consequent veritable sundering of both (the universal has more extension than the singular, the singular is concreter than the universal)

—is relieved in the *Syllogism* (the close, or taking-together). In it universal and singular become commediated (united) by the particular, which steps between both as mediate notion. The syllogism, consequently, exhibits the universal as, through its particularization, it realizes itself in the singular; or otherwise expressed, it exhibits the singular as, through mediation of the particular, it is in the universal. In short, the syllogism first perfectly demonstrates the nature of the notion to be distinction of itself in itself into a manner of being, within which the singular is through virtue of its particularity, as well self-substantially opposed to the universal, as closed together into identity with it. From what precedes, then, the notion is not something merely subjective, but something that, in the totality of being comprehended under it, is possessed of reality : so considered the notion is the objective notion.

(b) *Objectivity* is not outward being as such, but an outward being complete within itself, and intelligibly conditioned. Its first form is *Mechanism*, the co-existence of independent individuals which, mutually indifferent, are kept together in the unity of a whole (aggregate) only by a common bond. This indifference eliminates itself in *Chemism*, the mutual attraction, interpenetration, and neutralization of independent individuals which unite to a whole. But the unity here is only the negative one of the resolution of units into a whole; the third form of objectivity, is, therefore *Teleology*, the End (correspondent to the syllogism viewed as close), the notion that realizes itself, that subordinates being into means for itself, and that preserves and fulfils itself in this process of the sublation of the independency of things. The defect in the notion of End is, that it has objectivity still opposed to it as something alien; but this defect corrected, we have the notion of End as immanent in objectivity,—the notion that pervades objectivity, that fulfils and realizes itself in it,—in a word, the *Idea*.

(c) *The Idea* is the highest logical definition of the absolute. It is neither the merely subjective, nor the merely objective notion, but the notion that, immanent in the object, releases it into its complete independency, but equally retains it in

unity with itself. Its immediate form is *Life*, organism, the immediate unity of the object with the notion, which latter pervades the former as its soul, as principle of vitality. But the notion is at the same time not expressed in its own form here. The idea as such, then, opposing itself to the object, is *Cognition*, the finding of itself again on the part of the notion in objectivity (Idea of the True), the realizing of itself into objectivity, in order to resolve the independency of the object, and raise reality into intelligibility (Idea of the Good). This *over-against* each other of the Idea and the Object is, however, one-sided; cognition and action necessarily presuppose the identity of subjective and objective being. The highest notion, consequently, is the *Absolute Idea*, the unity of Life and Cognition, the universal that thinks itself, and thinkingly realizes itself in an infinite actuality, from which, as its immediacy, it no less distinguishes itself again.

The Idea, releasing itself accordingly into this immediate actuality, is *Nature*, from which returning into itself, and consciously closing itself together with itself, it is *Spirit*.

II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

Nature is the idea in the form of heterogeneity (otherwiseness)—the notion that has issued from its logical abstraction into real particularization, and that so, consequently, has become external to its own self. The unity of the notion, then has become concealed in nature; and, in assuming for problem the following up of intelligence as concealed in nature, or the self-development of nature into spirit, philosophy must not forget that self externalization, sunderedness, out-of-itself-ness, constitutes the character of nature as such; that the products of nature possess not yet any reference to themselves, or are not yet correspondent to the notion, but riot in unrestricted and unbridled contingency. Nature is a Bacchantic God, uncontrolled by, and unconscious of, himself. It offers, then, no

example of an intelligibly articulated, continuously ascendant gradation. On the contrary, it everywhere mingles and confounds the essential limits by intermediate and spurious products which perpetually furnish instances in contradiction of every fixed classification. In consequence of this impotence on the part of nature to hold fast the moments of the notion, the philosophy of nature is constantly compelled, as it were, to capitulate between the world of the concrete individual products and the regulative of the speculative idea.

Its beginning, middle, and end are prescribed for the philosophy of nature. Its beginning is the first or immediate characteristic of nature the abstract universality of its self-externality,—Space and Matter. Its end is the disimprisonment of spirit from nature, in the form of rational, conscious individuality,—Man. To demonstrate the connecting middle-terms between the two, to follow up step by step the ever more and more successful attempts of nature to rise in humanity to self-consciousness—this is the problem which the philosophy of nature has to resolve. In this process nature describes three stadia. It (nature) is :

(1) Matter and the ideal system of matter : *Mechanics*. Matter is nature's self-externality in its most universal form. In it, nevertheless, we have already manifested that tendency to individuality which constitutes the red strand in the philosophy of nature,—the *nisus* of gravitation. Gravity is the self-internality (the being within self) of matter, its longing to come to itself, the first trace of subjectivity. The centre of gravity of a body is the oneness which it seeks. The same tendency towards reduction of multiplicity into individuality is the fundamental principle of universal gravitation, of the whole solar system. Centrality, the constituent notion of gravity, is here a system, and that, too,—so far as the form of the orbits, the velocity of the movements, or the revolutionary periods are reducible to mathematical laws,—a system of real rationality.

(2) Matter, however, is not yet possessed of individuality. Even in astronomy, it is not the bodies as such that interest us,

but their geometrical relations. Everywhere here it is quantitative, not qualitative conditions that are considered. Matter, nevertheless, has in the solar system, found its centre, its self. Its abstract, dead, dull self-includedness has resolved itself to form. Matter, as qualified matter, then, is the object of *Physics*. In physics we have to do with matter which has particularized itself into a body, into individuality. Under this head we consider inorganic nature, its forms and their reciprocal relations.

(3) *Organics*—Inorganic nature, the subject of physics, destroys itself in the chemical process. In this process, namely, losing all its properties (cohesion, colour, lustre, resonance, transparency, etc.), the inorganic body demonstrates the fleetingness of its existence and this relativity constitutes its being. The sublation of the chemical process is organism and life. The animate body is always in act, indeed, to relapse into the chemical process. Oxygen, hydrogen, salts, tend ever to appear, but are always again eliminated. The animate body resists the chemical process till it dies : life is self preservation, self-end (its own object). Nature, then, attaining to individuality in physics, advances to subjectivity in organics. As life the idea describes three stages :

(a) The first, as *geological* organism, or as *mineral* kingdom, is the universal *effigies* of life. Still the mineral kingdom is rather the result and residuum of a past life and process of formation. The primitive mountain is the arrested crystal of life; the earth of geology is a gigantic corpse. The life of the present, the life that recreates itself eternally afresh, the first stir of subjectivity breaks forth only

(b) in the *vegetable* organism, the world of *plants*. The plant has attained to the processes of growth, assimilation, and generation. But it is not yet a totality co-articulated into its own self. Every part of the plant is the entire individual, every branch the whole tree. The parts are indifferent in regard to each other : the corolla may be the radix, the radix corolla. In the case of the plant, then, the true self-involution of individuality is not yet attained to : to that there is necessary the

absolute unity of an individual. This unity,—singular, or individual, concrete subjectivity,—we have first of all only

(c) in the *animal* organism, the animal kingdom. The animal organism alone possesses uninterrupted intussusception, spontaneous movement, sensation, and, in its higher types, voice and internal warmth. In its highest type, lastly, in man, nature, or rather the spirit that works in nature, has taken itself together into conscious unity in an ego. And so spirit now, become a free rational self, completes its deliverance from Nature.

III THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT (MIND)

1. *The Subjective Spirit*

Spirit is the truth of nature, the resolution of its alienated outwardness, the attainment to identity with self. Its nature, then, is : formally, freedom, or the capability of abstracting from everything; materially, the power to reveal itself as spirit, as conscious reason, to erect a structure of objective rationality, to assume for its domain the universe of mind. But, in order to know itself as reason and all reason, in order to render nature more and more negative, spirit has at the same time, in a similar way to nature, a series of grades to describe, a series of liberating acts to perform. Proceeding from nature, from the externality of which it wrests itself into independency, it is in the first instance *Soul*, or natural spirit, and, as such, the object of *Anthropology* in the narrower sense. As this natural spirit it lives the universal planetary life that is the common condition; and is in subjection, consequently, to the difference of climates, to the vicissitudes of the seasons, and the changes of the day. It is submitted also to the influence of geographical position, and must accept the peculiarities of race. Again, it undergoes the modification of national type, and is affected by the way of living and the bodily form. These natural conditions, moreover, exercise a control also over the intellectual and moral character. Lastly, there must be considered here the natural peculiarity of the individual subject, in disposition,

temperament, character, family idiosyncrasy, etc. To these we must add, too, the natural variations of age, sex, sleep, etc. Spirit everywhere here is still absorbed in nature, and this intermediate condition between sleep in nature and individuality is Sensation, the blind groping of the spirit in its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. A higher stage of sensation is Feeling, sensibility, as it were sensation into self, in which the individuality of self appears. Feeling, in its perfected form, is the feeling of self (self-possession). The feeling of self, inasmuch as the subject of it is at once absorbed into the speciality of his own sensations, and collected within himself as subjective unit, constitutes the first step to Consciousness. The ego appears now as the pit in which the various sensations, perceptions, conceptions, ideas, are put away—the ego that is present with them all, that is the centre in which they all concur. Spirit, as conscious, as conscious individuality, as ego, is the object of the *Phenomenology* of consciousness (which, in smaller compass, reappears here as intermediate between anthropology and psychology).

Spirit was an individuum so long as it was interwoven with nature; when it has stripped off nature it is consciousness, or an ego. Distinguishing itself from nature, it has retired consequently into its own self; and that with which it was previously identified, what was its own (telluric, national, etc.) speciality, confronts it now as its external world (earth, nation, etc.). The awakening of the ego, therefore, is the creative act of objectivity as such; and, conversely, only by reference to objectivity, and as opposed to objectivity, is it that the ego, in conscious subjectivity, does awake. The ego, thus in front of objectivity, is consciousness in the narrower sense of the word. Consciousness becomes Self-consciousness by rising through the successive steps of immediate sensuous Opinion, Perception (*Wahrnehmung*), and Understanding, to the pure thought of personality, to knowledge of itself as the free ego. Self-consciousness, again, becomes the Universal of Rational Self-consciousness in this way, that in consequence of its endeavours to appropriate objectivity and obtain recognition as a free

subject, it falls into conflict with other self-consciousnesses, enters thus into a war of extermination with them, but, out of this *bellum omnium contra omnes* (the violent beginning of the State), emerges in the end as a common consciousness that has found the due mean between despotism and servitude, that is to say, as the veritably universal, rational self-consciousness. Rational self-consciousness, no longer negatively selfish towards its neighbour, but acknowledging the identity of this neighbour with itself, is actually free; it has itself in its neighbour present to itself, and has burst asunder the limitation to its own natural egoism. Now that it has subdued the nature and subjectivity in its ownself, we have spirit as spirit; and as such it is the object of *Psychology*.

Spirit here is first of all Theoretical spirit or Intelligence, and then Practical spirit or Will. It is theoretical, as relating itself to the rational object as something given, and as exhibiting it as *its*; practical, as freeing from the one sided form of subjectivity, and converting into objectivity, the subjectivized theoretical matter (truth) which it now holds and directly wills as its own. The practical, so far, is the truth of the theoretical spirit. The theoretical on its way to the practical spirit describes the stages of Perception (*Anschauung*), Conception, and Thought. Will, for its part, again, through Appetite, Desire, and Passion, reaches Free-will. The existence of free-will is *Objective Spirit*,—civil and political institutes, the State. In rights, morals, politics, freedom is realized—the rational will brought into external objectivity, into existence in real universal forms of life (institutions),—reason or the idea of the Good made actual. All the instincts and motives of nature return now moralized and established as ethical institutes, as Rights and Duties (the sexual instinct as Marriage and Family, the instinct of revenge as legal Penalty, etc.)

2. *The Objective Spirit*

(a) The immediate existence of free-will, free will as actual and as actually and universally (legally) recognised in its free-

dom, is *Legal Right*. The individual, so far as he is capable of rights, so far as he possesses and exercises rights, is a Person. The rule of right, then, is, Be a person and respect others as persons.

As a person man gives himself an external sphere of freedom, a substrate in regard to which he may realize his will : *Property*, Possession. As a person I have the right of property, the absolute right of appropriation, the right to set my will on everything, which thereby becomes mine. But I have equally the right to dispossess myself of my property in favour of another person. This is effected in the sphere of right by *Contract*, and in it is freedom, liberty of disposal in regard to property, first perfectly realized. The relation of contract is the first step to the State, only the *first* step, however; for to define the State as contract of all with all is to degrade it into the category of private right and private property. It depends not on the will of the individual whether he shall live in the State or not. The relation of contract concerns private property. In contract as voluntary agreement there lies the possibility of the subjective will individualizing itself against right in itself or the universal will, the division of the two wills is Wrong (civil wrong—delinquency, fraud, crime). This division demands a reconciliation, a restoration of right or of the universal will as against its temporary sublation or negation occasioned by the particular will. The right that thus restores itself as against the particular will, the negation of wrong, is penalty (punishment). Theories that found the right of penalty on purposes to prevent, deter, intimidate, or correct, mistake the nature of penalty. Prevention, intimidation, etc., are finite ends, *i.e.*, mere means, and these, too, uncertain means. But an act of justice cannot be degraded into any mere means : justice is not exercised, in order that anything but itself be attained and realized. The fulfilment and self-manifestation of justice is an absolute end, an end unto its own self. The special considerations which have been mentioned can come to be discussed only in reference to the modality of the penalty. The penalty which is realized in the person of a criminal is *his* right, *his* rea-

son, *his* law, under which, then, he is justly subsumed. His act falls on his own head. Hegel defends even capital punishments, then, the repeal of which appears to him untimely sentimentality.

(b) The antithesis of the universal and the particular will transferred within the subject, constitutes *Morality*. In morality the freedom of the will develops itself into the spontaneity of the subject; it is the negation of the externality of the legal element; it is will gone into its own self, and determining its own acts by reference to specific purposes, and its own conviction in regard to right and duty. The position of morality is the right of subjective will, of free ethical decision, the position of conscience. In right proper the consideration was not of my principle or design, but now there occurs question of the motive of will, of the intention. Hegel calls this position of moral reflection, of action conditioned by a reference to motives and duty,—*Morality*, in contradistinction to *Sittlichkeit*, or substantial observance. This position has three moments: (1) The moment of the Purpose, so far as only the internal state of knowledge and will on the part of the agent comes into consideration,—so far as I accept the responsibility of an act only to the extent that the result is chargeable to my knowledge and will (imputation); (2) The moment of Motive and the gratification of one's own subjective sense of the right, so far as I recognise as mine not only the purpose but the motive of the purpose, and so far as I possess the right to realize my convictions, and to insist on consideration for my own well-being (this last is not simply to be sacrificed to abstract justice); (3) The moment of the Good, so far as it is to be expected that the subjective will (for the very reason that, reflected into itself, it is the deciding will) shall maintain its subjective ends in unity with the universal will. The Good is the union of the particular subjective will with the universal objective will, or with the notion of will; it is willed reason. Opposed to it is the Bad, the resistance of the subjective will to the universal, the attempt to make absolute its own individual self and self-will; it is willed unreason.

(c) In the sphere of morality, will and the good are still only abstractly related; the will as free is still possibility of the bad; the good, therefore, is as yet only a something that is or ought to be, it is not yet actual. Morality consequently is but a one-sided position. A higher position is that of established observance (*Sittlichkeit*), which is the concrete identity of will and the good. In it the good becomes a something actual : it obtains the form of ethical institutions within which the will dwells : in this manner the good becomes to consciousness a second nature, and morality is converted into character, into living principle, into the ethical spirit.

The ethical spirit is first immediate or existent in natural form, as Marriage and the Family. Three moments enter into marriage, which ought not to be separated, but which, nevertheless, are very often erroneously isolated. Marriage is : (1) A relation of sex, and rests on the difference of the sexes; the societary or institutional element in it is, that the subject, instead of being isolated, has his being in his natural universality, in his relation to the genus. (2) It is a relation of Right, particularly in the community of property. (3) It is a spiritual communion of love and confidence. Hegel, however, lays no great weight on this subjective moment of sentiment in the concluding of a marriage : in the life of matrimony mutual inclination will soon grow. It is more ethical that the intention to marry should constitute the beginning, and that the personal inclination should be allowed to follow. For marriage is proximately a duty. Hegel, therefore, would have divorce made as difficult as possible. For the rest Hegel develops and describes the being of the family with deep ethical feeling.

The family in enlarging into a plurality of families grows into civil society, the members of which, although independent and individual, are associated into unity by their wants, by the external ordinances of police, and by the establishment of law and authority generally for the protection of person and property. Hegel distinguishes civil society from the State in dis-

agreement with the majority of Publicists, who, in regarding the security of property and personal freedom as the principal purpose of the State, reduce the latter to a mere municipality. But from the principle of municipal association (civil society), union from mutual necessities, and for the preservation of natural rights, war is not intelligible. On the platform of municipal (civil) society, each is for himself, independent, an end unto himself. All else is for him means only. The State, on the contrary, knows not independent individuals, each of whom contemplates and pursues only his own advantage: in the State the whole is the end, and the individual the means. For the administration of justice, Hegel, in contrast to those who refuse to our days the function of legislation, demands written, intelligible, and universally accessible laws; and, in addition, as regards the exercise of judicial authority, open courts and trial by jury. As concerns the organization of civil society, Hegel manifests a decided preference for corporate life. Marriage-sanctity, and honour in the corporations—these, he says, are the two moments, with which the disorganization of society connects itself.

The interests of the individual subsuming themselves into the idea of an ethical whole, the municipality passes into the State. The State is the actuality of the Ethical Idea, the Ethical Spirit as it controls the action and knowledge of the individuals that are contained in it. The various States themselves finally, entering as individuals into a mutual relation of attraction or repulsion, display in their destiny, in their rise and in their fall, the process of *Universal History*.

In his conception of the State, Hegel has a decided leaning to the ancient political idea which completely subordinates the individual, the right of subjectivity, to the will of the State. The omnipotence of the State in its antique sense—this, before all, is held fast by Hegel. Hence his aversion to modern liberalism, to the claims, criticisms, and pretensions to know better on the part of individuals. The State to him is the rational ethical substance, within which the life of the individual must find itself,—it is existent reason to which the subject must with

free vision adapt himself. The best constitutional form Hegel holds to be a limited monarchy, as exemplified in the English constitution; to which Hegel especially leant, and which he doubtless had in view in his famous phrase *The king is the dot on the i*. An individual is required, thought Hegel, who shall say yes, who shall prefix an 'I will' to the decrees of the State, who shall be, as it were, the point of formal decision. 'The personality of the State', he says, 'is only actual as a person, a monarch.' Hegel advocated, therefore, the hereditary monarchy. But he places at its side, as mediating element between the people and the prince, the various orders of the privileged classes—not indeed for the control or restriction of the government, not for the preservation of the rights of the people, but only in order that the people may understand that the government is being well carried on, that the consciousness of the people may participate in it, that the State may enter into the subjective consciousness of the people.

The various states and the individual national spirits lapse into the flood of *Universal History*. The conflict, the triumph and defeat of the various national spirits, the transition of the universal spirit from one people to another—this is the thesis of *Universal History*. The evolution of universal history is usually connected with a dominant people, in whom dwells the universal spirit, correspondently developed, and as against which the spirits of the other peoples are without right. Thus the spirits of the peoples encompass the throne of the absolute Spirit as witness and ornaments of the glory, and as co-operating to the realization, of the latter.

3. *The Absolute Spirit*

Spirit is *absolute*, so far as it has returned from the sphere of objectivity into itself, into the ideality of cognition, into the perception of the absolute idea as the truth of all being. The subjugation of natural subjectivity by means of ethical and political observance is the path by which spirit ascends to this pure freedom, to the knowledge of its ideal substance as the

Absolute. The first stage of the absolute spirit is *Art*, the immediate view of the idea in objective actuality; the second, *Religion*, the certainty of the idea as what is above all immediate reality, as the absolute power of being, predominant over all that is individual and finite; the third, *Philosophy*, the unity of the two first, the knowing of the idea as the absolute that is no less pure thought than immediately all-existent reality.

(a) *Art*—The absolute is immediately present to sensuous perception in the beautiful or in art. The beautiful is the shining of the idea through a sensuous medium (stone, colour, sound, verse), the realization of the idea in the form of a finite manifestation. To the beautiful (and its sub-species the beautiful as such, the sublime, and the ludicrous) there always belong two factors, the thought and the material; but both are inseparably together; the material expresses nothing but the thought that animates and illuminates it, and of this thought it is only the external manifestation. The various forms of art depend on the various combinations that take place between the matter and the form. In the *symbolical* form of art, matter predominates; the thought struggles through it only with pain and difficulty in order to bring the ideal into manifestation. In the *classical* form of art, the ideal has conquered its adequate existence in the material : form and matter are mutually absolutely commensurate. Where finally spirit predominates, and the matter is reduced to a mere sign and show, through and beyond which the spirit ever breaks and struggles further—here we have the *romantic* form of art. The system of the individual arts coheres also with these varieties of form in art generally, but difference in the former is proximately conditioned by difference in the material. (1) The beginning of art is *Architecture*. It belongs essentially to the symbolical form, the sensuous material being greatly in excess in its case, and the true adequacy of form and matter being still to seek. Its material is stone arranged in obedience to the laws of gravitation. Hence the character that belongs to it of mass and massiveness, of silent gravity, of oriental sublimity. After *Architecture* comes (2) *Sculpture*, still in subjection, indeed,

to a stiff and unyielding material, but an advance, nevertheless, from the inorganic to the organic. Forming it into body, it converts the matter into a mere vehicle simply ancillary. In representing body, this building of the soul, in its beauty and purity, the material completely disappears into the ideal; not a remnant of the crasser element is left that is not in service to the idea. Nevertheless the life of the soul, feeling, mood, glance—these are beyond sculpture. The romantic art, κατ' ἐξοχήν, (3) *Painting* is alone equal to them. Its medium is no longer a coarse material substrate but the coloured plane, the spiritual play of light; it produces only the show of solid dimension. Hence it is capable of expressing the whole scale of feelings, moods, and actions—actions full of dramatical movement. The perfect sublation of space, however, is (4) *Music*. Its material is tone, the inner trembling of a sonorous body. Music quits consequently the world of sensuous perceptions and acts exclusively on inner emotion. Its seat is the womb and the well of the emotional soul whose movement is within itself. Music is the most subjective of arts. But the tongue of art is loosened at last only in (5) *Poetry* or the literary art; poetry has the privilege of universal expression. Its material is no longer sound simply, but sound as speech, sound as the world, the sign of an idea, the expression of reason. Poetry shapes not this material, however, in complete freedom, but in obedience to certain rhythmico-musical laws of verse. All other arts returns in poetry; the plastic arts in the epos which is the large complacent narrative of picturesque national events; music in the ode which is the lyrical expression of the inmost soul; the unity of both in the drama, which exhibits the conflict of individuals, absorbed in the interests of opposing sides.

(b) *Religion*—Poetry forms the transition of art into religion. In art the idea was present for perception, in religion it is present for conception. The burthen of all religion is the inward exaltation of the soul to the Absolute as the all-comprehending, all-reconciling substance of existence, the knowing of himself on the part of the subject as in unity with God. All religions seek unity of the divine and human. The

rudest attempts in this direction occur (1) in the natural religions of the East. God in them is still natural power, natural substance, before which the finite, the individual, disappears as a nullity. A loftier idea of God we find (2) in the religions of spiritual individuality, in which the divine is regarded as subject,—as sublime subjectivity full of wisdom and might in Judaism, the religion of sublimity; as galaxy of plastic divine forms in the Greek religion, the religion of beauty; as absolute political purpose in the Roman religion, the religion of the understanding or of expediency (means to an end). Positive reconciliation of God and the world is only attained at last, however, (3) in the Revealed or Christian religion, which, in the person of Christ, contemplates the God-Man, the realized unity of the Divine and the human, and apprehends God as the self-externalizing (self-incarnating) idea that from this externalization eternally returns into itself,—that is to say, as the Tri-une God. The spiritual import, therefore, of the Revealed or Christian Religion is the same as that of the Speculative Philosophy, only that it is expressed there in the mode of conception, in the form of a history, here in the mode of the notion. But with abstraction from the form of religious conception, we have the position of the

(c) *Absolute Philosophy*, of thought that knows itself as all truth, that reproduces from itself the entire natural and spiritual universe,—that thought the evolution of which is precisely the system of Philosophy—a sphere of spheres self-closed.

With Schelling and Hegel the history of philosophy ends. The succeeding efforts, partly to advance the previous idealism, partly to find new principles, belong to the present, and not yet to history

